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IT has become  customary,  within  the last few 
years, to apply to all kinds of  industrial  combina- 
tions  and coalitions indiscriminately the name  of 
~6trusts." This  is  very significant;  for  it shows 
that the public has unconsciously recognized  that, 
though  different  in their form  and sometiriles  in 
their temporary  aims,  all these attempts at com- 
bination are but manifestations of  one underlying 
tendency.  While theorists still discuss the advis- 
ability, lawyers attack the legality, and politicians 
doubt the constitutionality of  the principle of  com- 
bination,  we  learn  daily of  the formation  of  new 
combines  throughout  the  civilized  world.  This 
seems  somewhat  to  discredit  the  cheerful hope- 
fulness of  the believers  in the orthodox teaching 
that combinations are nothing but temporary aber- 
rations  from  the natural law of  free  competition. 
At the same  time it becomes  evident  that  mere 
legal prohibition has proved  neither successful nor 
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productive of  any satisfactory  results.  Men  who 
were  among the strongest opponents of  all sorts 
of  combinations  a  few  years  ago  now  officially 
admit  them to be  in  certain instances the lesser 
evi1.l 
But the way in which the discussion has, up to 
this time,  been  carried  on  before  the public  can 
hardly be  said  to have  done  justice  to the ques- 
tion  as  a  whole.  Very  few  of  the  numberless 
writers on trusts have  attempted to treat the sub- 
ject  from a  more  general and independent stand- 
point.  Their  views,  as will  be  shown  later  on, 
have been niostly dictated by theoretical reasoning, 
self-interest, or desire for popularity. 
It must  certainly be disappointing to the theo- 
rist, who  reasons  from  transcendental  principles, 
to wake up one day to find that he is left alone in 
the field, and that events have taken a somewhat 
different  direction  from  that which  he  thought 
would  be  their natural  course.  He will discover 
1 The present  railroad  commissioner of  Texas, Mr.  Regan, 
to whose  endeavours, when in the House of  Representatives  in 
1886, the anti-pooling clause of  the Interstate Commerce Law 
was mainly due, has recently admitted in his official report that 
thorough investigation has taught him the advisability  of  rail- 
way pools under certain restrictions in the interest of  all parties 
concerned.  (Report of  the Interstate Cornmerce  Commission, 
1802, p. 61.) INTRODUCTION.  xi 
by  and by  that  theories  can  be  based  only  on 
the amplest  knowledge of  the facts  of  economic 
life and of  their historical  development.  On the 
contrary,  the  discussion  that  has  taken  place 
has already passed judgment on laissex *faire.  Ad- 
vocates  of  this  principle  certainly fall into their 
own  trap  when  they  cry  out  for  restrictions 
against things that have ilaturally developed, and 
for  state interference to secure  b4 the unhindered 
working of  natural forces." 
The right of  the public  to look into the affairs 
of  the combinations,  although it has  been  gener- 
ally  acknowledged,  has  been  qu3stioned  by  the 
parties immediately concerned.  Yet, as Schmoller 
says,  "they  must  be  reminded  that they are not 
violets that may blush unseen." 
To leave  the investigation, discussion, and set- 
tlement of  the trust problem in the hands of  pol- 
iticians  does  not seem  to have proved  a  success 
in  the  United  States.  In other  countries  it is 
regarded  as  one  of  the  chief  duties  of  political 
economists  to  make  themselves  the foremost  ex- 
perts on the facts of  economic life and conditions. 
Their advice is more and more sought where there 
seems to be  danger that party politics and se1f:in- 
terest may lead people  to a one-sided view.  This 
gives  them  a  most  important  mission  under  a xii  INTRODUCTION. 
system of  popular  government, and has removed, 
to a  great extent,  the prejudice  existing against 
economists and economic science i11  general, -  the 
prejudice  which  was  expressed,  for  instance,  in 
an answer made  by the Saxon government at the 
beginning of  this century.  An applicatiorl to have 
a chair of  political economy established at  the Uni- 
versity of  Leipzig was declined on the ground that 
this would  be  a  useless  expense, as  the political 
economist  taught things  that were  not true, and 
theories that had no application to real life. 
In Germany, since the beginning of  the sixties, 
economists  and other  leading public  men,  aware 
of  their duty of  influencing public  opinion,  have 
established  associations  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
cussing the economic questions of  the day.  It has 
become  custon~ary  to prepare volumes  of  reports 
which  should  give  the  members  of  the associa- 
tions, as well as the public  at large, the most reli- 
able  information  about  the  facts  concerned.  In 
earlier  days  the  Volkswirthschaftliche Vereini- 
gung" was  of  the foremost  importance,  and the 
discussions and opinions of  its members had a far- 
reaching  influence in the abolition  of  guilds, the 
inti.oduction  of  free  migration,  currency reform, 
and commercial policy.  Its standpoint was  some- 
thing  like  that  of  the  Cobden  Club.  When, in INTBODUCTION.  xiii 
the seventies, a reaction was felt against the older 
school and the policy which it advocated, 
and  when  it appeared  that llenceforth the social 
question  would  deinand  the  chief  part  of  public 
attention, the Lb Verein fur Social-Politik " was  es- 
tablished (1872).  Its influence steadily increased, 
so that withi11 about ten years it took  the place  of 
the older society.  A series of  fifty-eight volumes of 
reports  and  proceedings, covering many questions 
of  the day, had  been  already published, when, in 
the year 1892, the board of  the association decided 
to take up as  the next.subject  "1ndustri:zl  Com- 
binations " in  all Eountries.  Among  others,  the 
author, then  in Chicago,  was  requested,  in May, 
1893,  to  take  part in the preparation  of  the  re- 
port, and the United  States were  assigned to him. 
After some  eight months  of  investigation  he was 
able to submit a paper, which has since been printed 
in Volume LIX.  of  their publications. 
The present book  is  not  a  mere translation  of 
this  essay.  A  great  deal  of  material  has  been 
omitted,  which,  though necessary  to the German 
reader,  dealt  with  subjects  which  have,  of  late, 
been sufficiently discussed in the United States and 
England ;  such as the railway problenl  and a  pzrt 
of the legal history of  the trust question.  On the 
other hand, a great deal of  the remainder has been xiv  INTRODUCTION. 
rearranged and rewritten, and much  further infor- 
mation  added.  The  most  recent  literature  has 
been  taken notice  of, especially  the very interest- 
ing essay by Professor  Jenks in  the Political Sci- 
ence Quarterly for Septeiilber, 1891. 
A11  economist is entitled to take a definite atti- 
tude towards the subject he  deals with, after hav- 
ing investigated  it carefully.  He is  entitled  to 
make  his  book  a  programme  of  his  convictions; 
but it seems  indispensable  that he  should try  to 
do justice  as fully as possible  to all interests con- 
cerned, and make his work neither  a  blind eulogy 
nor an acrimonious pamphlet.1 
The principles  of  perspective  may easily apply 
to  the  intellectual  eye,  just  as  they  do  to  the 
physical, -  enlarge  the near  and  prominent,  and 
make the background seem small.  According to 
the  different  tastes  and party  affiliations  of  the 
observer, he will endeavour to draw the picture as 
he  sees it or wants  it to be  seen, adjusting  the 
focus  to group  the  lights and shadows  so  as  to 
harnionize with his particular purpose. 
If, however, one wishes  to obtain an unbiassed 
1 The latter objection must be  raised  against  H. D. Lloyd's 
'L  Wealth  against  Commonwealth,"  which  loses  considerable 
part of  its value by  not even attempting to present the facts 
on both sides. INTRODUCTION.  XV 
impression, one has to proceed mathematically, and 
to attempt  a  determination  of  the  relation  be- 
tween the parts and the whole.  For that purpose 
an analytical division  into the several elements is 
necessary ;  and then, by re-combining  the various 
parts  of  the problem,  we  may  hope  to put  our- 
selves  in  a  position  to judge  the phenomenon as 
a \Thole.  Let us ask, then, what are the inherent 
tendencies  of  the  general  development ?  What 
the product  of  a  local and temporary situation? 
What  of  accidental  and  individual  influences? 
These  questions  must suggest  the outlines  of  an 
analytical inquiry. 
There are, accordingly, four preliminary matters 
to be considered. 
1.  The general economic  development,  which, 
growing  out of  the past,  influences  and is influ- 
enced  by the present, and f~xrnishes  the basis for 
the conditions of  the future, themselves changing 
in their turn. 
2.  The national character, to which it  is  due 
that  phenomena  differ  from  place. to place,  al- 
though the general  features  of  the development 
are similar. 
This largely conditions 
3.  Legal  relations,  which  determine  the  form 
of  the  new  phenomena,  uilless  they  are  strong xvi  INTRODUCTION. 
enough to break them down and create new ones 
for themselves. 
4.  Then there  are,  lastly,  the purely "subjec- 
tive"  influences,  the  chance  concurrence of  cir- 
cumstances, the presence  or absence of  particular 
iadividuals,  which  give  their  colour  to  events. 
These are usually put in the foreground, and are 
o111y too likely  to have an undue influence upon 
our judgment  by misleading  us  as to the relative 
importance of  things. 
In his  investigation  the  author has been  sup- 
plied with much valuable information by all parties 
interested in this question.  These  personal  expe- 
riences,  combined  with  the contents of  the books 
referred  to in the bibliography,  Appendix  XVI., 
have  furnished the materials of  the sketch.  The 
author  avails  himself  of  the  opportunity,  with 
very great pleasure,  to express  his  thanks to all 
the statesmen, economists, trust-presidents  and at- 
torneys, labour-leaders, financiers,  merchants, and 
lawyers  who  have  supported  him  in  his  task. 
Besides,  he  feels  especially  obliged  to Professor 
W. J. Ashley, who has been so very kind as to  read 
the  proof-sheets  and remove  the numerous  Ger- 
manisms of  the manuscript. 
BOSTON,  January, 1895. TRUSTS 
INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS  AND  COALITIONS 
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
CHAPTER  I. 
EARLIER  PUBLIC  POLICY  AS TO  COMT3INATIONS. 
IN the United  States  the question  of  combi- 
nations presents a different  appearance  from that 
which it has in Europe, where  guilds and corpor- 
ations  have,  from  time  immemorial,  been  leg.,d 
institutions.  Not  before  the  great  industrial 
changes  in  the  first  half  of  our  century -in 
some  countries not till  1867  1-  were  they abol- 
ished.  And this  was  at the time  the necessary 
condition  for econoinic  progress. 
The constitution of  the United States, and the 
English law, in the shape in which it  was adopted 
at  the  time of  the separation  from the  mother 
In  certain  states of  Germany  the  "Gewerbeordnung  des 
Norddeutschen Bundes "  abol~slied  artmans' guilds. 
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country,  did  not  recognize  guilds and combina- 
tions.  The old  English  law  of  the  eighteenth 
century abhorred  monopolies  and  agreements to 
control  or  restrict  the  production  and  sale  of 
goods,  or  in  any  way  to enhance  prices.]  The 
Constitution  aimed  at securing  equal  personal 
rights for every one, and at prohibiting whatever 
might be  attempted to cripple them, or to inter- 
fere wit11  the free transaction  of  lawful  private 
business.  It  was  drawn up in the  time  of  the 
complete predominance of  the "physiocratic"  doc- 
trines of  natural rights, and the rise of  the laissez 
faire  theory.  These -ideas  penitrated  the  first 
rulers of  the United States; to this their actions 
bore  witness.  In the first  half  of  the century, 
the physiocratic  principles  permeated  the  whole 
of  American public life.  They seemed to be con- 
firmed  by  experience.  Experiments  with  state 
ownership  of  banks and railroads,  almost  every 
extension  of  public  activity,  turned  out  disas- 
trously.  A belief  in the blessings of  a  minimum 
of  government, and a disinclination for the inter- 
ference  of  society  with  the  sphere  of  the indi- 
vidual,  was  more  widely  diffused  than  in  any 
other  country.  To forbid  as little as possible, 
1 Coke,  On Monopolies." EARLIER  PUBLIC  POLICY.  3 
and to regard  what mas  not forbidden as silently 
permitted,  to  consider  a  right  once  granted  as 
irrevocable : these  were  the  principles  on which 
public  opinion  was  built.  The  device  of  free 
competition partook, in the eyes of  the people, of 
the  character  of  ttn  eternal  holy  truth,  remote 
from  the  influence  of  time  and  economic  con- 
ditions.  Whoever  disregarded  it  mas  eo  iyso 
wrong ; his actions were "  against public policy." 
And  for some tiine,  public  opinion  seemed to 
be justified.  For, what the energetic children of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  with  their  inborn  sense 
of  individuality,  active  strength,  and  econoinic 
ability,  achieved  by free self-conscious labour,  is 
most remarkable.  Advancing the work  of  civili- 
zation  from  place  to place,  the individual, look- 
ing out merely  for his own self-interest,  brcught 
about a gain for the commuaity;  especially since 
a  steady  stream  of  emigration  rejuvenated  the 
country's  blood,  kept the people  informed  about 
European progress in invention and thought, and 
provided  ample fields  for the wants of  fresh pro- 
ductive labour.  If a town was overcro\vded with 
tailors  or  shoemakers  or  smiths,  these  availed 
themselves of  the opportunity of  western  expedi- 
tion~,  to seek new homes  where they were sure to 
find a profitable and growing trade. 4  INDUSTRIAL  CO3LBINATIONS. 
The building of  railroads in the eastern states 
seemed still further to brighten the prospect.  By 
improved  means  of  transportation,  artisans were 
enabled  to largely  extend  their field  of  trans- 
actions,  and, at the  saine  time,  by the  gradual 
introduction of  machinery, their scale of  produc- 
tion.  They become manufacturers. 
But with the extension  of  the railway  system 
a new problem arose.  Centres of  production grew 
up,  which  very soon  destroyed  local  industries, 
and acquired control of  the supply of  vast terri- 
tories.  Consequently, that paragraph of  the con- 
stitution  which  vests  in  Congress the power  of 
regulating interstate  conlinerce  became  of  unex- 
pected importance. 
In all his undertakings the American is an en- 
thusiast.  In this case, also, he took a very opti- 
mistic view.  Wit11  that zeal  which  accoinpanies 
him throughout, he set up manufactories wherever 
the conditions  seemed  fairly favourable.  About 
his neiglibour's  doings he did not trouble himself. 
All over  the country there is  a  peculiar  ten- 
dency to generalize and to jump  at far-reaching 
conclusions, -  a tendency  which  the  geographer 
Ratzel has so brilliantly explained by the physical 
conditions of  the country with its boundless areas 
and  magnificent  distances.  It  is  the  necessary EARLIER  PUBLIC  POLICY.  5 
counterpart to the  American  spirit of  specializa- 
tion  and  adaptability  to  given  circumstances. 
Therefore,  the general  belief  was  that the true 
public  welfare  depends  up011  a  continuous  in- 
crease of  production, aiid upon a utilization of  all 
natural resources to the utlllost of  teclinical possi- 
bility.  "The  more  we  produce, the cheaper we 
can  sell ;  the larger,  therefore, the consumption. 
~11  increase in the demand  provides  more  hands 
with ~vork,  with higher wages,  and conseque~ltly 
results in a further rise in the consumi~ig  capacity 
of  the nation ;  and this again leads to a further 
opportunity for extension of  production,"  and so 
forth.  Similar ideas were upheld in the courts of 
the coimtry.  They were  not  inclined  to follow 
the example given by the English Bench, which, in 
two well-known decisions, had extended the prin- 
ciple of  laissez faire so far as to remove the old re- 
strictions of  common law  upon combinatioils and 
upon  L'  forestalling, enhancing, regrating, and en- 
grossing."  From the clays of  adam Smith, who 
Most of  the older statutes, especially 5 and 6 Ed. VI. c. 14, 
had  already been  abolished  by  6  George I.  o. 18-28,  and 12 
George I. c. 71. 
IS.  C. 7'.  Dodd,  xL  Present Legal Status of  Trusts "  ; W.  W. 
Cook, lL  Treatise on Stock, Stockholders, and General Corpora- 
tion Law,"  3d  ed. ;  A. Abbott, ''  Condition  of  the Law as to 
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had compared "  the popular  fear of  forestalling " 
with  the popular  terrors of  witchcraft,"  public 
opillion  had  inevitably  gone  in  this  direction. 
Subsequently, in 1844, Parliament recognized  the 
altered conditions by abolishing definitely all re- 
strictive legislation  in this  direction,  except,  of 
course, the general restrictions of  coinmon law as 
to offences against p~~blic  policy. 
But in the United States tlie tendency of  public 
policy itself was different.  The democratic theory 
would not admit that the creation of  classes or of 
a firm economic  organization could in any case be 
beneficial.  And further, the lack of  governmental 
power aid  authority made the rise of  combinations 
a inucll greater menace to the fundamental demo- 
cratic policy.  Therefore the coilrts did not adopt 
the English precedents.  They upheld the validity 
of  the  unchanged  common  law  and  statutory 
restrictions ;  occasionally  even  of  some  repealed 
in England  before  the time  of  the  separation.1 
Yet,  of  course,  all  this incant a violation  of  the 
principle  of  Laissez  faire.  We  can  divide  the 
decisions  into four groups : 
1.  Cases where the parties to a combination had 
not fulfilled their  agreements  with  one  another. 
1  Bishop, "  On  Criminal Law,"  sec. 527. EARLIER  PUBLIC  POLICY.  7 
Bere the court declined to protect those who con- 
sidered  themselves  damaged thereby,  whether  it 
were that a member  sued the combination or the 
combinatioil  prosecuted  a member.  Agreements 
of this sort were declared illegal and void.  ''  Illegal 
do  not  exist  before  the  law;  the 
court leaves the parties where they are. "  1 
2.  Cases where a  party to a transaction  sought 
to have it annulled.  Here also, the court refused 
to interfere. 
3.  Cases  where  outsiders  felt  damaged  and 
brought  suit.  Here  the  combinations  were  de- 
clared illegal by the courts, and occasionally sum- 
moiled  to  dissolve ; but  this has  never  been  of 
much  practical  effect. 
4.  Cases where the public prosecutor proceeded 
in the name  of  the people  against  the combina- 
tion or the parties  coilstituting it.  As we  shall 
see later, such proceedings usually came to nothing. 
The decisions  of  earlier  date very  often refer 
to questions of  principle  in connection with  our 
prob:ein, and explicitly base  themselves  upon the 
above views ;  whilst, as will be seen, to-day most 
of  them avoid this carefully, and draw their argu- 
ments from formal points and questions of  fact. 
Cases  in 
642-51. 
Cook,  LL Stock, Stockholders, etc.,"  3d  ed., PP. 8  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
Before  the beginning  of  the war there  were 
not  yet  many  symptonls  in public  life  to  fore- 
shadow the great change  which,  in consequence 
of  a  new  econonlic  development,  was  bound  to 
make  its  appearance.  We only learn  of  a few 
attempts at combination,l  e.g.  in  the  anthracite 
coal  trade  of  Pennsylvania,  ill  the  telegraphic 
service,  and,  above  all,  in  the eastern  railroad 
business. 
1 ~Ypelpelling,  On Trusts and Monopolies." THE  CONDITION OF AFFAIRS.  9 
CHAPTER  11. 
THE  COXDITION  OF  AFFAIRS BEFORE THE  INTER- 
STATE-COMMERCE  LAW,  AND  THE  ANTI-TRUST 
LEGISLATION. 
THE  civil  war  closed  the first great period of 
Ullited  States  history.  Its result  secured  the 
of  political union and the equal status 
of  all its inhabitants.  The extension of  the rail- 
way system, within the next two decades, brought 
the  closer  tie  of  economic  union,  which  alone 
makes a  country a  state, by adding to the legal 
freedom of  trade the practical  possibility.  This 
second  period  came  to an  end soon  after  1880. 
Whatever railway building may be done in future 
between  the Mexican  and  the Canadian  Pacific, 
will be  intensive "  work after the "  extensive " is 
practically  completed. 
During the progress  of  railroad  building,  the 
manufacturers soon  became aware that the great 
hopes  of  the new  era would  not  all  be  realized. 
Everybody had increased his production, regard- 
less  of  the  needs  of  the market ; and whilst  he 
victoriously  entered  the  boundaries  of  distant 10  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
zones,  a  foreign  co~npetitor had  attacked  him 
within the range of  the domestic hearth. 
The crisis  all  over  the  world,  fro111  1873 to 
1877,  clearly  displayed  the  harmful  accompani- 
ments  of  nlodern  industrial  methods : suffering 
industries,  ailtl conlplaints  about over-production 
and  under-consumption.  Public  opillion  was 
startled;  and up to the present  it has not fully 
understood what are the reasolls and remedies  for 
that u~iexpected  result, and ~vlly,  ever  since, our 
entire  industrial  systeni  has  been  placed  under 
the strain of  a contiiluous excitement; long crises 
following each other with increasing rapidity after 
short periods of  temporary prosperity. 
Business  interests,  meanwhile,  tried to relieve 
thelllselves  in their  own  way.  The remedy was 
sought in combination, -a  realizatioil of  the re- 
mark  of  Steplienson :  "Where  combination  is 
possible, competition beconles  impossible,"  which 
President Andrews,'  fifty years later, expressed in 
the still more significant words: "  The day of  old- 
time competition has set.  Law or not law, capital 
will henceforth march nlostly in phalanxes." 
It was  but natural that business  men,  seeing 
that as individuals  they  were  powerless  against 
1 "Trusts accol.di~lg  to Official Investigations,"  p. 20. THE CONDITION  OF AFFAIRS.  11 
tried to meet  the danger by asso- 
ciating  in "Pools "; for they  could  not perceive 
any other way of  relief.  The law, however,  did 
llot  recognize the legality of  these unions.  There- 
fore the "Pools"  were  soon  found to be insuffi- 
cient.  It  was the genius of  J01111  D. Itockefeller 
which  suggested  a  new and more  promising sys- 
tem.  We may  rightly  ascribe  to  his  initiative 
the actual beginning of  the new period,  and the 
first steps towards an industrial reorganization. 
Tile  early history  of  the  Standard Oil combi- 
nation is ~~~OTVII  throughout the country.  Several 
public  investigatioils  have  brought  to light  the 
devices by which the poor  teamster, who in 1865 
started with a friend a small oil refinery, within a 
few years acquired  control of  the entire oil trade 
of tlie country.  He  was able to secure special rates 
of  transportation  with  the  help  of  some  bribed 
railroad  freight agents.  Soon he became power- 
ful  enough  to  dictate  arbitrary  terms  to  the 
railroads  through  the  "Southern  Improven~erit 
Company,"  and  when  this was  declared illegal, 
through  the  combination  of  the  several  state 
Standard Oil  companies.  The subsequent  build- 
illg of tlie pipe line system and the like, we do not 
need  to go into at this place.1 
'  See the different investigations, and, in the bibliography, the 12  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
The formal union mas  actually coinpleted with 
the establishine~it  of  the  Standard  Oil Trust in 
1882.1  But  this  was  a  mere  formality,  as  tlie 
trade was  already monopolized  long hef~re.~ 
The  apparent  success  of  the  Standard  Oil 
Trust gave a vigorous stimulus to the consolidat- 
ing movement.  A  number of  other trusts were 
formed on t,he same general lines,--  for the manu- 
facture of  sugar, whiskey, lead, cotton oil, linseed 
special references to the Standard Oil Company.  A  very good 
record of  the development of  the petroleum industry is given in 
the recent report of  the Bureau of  Statistics of  Pennsylvania: 
A. S. Bolles,  Petroleum, its Production axid Products,"  which 
of course does not merltio~l  the trust controversy. 
1 For  this see H. D. Lloyd ''  Wealth against Commonwealth," 
which is, however,  only a chroaique scundalezcse. 
2 Therefore Jenks'  criticisms  of  Aschrott do'not seem to me 
to be completely justified ;  the former attributes perhaps a little 
too much importance to the formality of  the establishment of  a 
uniform trust.  The prices were  already before  that time con- 
trolled by the Xockefeller interest.  As to other price statistics 
given by Jenks,  a  comparison  seems  to be  desirable with the 
prices of  the same articles and the raw materials  they consist 
of  in the markets of  other countries, where they are not manip- 
ulated, and with the entire movement  of  wholesale  prices  for 
other articles in the United States during the same period ; and 
even then the price question is rather doubtful, because the fig- 
ures as given in  the papers or published by the parties interested 
will  be  very  often found  quite misleading.  Managers of  the 
trusts have frequently told the author that the public statements 
do not always tally with  the actual transactions, and that the 
largest sales are made very often on quite different terms. THE  CONDITION  OF  AFFAIRS.  13 
oil,  starch, etc.  The securities  of  the  combines 
were  introduced on the  stock  exchanges.  Soon 
they wielded a powerful influence over the whole 
of  business.  But  their  appearance  was  by  no 
lneans universally loolied upon in a cheerful mood. 
Competitors,  who  either  had  not  been  able  to 
secure  admittance  under  satisfactory  ternis,  or 
had  not been willing  to give  up their  indepen- 
dence, and to entrust tlleir property and interests 
to the promoters of  the new schemes, arose every- 
where in opposition.  Producers of  raw materials, 
used  by the combinations,  felt uneasy, now  that 
they faced only one strong buyer instead of  many 
competitors  for  purchase.  Retailers  and  con- 
sumers felt the effect of  a new rkgime  in tlie sup- 
plies  of  certain  goods.  On  the  exclianges  the 
rapid increase of  huge quantities of  stocks, rather 
doubtful in their value, provoked a good  deal of 
distrust and anxiety.  The whole public was  dis- 
turbed by the iiicessant news of  "  deals " between 
combinations and railroad  companies,  legislators, 
and  even the judiciary. 
In railroad affairs, things had become so unbear- 
able  that in 1885  Congress  gave  up its former 
attitude of  non-interference with private matters. 
After two years of  investigation and deliberation, 
the Illterstate Cominerce  Act  was  passed.  The 14  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
facts in connection with this part of  the problem 
Lave  been  discussed  so  often  in  this  country 
within  recent  years,  that  there  is  hardly  any 
need  of  repeating them here.1  The two most im- 
portant points for our purpose in the law which 
was finally passed  are the prohibition of  all dis- 
criminating rates  and the forbidding  of  railway 
pooling, -  though  a  majority  of  the Senate was 
strongly opposed  to the latter clause. 
The interstate cornmerce  investigation revealed 
much that was new about tlie  character  and tac- 
tics of  the inclustrial combinations, ant1 led in con- 
sequence to denland for governmental action.  In 
the state of  New York, Tammany Hall established 
an anti-trust agitating committee, and in numer- 
ous addresses its leaders demanded energetic meas- 
ures against the fleecers of  the people. 
Newspapers daily devoted columns to  the gather- 
ing of  alleged  facts  about  trusts.  Tlle  latter 
had carefully avoided a publicatioll of  their deeds, 
and kept their  methods  and objects  in absolute 
darkness.  Even the certificate holders were not 
allowed  an inside view;  they did not know the 
text and meaning of  that agreement  upon which 
1  T7ide  the  publications of  Stickney, Hadl~y,  Congressional 
Documents in Con~iection  with  the Interstate Colnlnerce  Act, 
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the exchange of  their former stocks in the different 
companies for the new trust securities was based. 
In  the first edition of  his Trusts Cook gives a fair 
of  the general feeling as to  trusts, before 
detailed information was accessible.  He helps us 
to  understand  why the  resolutions of  the  New 
York Senate and of  the Federal House of  Repre- 
sentatives to create committees for an investigation 
into trusts met with the most hearty approval on 
the part of  the people. 
Their  principal results have  been  set forth in 
many  publications;  the  best  of  which  are  the 
article  of  President  Andrems  in  the  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  the  second  edition  of  Cook's 
Trusts, and the same author's CYorporation Problem.1 
A  storm  had  arisen  against  everything  that 
smelled  of  combination ; newspapers  and pam- 
phlets vied with each other in denounciilg them as 
the root  of  all the evil experiences  of  the  past. 
Vigorous cries were heard  for severe legislation. 
It has nevertheless been stated, with some appear- 
ance  of  justice,  that  not  all  the  parties  were 
equally sincere  in their  denunciations,  and that 
the  most  zealous  of  thein  were  not always  the 
J. W.  Jenks'  monograpll  on the early history and  growth 
of  the Whiskey Trust is to be noticed  as the best  monograph 
&bout  an individual trust. 16  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
best elements of  the community, and did not act 
from  mere unselfishness.  ''  Ward politicians  of 
the baser  sort have mostly been  noisiest  in their 
denunciations to make  something for themselves 
out of  them." 
'Numberless  bills  were  filed  with the different 
legislatures  during  the  next  few  years, -from 
three to five in every state.  They aimed  at for- 
bidding every kind of  combination or coalition for 
the purpose of  clleckillg competition, raising prices, 
ant1 so  forth.2  Eighteen of  them threatened the 
following puriisliments : 
Whosoever  acted against the provisions of  the 
laws should be  fined  from $5000  to $10,000, and 
imprisoned  from  five  to  ten  years.  Payments 
could  not be  collected  or  afterwards recovered. 
Directors of  a corporation  colnmitting  the above 
crimes, all stockholders, officers, agents, and attor- 
neys, should be guilty of  conspiracy and liable to 
imprisonment. 
1 C. F. Bench, Jr., "Facts  about  Trusts,"  Forum, Septem- 
ber, 1890, p. 70.  This remark does not seem unjustified; the 
author  learned  from  a perfectly reliable  source, that, in  the 
New  York  Senate investigation, one of  the  trusts was offered 
relief  from the  investigation  by  the secret payllient  of  $7500 
to Tammany Hall men. 
2 S. C. T.  Dodd,  LLShall  all  business  co-operatjon be  ren- 
dered criminal ? "  A statement of  pending legislation and its 
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with a  desire  to  achieve  popularity,  many 
legislatures  some  sort  of  bill.  By  the 
of  1894 the federal  government, twenty-two 
states  and one  territory,  had  enacted  anti-trust 
laws.  first  provision  in this direction  was 
introduced  into the  Constitution  of  Georgia  in 
1877 :  The  General  Assembly  shall  have  no 
power  to  authorize  any  corporation  to  make 
ally  contract  or  agreement  whatever  with  any 
(other)  corporation  which  may  have the effect, 
or  be  intended  to have  the  effect  to  defeat  or 
lessen  competition  in  their  respective  business, 
or to encourage monopoly ;  and all such contracts 
or agreements shall be illegal or void."  This was 
of  course  not  originally  directed  against  trusts 
but against  railroads,  but it could  afterwards be 
readily  applied  to trusts.  Anti-trust laws were 
passed in 1889 by Kansas, Maine, Michigan, i\lis- 
souri,  Nebraska,  N.  Carolina,  Tennessee,  Texas, 
and  the  territories  of  Idaho,  Montana,  and 
N. Dakota;  and the  new  states  of  Washington 
and Wyoming introduced provisions in this direc- 
tion into their  constitutions.  In 1890 anti-trust 
laws were  passed  by  Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, and S. Dakota.  In 1891 Kentucky and 
lllissouri  introduced  provisions  into  their  con- 
stitutions.  In the  same  year  Alabama,  Illinois, 
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Minnesota, and the territory of  New Mexico;  in 
1892  New  York  and  Wisconsin legislated  to a 
like effect ;  while in 1893 California forbade com- 
binations  in  live  stock,  Nebraska  in  coal  and 
lumber.  Amendments to these laws were passed 
in Missouri and Tennessee in 1891 ; Louisiana  in 
1892 ; Illinois,  Minnesota,  and  South Dakota  in 
1893.  The United States act was passed in 1891, 
and the Tariff  Act  of  August, 1894, inakes some 
general provisions of  the same character as to the 
regulation  of  prices.l  No  anti-trust  legislation 
was passed in 1894 in the several states. 
Before we  go  into  details,  an examination of 
the character of  the different forms of  organiza- 
tion seems advisable, because we shall see that the 
effects  of  legislation,  as far as there  have  been 
any, have been felt only on the surface. 
1 F. Il. Cooke, "  Economic and Anti-Economic Legislation." THE  FOBMS  OF  ORGANIZATION. 
CHAPTER  111. 
THE  FORMS  OP  ORGANIZATION. 
TEE United States have gradually become cov- 
ered  lvith  a  network  of  different  conlbiil  a  t'  ions 
and  These can be  grouped in various 
classes  correspollding  to their objects and ends. 
In view  of  the large  iluinber  of  species,  which 
in infinite variety adjust themselves to the special 
purposes  of  every case, we  can only consider  the 
principal  ones. 
I.  More or less amorphous. 
(a) Associations of  men who are interested in 
the same line of  business, for certain general pur- 
poses, without altering the conditions of  competi- 
tion,  i.e.  national, state,  or local  associatioils for 
the protection  of  special  interests.  Such are the 
"  Brewers7 National Convention," which occasion- 
ally collects money  to influence the elections, or 
to pacify the legislatures, -especially  when  un- 
favourable taxation or temperance laws are inlmi- 
nent.  Similar associatioils exist in all branches of 
the liquor  traffic, ainong the butchers (Butchers' National  Protective  Association),  the  bankers 
(Bankers'  National  Convention),  among  travel- 
ling  salesme~i,  hotel  men,  actors,  teachers,  etc. 
In some  instances  aid  and  invalid  funds,  life 
policies,  or  peilsioiis  for widows  anci  orphails are 
features of  the uiiiolls ; and these form an impor- 
tant part of  their prograinme whenever the wortis, 
"mutual,"  "protective,"  or  provident " occur in 
the title. 
(b)  Associations  in wliich  besides  the  above- 
mentioiled  features,  there  are  regulations  con- 
cerning  trade  custonls,  listings, and  quot  a  t'  ions, 
or scales of  prices.  Again, the brewing industry 
is very instructive.  In the year 1886, the brewers 
of  tlie  Northwest  entered  upoil  an  agreement 
as to the ilorlnal price of  beer,  aiid  concerning re- 
bates to tlze  trade.  They fixed  the prices  in the 
saloons.  In Cincinnati, at one time, they installed 
agents on common account, who opened bar-rooms 
to conipete with some  disobedient customers, and 
who sold beer  more  cheaply to the public,  with 
the  illtelltion  of  crushing  the  offenders.1  The 
Brewers' Associations of  Chicago and New York de- 
termine the kiiids and limitations of  rebates to be 
granted to retailers ;  they restrict those &'treating" 
1  Collection  of  newspaper  clippings  by  Mr.  H.  D.  Lloyd. 
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of  tile  drivers, ~vl~ich  were  custon~ary 
upoll  delivery  of  beer  at  the  restaurants;  they 
lilnit the presellts to customers, such as beer, ice- 
boxes,  pictures,  etc.;  pledge  themselves  to cut 
advertising,  and the like.  Allied  against 
them we  find in  New  York the "Wine,  Liquor, 
and  Beer  Dealers'  Central  Association."  It 
delllands  that  non-members  shall  not  be  ac- 
colnmodated by  the brewers.  When  they were 
disregarded, they started a co-operative establish- 
mellt  of  their  own,  the "  New  York  Consumers' 
Brewery." 
Much  more important for the whole  country is 
the centralizstioil  of  cattle and meat  dealing  in 
Chicago,  molnentous  enongh to justify  a  special 
iuvestigation  in 1889-90.  Though this did not 
reveal a forinal  union of  the large  Chicago pack- 
ers,  it was  demonstrated that heavy pressure  on 
the railroads and ownership of  the Chicago stock- 
yards on the one hand,  "friendly agreelnellts " on 
the  other, had  resalted  in an  effective  control 
of  the  whole  market.  Armour,  Swift,  Morris 
Nelson,  and Hammond  rule the cattle and  meat 
market  of  the  country.  They  conduct  their 
business  individually,  but  jointly  they  fix  the 
'  U. S. Senate Report, NO.  829,51st Congress, second session, 
May 1,1890. 2  2  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
prices  for  the purchases  of  cattle  and  sales of 
meat  in  the  markets  of  Chicago,  Kansas  City, 
and Omaha.  They annihilate independent butch- 
ers by cheaper  sales through their own agents. ' 
They determine the daily market price of  cattle. 
If  the seller  refuses  to take the first bid,  he  is 
generally  forced  to  accept  a  lower  one ; the 
purchasing agents are instructed  never to overbid 
each other.  The principals theiuselves are in con- 
stant communication with each other, and decide 
the evening before what shall be the tendency of 
the morrow's  market.  They have  an agreement 
not to interfere with each other in certain markets 
and localities.  They bid  jointly  for public  con- 
tracts, and ruin those who dare to appear  against 
them. 
There has been  much  talk  about  a  league  of 
the  same  sort in the milk trade2 of  New  York. 
An association of  milk wholesalers llas established 
a  so-called  Milk  Exchange ; aid, though  only 
joined  by  a  majority  of  the tradesmen, it estab- 
lishes  the  prices  for  the  entire  business.  The 
farmers in the neighloourhood  were unsuccessful 
in an attempt to resist  their alleged arbitrariness 
by means of  an association. 
1 Ibid. p. 6 ; LL Testimony,"  p. 481. 
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~h~ Exchanges of  the country are closed corpo- 
rations.  They regulate the standard of  quality of 
articles  dealt  in,  the admittance  of  securities to 
dealings  and listings, the terms of  payment, the 
forms of transaction, the methods of  clearing ; oc- 
casiollally they forbid certain practices, as recently 
the  arbitrage  business  at the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange.  Their  directors  (governors)  act as 
among members, and have jurisdiction 
as to their moral conduct in business1 
To this same  group belong,  in a  way,  physi- 
cians  and  lawyers.  They  serve  their  common 
interest  in  boards,  academies  of  medicine,  and 
associations of the bar.  They have general scales 
of  prices ;  their competition is limited by "  profes- 
sional courtesy";  and the lawyers sit in courts of 
honour in cases of  unprofessional conduct. 
(c) Associations where the parties hold regular 
meetings  to fix  prices,  and to decide  upon  the 
output, or appoint  common  agents to market the 
product.  This  has  for  many  years  been  cus- 
tomary with the coal trade.  The sales agents of 
the owners of  the  large  anthracite  mines  meet 
once a month at the Fifth Avenue  Hotel in New 
York, to fix prices, and'to allot the quota of  the 
See Rules and  Regulations of  the  various  Exchanges  in 
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output.1  Similar friendly agreements we  find  in 
the  railroad  business.2  All these  arrangements 
approach very near  to the second  class,  and are 
species of  the large genus, ''  Pool." 
11.  Agreements strengthelled by a more formal 
or material tie. 
(a) Sometimes the resolutions concerning out- 
put,  quantities  to be  marketed,  and  prices,  are 
verbally formulated and put in writing.  To this 
class belonged the contract between the petroleum 
refiners, or the "Standard  Oil. Company of  New 
York,"  acting  as  their  representative,  and  the 
"Oil  Producers'  Association,"  for  a  temporary 
restriction of  the oil production in 1887.3  Other 
instances are the numerous agreements among the 
wholesalers' associations concerning the minimum 
prices of  sales to retailem4 
(b)  Sometimes  the  ties  are made  closer  still 
by the institution of  penalties, or by the payment 
1 There have been various investigations of  the coal combines 
by the state of  Pennsylvania in 1833, 1858, 1871 ;  by the federal 
government in 1886,49th Congress, report 46, part 2 ;  in 1887- 
89, 60th Congress, second session, No.  4147 ;  in 1893, 52d Con- 
gress, second session, No. 2278. 
2  Cf. Reports of  the Interstate Commerce  Commission, sec- 
tions on classification. 
3 See U. S. House investigation on Standard Oil Trust, 1889, 
July 30. 
4 Andrews, "Trusts according to Official Investigation," p. 6. THE  FORBIS  OF  OILGANIZATION.  25 
of  a  of  the earnings into a  common  fund 
in order to secure the observation of  the agreement, 
or  for expenditure in the  common  interest,  and 
later redistribution in fixed percentages. 
AS to penalties, we have numerous reports from 
the iron industry, rail combines, and so on.1 
For  the  second  case,  the  envelope  industry 
furnishes an illustration.  The "Standard  Enve- 
lope Company"  of  Springfield, Rlass., is coinposed 
of  a  number  of  envelope  manufacturers  who 
produce  the  majority  of  all  envelopes  for  con- 
sumption of  the country; its only  powerful  conl- 
petitor being the IJnited States stamped envelope. 
Its c~~pital  is 85100.2  011  each thousand of  manu- 
factured  envelopes  every member  pays  into the 
company's  treasury  a  certain  sum  which  serves 
in  part  to buy out competition and acquire new 
patents,  and  is  in part  redistributed  according 
to  the  respective  holdings  in  the  company's 
stock.3 
(c)  In some cases, finally, the coalition is upheld 
by a system of  premiums.  The one party pledges 
itself  to buy only from the other, or to sell exelu- 
sively  to it; in compensation it receives  special 
l See the Iron Age, November 16, 1893, p.  880. 
New York state investigation. 
Ancl~ews,  p. 7, and ibid. 26  INDUSTKIAL  COMBLNATIOXS. 
rebates.  The "American  Tobacco Company "  has 
for a long while granted such rebates to the cigar- 
ette dealers.  The Whiskey Trust grants them at 
this  present  time  to  its  exclusive  customers.' 
Such  rebates  are  also  very  common  in life  and 
fire insurance. 
Again,  the  newspapers  of  the  country  have 
established  uniform  news  and  cable  service  by 
means  of  the "Associated  Press,"  the ''  United 
Press,"  and their southern  and western affiliated 
branches.  No  large  paper  can  exist  without 
their  accommodation, because  separate and inde- 
pendent  correspondence  would  be  too  costly. 
Consequently  the  associations  are  free  to  shut 
out  undesired  competitors  by  requiring  exor- 
bitant  initiation  fees  froin  new  applicants  for 
admission.  The German papers of  San Francisco 
a while  ago put  this  fee  for a new German daily 
at $80,000 ;  whereupon the projector had to give 
up  his  plans.  In that  city  the  Wrestern  Press 
Association alone holds full sway.  In New York 
several  companies  compete,  but  this  does  not 
influence  the fees very much. 
Herewith end the groups which may rightly be 
described as ''  Pools." 
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JII. Combil~ations  which  strive for  and attain 
identity of  all interests. 
(a) Cases  where  the individual  undertakings 
are  or  nomillally  preserved:  the  6L  Trusts 
proper." 
1.  Either the trust is established by a t4ransfer 
of a majority of  stock of  the different compaiiies to 
the trustees, in whom thereby the control is vested, 
and \vho issue trust certificates in exchange ; 
2.  Or the  total  amount  of  all  the  stocks  is 
transferred  to the  trustees,  who  issue  the trust 
certificates whilst  the former owners keep mort- 
gages  to  the  extent  of  the  valuatioil  of  their 
factories, and perhaps receive an additional bond; 
3.  Or  the  property  is  unconditionally  trans- 
ferred to the trustees, in return for the delivery of 
trust certificates. 
Under  2  caille  the former  "Whiskey  Trust," 
under  3  the "  Standard  Oil Trust."  The diver- 
gences between the three forms, which fundamen- 
tally rest  upon the same  principle, are  explained 
by the degree  of  coiifideilce  which  the  trustees 
enjoy.  Where  mortgages  are  given,  the  trust 
certificate represents only the good will. 
(b)  Cases (practically  differing little from the 
"  trusts "  ) where  the undertakings them- 
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1.  Temporarily,  by  lease  or  rent,  which  is 
quite  common  with  railroads,  and  also  happens 
in all other branched of  busiiless ; or 
2.  Permanently, 
a.  By  sale : a  trunk line buys a branch  line; 
one  concern  purchases  another,  and closes  it  or 
runs it as a branch ; 
p.  By complete  control through ownership of 
the stock ; 
y.  By  amalgamation:  as  the  Hecker-Jetvell- 
Jones  Milling  Company  in.  Brooklyn,  which 
evolved  from  three  separate  mills;  the  New 
York  Central and Hudson  River  Itailroad,  etc. 
6. By  establishment  of  a  new large  company 
tvhich  absorbs in itself all those already existing. 
Some are then operated entirely by the central ad- 
ministration.  To others a  certain  independence 
is left  for particular  branches or districts.  Still 
others are run as branch offices ; others again, -as 
all the establishmeilts  located  in different states, 
controlled by owilership of  the whole or a majority 
of  their stock, -;ire  managed  in one of  the forms 
described  above.  (1 and 2 a, P, y).  This last 
group contains the legal successors of  the indus- 
trial trusts, into which  the latter  have  been  re- 
cently  transformed. 
Both  in  number  and  comprehensiveness  the most  important, by  its control  of  entire classes 
of  industrial production  ancl  trade, is group Ill., 
wlricIl represents the last a11cl fir~a~l  phase of  national 
cel~tralizwtioll  for the control of particular brallches 
of industry.  It mealls complete union both finan- 
cial and technical in whole fields of  production. 30  INDUSTRIAL  COBIBINATIONS. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
THE  OBJECTS  OF  ORGANIZATION. 
OF the various kinds of  combination  classified 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  only  certain  groups 
need  here  be  considered.  They  are  those  in 
which the individual  unctertakings  are influenced 
materially  by  their  con~lection  with  the  combi- 
nation: in which quantity of  production, or prices 
with  reference  to the  scale  of  actual  earnings, 
are the objects of  the agreement. 
I.  Natural monopolies.  There are comniodities 
which  only exist  in quantities locally limited, or 
are  manufactured  from  materials  so  limited. 
The ownership of  certain  territories,  therefore, 
or the purchase of  their products, can  easily con- 
fer a controlling  power upon  certain individuals. 
The attempts tit  cornbination  in  the production 
of  raw  materials  are still to a  great extent em- 
bryonic;  among  these  may  be  reckoned  the 
Rockefeller  interests  which  seek  to  monopolize 
the mining regions of  Lake Superior.  Generally 
iron ore is  found in too many places, and in too THE OBJECTS  OF  ORGANIZATION.  3 1 
various  forms, even to offer a chance for prelim- 
inary steps in this direction. 
The same is true of  bituminous  coal.  A  very 
rough  uuderstandi~lg  about the  quantities  to be 
milled, the range  of  prices  and wages, had been 
attained  in  the Middle  states  some  time before 
the  outbreak  of  the  crisis  of  1893.  But 
durillg  that  disastrous  period  it  collapsed  com- 
pletely in  the  district  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 
Some of  the mine-owners  attempted  to  increase 
their  production  by  a  cut  in  prices,  and  they 
indemnified themselves against the losses incurred 
by  a reduction in wages.  After the end of  the 
panic,  their  conduct  made  a resurrection  of  the 
old scheme impossible, and was the principal factor 
in bringing about the grievous coal strike in May, 
1894.  The  other  operators  were  not  able  to 
restore wages  without their co-operdtion.1  That 
no  closer  agreenlent  was  reached  previously,  is 
found to have  been  due  to  the widely  diffused 
territories in which bituininous coal is found, and 
the vast differences of  economic coilditions within 
them.  As long as the understanding lasted  for- 
mally,  local  divergencies  were  agreed  t~  as  to 
of  work and as to wages;  but this  system 
was never thoroughly effective. 
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Anthracite  coal,  on  the  other  hand,  is  found 
oilly in a very limited area in Pellnsylvania and 
the neighbouriiig states ; the recently discovered 
western coal fields are too distant and too small to 
come into consideration in the market.  The com- 
petition of  Nova Scotia is hindered by high duties 
and bad  facilities  for transportation,  but would 
probably be  of  little consequence in any case. 
Much has been said and written for Inore than 
half  a century about conlbinations in the anthra- 
cite  coal  production;  but a  truly  organic  union 
of  the  producers  has  not  as  yet taken place. 
Pools  of  one  form or  another  existed  for many 
years.  The  anthracite  region  is  covered  by  a 
number  of  large  railway  systems :  the  Phila- 
delphia  and Reading ; the  Lehigh  Valley ; the 
New Jersey Central ;  the Pennsylvania ;  the Dela- 
ware and IAackamanna  ; the New York, Lake Erie, 
and Western ; the New York, Susquehannah, and 
Western; and the New York, Ontario, and West- 
ern1  The annual  capacity anlouilts to 50,000,- 
000 toils ;  the actual output averages hardly over 
1 Report of  Cornmission appointed to investigate the waste 
of  coal mining, with a view to the utilizing of  the waste.  Com- 
monwralth  of  Pennsylvan~a,  l'hila.,  1803 -  J. F. .JOILPS,  "  A 
Short Descriptioil of  the Pennsylvania Anthracite Coal Fields," 
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41,000,000  tons.  Of this total, the lines n~entioned 
bring  &bout 35%  to tide-water.  Of  the  total 
in 1895, 70% were consumed in Penusyl- 
,,,ia,  ~ew  York, and New  Jersey ; 10% in the 
N~~  England  states; 13% in the western states; 
4% ill  the  and Pacific  states;  and 3% 
in Canada. 
The coal  lands  belong  partly to the railroads 
themselves,  partly  to  companies whose  stock is 
in  their  control, or who are otherwise  dependent 
upon  them.  Only  about  5% are  independent 
and in private hands. 
In 1884 the pool arranged for monthly meetings 
of  the sales  agents, at which  they should  agree 
to a  definite  allotment  of  the  output.  This, a 
('friendly  agreement  among gentlemen,"  merely 
oral,  without any penalties  for violation  of  the 
agreement, is said not to have  been obeyed very 
strictly.  In 1891  the Reading obtained control of 
over 60% of  the totrtl output by leasing the Cen- 
tral Railroad of  New Jersey, and the Lehigll Valley 
road for 999 years each; it attempted thereupon 
to bring about a further centralization and a more 
bindillg agreement with the others.  About 85% 
the  coal  roads  becanle  parties  to  this,  the 
alone absolutely refusing.  By pur- 
chase~  of shares in the New York and New England 
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Railroad, the  president of  the Reading system aimed 
at opening  a  direct  outlet  into New  England. 
Rut in  October of  the same year signs of  decay were 
already apparent, when  the Delaware road began 
to exceed  its allotted quota of  the output.  The 
managers  of  the  Jersey  Central, also, no  longer 
seemed  to  be  satisfied  with  the  arrangements; 
they,  or  powerful  interests  behind  them,  were 
able to secure  a legal decision from the courts of 
New  Jersey, -based  upon a recent statute which 
had been advocated by the Pennsylvania railroad 
interest, -  which declared a lease entered into by 
a foreign corporation illegal and v0id.l  As a mat- 
ter of  fact, the president and managers of  the Read- 
ing, seeing their old plan failing, had sold out their 
own interest in the road and invested heavily  in 
other stocks.  They managed  in a short time to 
make the Reading pay $1,500,000  for its lease of 
the Lehigh Valley ;  and circulated fictitious reports, 
causing enorinous English investments in Reading. 
Then suddenly they declared  the road  bankrupt, 
which terminated eo ipso the Lehigh Valley lease. 
Thus the coal combine foundered. 
The union of  sales agents, however, continues to 
exist.  Its success is only moderate, as every par- 
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ticipant  breaks the agreements.  Further- 
more, the ~ennsylvania  system refuses to become 
member of  any close agreement for restricting and 
allotting  the  output.  Its assessed share is 10%. 
~~t  as  the  road  is  miner  as  well  as  carrier, 
it can  afford to cut  prices  on the raw product, 
being  compensated  by ample freight rates.  The 
cost of  freight within the last few years has aver- 
aged  between  46% and 40% of the price  of  coal 
in New York City. 
It is impossible  to foretell how  the anthracite 
coal  trade  will  develop  in  the  near  future. 
Bituininous  is gradually  replacing  antliracite  in 
the iron industry, as better  results  are obtained 
thereby.  On the other hand, the western  states 
bring  a  new  demand  for  anthracite.  They 
consumed  2,231,000  tons in 1882,  and 4,996,000 
tons  in  1889.  This  is  probably  due  to  the 
movement  to  replace  the  dirty  and  unhealthy 
soft coal by  the more  cleanly anthracite in large 
cities. 
To  this  same  group  belongs  a  combine  in 
the  borax  production,  which  is  concentrated  in 
some of  the western states.  We hear, i11  certain 
districts  of  the  country,  about  conll~inations in 
quarries,  particularly  in  marble  and  sancistone ; 
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the architects and contractors of  New York.  But, 
on  the  whole,  the  failure  of  the  great  inter- 
national  copper  syndicate  seems  temporarily to 
have checked the attempts at combination in the 
mining industries. 
Much more numerous are the attempts at com- 
bination in those intllustries which use the products 
of  mining  as raw materials.  Combines exist for 
the various products of  the iron, copper, zinc, sil- 
ver, and lead industries, and especially for refined 
petroleum.  This has  been .manufactured  for  a 
long while exclusively  in the  United  States, and 
its only possible competitor, the oil from the Baku 
districts of  Itussia, is of  comparatively recent ori- 
gin.  The failure of  attempts to moiiopolize  the 
prociuction  of  the raw material,  is explained  by 
the fact that the digging of  a well requires  only 
a sinall  capital;  so that men of  small capital are 
able  every  day  to  open  new  wells,  the  run  of 
wllich will,  of  course, not exceed  from twelve to 
twenty  years.  Refining  and  transportation,  on 
the other hand, require such an enormous capital 
to be  profitable,  that  only  the  most  centralized 
undertaking  will  succeed  in  them.  The  same 
is  true  about  cotton  oil. 
11.  Quasi - natural  monopolies ;  i.e.  certain 
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which,  ollce  introduced,  can hardly be  competed 
at least only with very disastrous  econon~ic 
consequences; because  they require an enorn~ous 
macllinery  of  capital,  employees,  and  manage- 
ment.  By the mere fact of  their existence, they 
become nearly as powerful as natural monopolies. 
Therefore it is now  almost general17 recognized 
that they callnot  be  treated  like  other  busiiless 
undertakings. 
(a) The  general  knowledge  of  railway affairs 
in  this  country makes  it unnecessary to  dwell 
upcn  them  at any length.  It  neecl  only be  ob- 
served that a tendency towards centralization has 
existed froin  the first  in the railroad world,  and 
that this centralizing  process has steadily contin- 
ued in spite of  hostile  legislation.  Competition 
among  rival  railway  systems  has  always proved 
very dangerous,  not only to the railways, but also 
to the public.  The inevitable rate wars not only 
destroy inillions of railway property, but also very 
often give  an unhealthy stimulus to business  ac- 
tivity and the distribution of merchandise through- 
out the country.  The crisis of  1884 was  the last 
great  illustration of  this;  the rate war  between 
Vanderbilt  lines  and  the  new  Drexel  Mar- 
gan system from New York  to Chicago  involved 
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desperate situation of  railway affairs durii~g  1893 
was also, to a large extent, due to former contests 
of  this kind ;  as is shown by the situatioil of  the 
Atclrison and the Missouri Pacific systems, which 
are both weakened by their mutual conipetition. 
The repeal  of  the  anti-pooling  clause  of  the 
Interstate Conlmerce Law  is universally acknoml- 
edged  as  a  necessity.  Its repeal  will  publicly 
recognize  the  fact  that  in the  railway  business 
unrestricted  and  free  competition  has  proved 
unwliolesome. 
The progress towards  consolidation among the 
great  Atlantic  freight  and  passeijger  steamship 
lines  may be  mentioned at this point, though the 
conditions are somewhat different.  Though these 
lines can hardly be called quasi-natural monopolies, 
they have  a  great power  based  on their capital, 
acquired reputation, and good will.  The Ameri- 
can line is an amalgamation  of  three formerly in- 
dependent companies.  For some years the foreign 
lines have pooled their steerage rates, forming for 
this purpose the North Atlantic Steamship Asso- 
ciation.  Recently pooling has been  extended to 
other rates.  The North  Gerrnan  Lloyd  and the 
1 On  the progress  of  the consolidation  process, see the Re- 
ports of  the Interstate Commerce commission, and its $'  Statistics 
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Hamburg-~merica~~  line,  in the winter  of  1893, 
a,,lgsmated  their entire Mediterranean  service, 
alld  sooll  their agreeme~t  to the whole 
passellger traffic on all their North American lines, 
and to a part of  the freight business.  Tlley came 
to terms also about the pooling of  freight traffic 
with the other foreign lines.  The English, ~efusing 
to join  them, were notified of  the invasion of  their 
own territory by the establishment of  a competing 
line  from Liverpool,  thus precipitating  a  fierce 
rate war.  This, it is reported, very soon  led to 
the  reopening  of  negotiations,  which  are  still 
pending. 
(b) 1.  It  is well known that European railroads 
are,  to  a  large  extent,  operated  by  the  state. 
More  generally  still, state  ownership  has  been 
introduced  in Europe  in  the postal,  telegraphic, 
and telephone service, and the cities furnish water 
and  light.  Of  all  these  enterprises,  only  that 
branch of  the postal service which takes charge of 
letters and printed  matters  is completely  under 
public administration in this  country.  The ex- 
Press service and the greater part of the money or- 
der and transfer business are conducted to-day by 
four great private companies,l with an aggregate 
Adams, American, United States, and Wells-Fargo Express 
Companies. 40  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
capital  of  $48,000,000.  These  companies  have 
gradually bought out or  ruined all smaller ones, 
excepting local "  expresses, "  which serve as feeders. 
Agreements  have  been  reached  concerning  uni- 
form rates, a geographical division of  the country 
to avoid  competition,  and transfers  of  business 
from  one  company  to  another.  Contracts  have 
been  concluded  with  the  railroads  for  the  mo- 
nopoly  of  the  package-carrying  traffic  on  their 
respective  lines.  The express  employees  count 
by  the thousands. 
2.  The  telegraph  system  has  developed  since 
the fifties.  Two companies,  in spite of  numer- 
ous attempts to restrict them, and to declare their 
actions illegal, have  succeeded  in buying out, or 
checking  all competitors, -the  older  and more 
powerful Western Union, and the younger Postal 
Telegraph Company.  They own  some  of  the in- 
ternational  cables,  and  have  contracts  with  the 
proprietors  of  others.  They are controlled and 
administered principally by those New York finan- 
cial circles which represent the large railway inter- 
ests.  The origin of  the Western Union Company 
dates back to the years  1852 to 1856, when  this 
company absorbed some fifty minor companies, and 
received a New York state charter on April 4,1856. 
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1880 the last great consolidation took place.  The 
stock of  forty-one milliolls  was  raised to 
eighty millions, "giving par ($1.5,000,000) for the 
stocks and bonds  of  the American  Union,  60% 
for old Atlantic and Pacific stock in new Western 
Union, and a stock dividend of  48.5% to Western 
Union  shareholder^."^  The  Western Union had 
since 1877, through its ownership of  71,000 shares, 
controlled the Atlautic and Paciiic Company, and 
had also gradually bought up the American Union  - 
stock.  An attempt to get an injunction against 
this  consolidation  was  fruitlem2  In 1887 the 
Baltimore  and Ohio Telegraph Company's  stock 
was bought for $5,000,000;  and in October,  1892, 
the  Western  Union  capital stock  was  raised  to 
$;100,000,000,  of  which  $8,620,148  mere  paid  as 
a 10% scrip  dividend to the stockholders, "sur- 
plus earnings expended  on  the property. "  3  The 
1 Investors'  Supplement  of  the Commercial  and  Finai~cial 
Chronicle, May 26, 1894, p. 151. 
Archives of  Bradstreet's. 
a The  policy  of  the  Western  Union  administration  was, 
except  on  certain  occasions when Jay Gould  abused his influ- 
ence for his own purposes, always very conservative.  In former 
times of hard fighting with rivals, the payment of  dividends was 
stopped, in order not to impair the cap~tal. It is worth while 
noticing  that  the  Fi~~ancial  and  Com~nercial  Chronicle, No. 
1498,  reports that after Jay Gould's  death the securities rose 
in price as well as in public appreciation. 42  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
follo-cving table  shows  the property and 'business 
of  the company :  l - 
The dividends in 1887 amounted  to 2% ; since 
then they were 5% per annum.  In  January, 1890, 
an  extra dividend  of  7$%  was  declared, and in 
1892 the 10% stock dividend referred to. 
The Postal Telegraph  Cable  Company  is  the 
successor of  the Postal Telegraph Company  and 
the  Postal Telegraph and Cable  Company.  Its 
capital is to-day $10,000,000. 
The Western Union Telegraph offices  line the 
railroads; the Postal  uses  the public  highways. 
The growth of  the demand for the telegraph ser- 
vice has been so rapid, specially between the large 
centres of  population, that it was almost impossi- 
ble  for one system to keep  pace  with it.  This 
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explains why there are still to-day  two separate 
which,  however,  will  by  and  by 
probably  anldganlate. 
The  rates  for  telegraphiilg  have  meanwhile 
and largely decreased, and are to-day for 
shorter distances not appreciably higher, and, con- 
sidering the  purchasing power  of  money  in the 
United  States, perhaps  lower, than  in  Eur0pe.l 
The telephone  service  is monopolized  by  the 
Bell Telephone Company and its concessionaires, 
after a victory in a  number of  patent  cases.  Of 
the total amount of  $83,000,000  invested in tele- 
phone  stocks,  this  company  owns  a  majority. 
The local  service is done  by  a  number  of  indi- 
vidual companies, some of  which are confined  to 
certain parts  of  a state, as  in New  York ; others 
extend  over  the  whole  state,  as  in  Nebraska; 
others over  several states, as does the New  Eng- 
land  Bell  Telephone  Company.  The  interstate 
service is done by  the American  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Company.  With the  Western  Union 
Telegraph, the  General  Electric  Company,  and 
other  large  concerns,  the  Bell  Company  has 
made  especial  contracts.  The  individual  corn- 
'  R.  T.  EIy, "  The Telegraph Mo~lopoly," 149, North Amer- 
ican  firview,  1889;  G. Runto~t,  <&The  Economic and  Social 
Aspect of Trusts,'? 3, Political  Science  Quarterly, 1888. 44  INDUSTRIAL  CORIBINATIONS. 
panies enjoy rebates up to 50% and more, and the 
monopoly  for their  districts.  The  charges  are 
rather high.  After so'me  of  the  patents had  ex- 
pired, on January 28, 1894, a slight reduction was 
expect'ed, to prevent possible cornpetiti0n.l 
3.  The water supply of  many of  the large cities 
and districts  is  also owned by  capitalistic com- 
panies which  have  acquired chartered privileges. 
In  many places a lease is granted  to then1 by the 
communities, either for fixed  money rental or for 
a share in the  receipts.  A  particular source of 
complail~t has  arisen  on  account  of  the  use 
of  disreputable  means  in  obtaining  the  charter. 
The charge  of  bribing  influential persons,  with 
the intention of  putting competing interests at a 
disadvantage, has often  been  brought.  Valuable 
franchises are thns said to be  unjustly disposed 
of; for the community does not at present receive 
an adequate share in the profits.  The tendency 
is in favour of  the public administration of  these 
institutions. 
4.  The same is true of  gas works.  Of  particular 
interest for our purposes  is the so-called Chicamgo 
Gas Trust.  The four gas companies  of  Chicago 
had  formed  a  regular trust  in April,  1887, the 
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4'  Chicago Gas Trust Company."  In  April, 1890, 
tile name Tvas  changed to the "Chicago  Gas Com- 
pany,"  alld  an  Illinois  charter  taken  out.  As 
a  collcessio~l to the  public  feeling,  the  state of 
Illinois  soon  proceeded  against  the  company, 
and in the  subsequent  contest  the  organization 
mas  declared  illegal.  Thereupoil  the  stock- 
llolders  surrendered  their  charter,l and  a  com- 
mittee  was  appointed  to  wind  up  its  affairs. 
~ut  immediately  after  consultation  with  the 
attorney-general of  Illinois,  in  April,  1891, the 
stock  of  all the four  companies  was  deposited 
with  the  Fidelity  Insurance  Trust  and  Safe 
Deposit Company of Philadelphia.  This company 
issued trust receipts,  certifying "that  the holder 
is entitled to his ratable proportion of  the owner- 
ship in all the stocks  of  the several Chicago  gas 
companies, held by the Fidelity Company (subject 
to the lien of  the bonds),  and has a right to receive 
the dividends thereon, and to vote the sake as he 
nlay  choose."2  Of  the  twenty-five  illillions  of 
trust receipts, $114,200 have  been  cancelled.  In 
Bmdstreet's Archives, Investors'  Su~nlement  of  the Com-  - - 
m~rcial  ntzrl  Firinncia2  Chronicle, March,  1894, p.  138 ;  May, 
1894, p. 140. 
The bonds formerly issued by the Trust are still under the 
guarantee of  the four companies jointly.  See Conamercial and 
financial  Chronicle, 701.  xlvii.,  p.  746. September, 1893, tell  millions  of  6% bonds  were 
issued,  of  wlliuli  four  i~lillioils  were  used  to re- 
deem all prior bonds.  Tlie coinpanies furthermore 
control the Chicago Ecoiloi~~ic  Fuel Gas Company. 
Recently the attorney-general of  Illinois has begun 
new proceedings to annul the charters of  the par- 
ticipant  companies,  on  the ground that they are 
still maintainilrg a "trust." 
To this group belongs  also, from  one point  of 
view, the General Electric  Company.  It has  an 
authorized  capital  of  $GO, 000,000,  df  ~vhiah 
$10,000,000  may  be  preferred  cunlulative  seven 
per  ceilts ; $30,459,700  comi~lon  and 84,251,900 
preferred  stock  are  outstanding.  Convertible 
debentures are due to the amount of  $10,000,000, 
as well as a  small  amount of  guaranteed  bonds 
of  the  old  Thomson-Houston  securities.  The 
General  Electric  Coinpany  has  been  organized 
under  a  New  York  charter.  It consists  of  the 
Edison  ~eneral  Electric,  the  Edison  Electric 
Light,  the  Thornson-Houston  Electric,  and  the 
Thomson-Houston International  Companies.  On 
It seems very renlarkable  to a foreigner  that a number of 
papers of  good standing have stated, without being contradicted, 
that tlie details of  the attorney-general's proceeditlgs were known 
earlier by certain stockbrokers than by the general public, and 
have added, that these proceedings were apparently utilized  for 
tile purpose of  stock manipulation, January  31,  1894,  1479  central-station  lighting 
companies  and  541  electric railways  used  its 
apparatus.1  Formerly  the  General  Electric  ac- 
cepted  payments  from  these  companies  in their 
securities.  In August, 1893, because of  the 
financial stringency, the General Electric Company 
was obliged to turn over twelve millions  of  these 
miscellalle~~s  securities  to  a  new  institution : 
"Street  Railway  and Illuminating  Properties," 
to  receive  them for  four  milliolls  in 
cash.  Since then,  only cash sales can 'be made. 
Owning all the patents of  its mother companies, 
the General Electric belongs, like the Bell Tele- 
phone Company, also to the next group: 
111.  Legal  monopolies  to-day  are  Patefits and 
Copyrights.  There has  never  been  any question 
about their right to existence, "as  they stimulate 
the genius and give a due reward to the promoters 
of  human  progress."  2  Patent rights  have  been 
the basis of  innumerable important combinations, 
originating in patented processes of  manufactur- 
ing, or in patented machinery.  The legal decisions 
are, contrary to the tendency  in other instances, 
usually  in favour of  the widest  construction  of 
the franchises given by  patent. 
Investors7 Supplement, May, 1894, pp. 143, 144. 
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In  the case of  important patents,  we find either 
several branch  manufactures  distributed  all over 
the country for utilizing the process,  or  one  cen- 
tral establishment.  Sometimes the owners grant 
concessions  to a  number of  other  establishments 
to use their patents in return for fixed  royalties, 
whilst they pledge themselves to a certain restric- 
tion in the number  of  their concessionaires.  In 
some cases, finally, the undertakers of  one group 
combine  to buy up various patents, and use  them 
jointly,  or they establish another company to uti- 
lize them. 
All of  these  different  instances  are strikingly 
exemplified  in  the  barbed-wire  industry.l  The 
house  of  Washburn  8;  Noen  had  originally  ac- 
quired the patents relative  to the manufacturing 
of  barbed  wire.  Its exclusive  right  has  been 
vainly contested in several law-suits  since 1873. 
In the first stage, Washburn B Moen produced al- 
most the entire supply.  When the industry began 
to grow, tlie  firm  established branches.  Then it 
admitted several  other  co~npanies  upon  payment 
of  high fees.  Finally,  those  jointly  bought  up 
the entire set of  patents,  and trn~lsferred  it to the 
"Columbia Patent Company,"  chartered in Ken- 
tucky, with a capital of  four millions.  Since then 
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outsiders  are only admitted upon the payment of 
exorbitant fees.' 
Among the combinations  on the basis of  copy- 
right,  the  so-called  school-book  trust  is  worth 
mentioning.  It embraces all publishers of  school- 
books, except three publishing houses, and it has 
been attacked for keeping prices unduly high.2 
IV.  Besides the groups mentioned heretofore, 
we  find a vast number of  combinations, the cause 
for which can only to a  limited extent be  found 
in the coilditions described.  In numerous iadus- 
tries, they spasmodically  appear, and often disap- 
pear  just  as quickly.  The free-traders attribute 
their  growth to the protective tariff, upon which, 
they  assert,  the welfare  of  the conlbinations  de- 
pends  entirely.  Others  claim  that  they  could 
not have  come  into existence without  a  criminal 
conspiracy with the railroads of  the country. 
Day by day one reads of  the birth, growth, and 
vanishing of  6' pools " and combinations, of  amal- 
gamations and separations. 
1 An  agreement  to  exclude  outsiders  absolutely  from  the 
enjoyment of  patents of  that sort, or to combine for that pur- 
pose,  had  been  declared  illegal.  But  it  is  permitted to pay 
money  to a person who  desists from  any claim to the use  of 
certain patents ;  see Spelling. 
De lVitt  Warner,  Tariff  Trusts,"  6  Tariff  Reform,  p. 
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The free trade organ of  the New York Reform 
Club 1  mentions  one  hundred  instances which  it 
affirms are entirely due to protection, and the con- 
nection of  which with the high protective  duties 
it strives to show:  anthracite coal;  axe; barbed 
wire ; biscuit aiid cracker ; bolt and nut ; boiler ; 
boot  and shoe ; borax ; broom ;  brush ; button ; 
carbon ; candle ;  cartridge ; casket ; castor  oil; 
celluloid; cigarette; condensed milk; copper ingot; 
copper  sheet ; cordage ; crockery ; cotton duck ; 
cottonseed  oil ; cotton  thread ; electric  supply ; 
envelope;  flint  glass ; fork and hoe ; fruit  jar; 
galvanized  iron ;  glove ;  harrow ;  harvester; 
hinge ; indurated  fibre ; lead ;  leather  board ; 
lime ; linseed  oil ; lithograph ; locomotive  tire ; 
marble ; match ; morocco  leather ; oat  meal ; oil 
cloth ; paper  bag;  pitch;  plate  glass;  pocket 
cutlery ; powder ;  preserves ; pulp ; rice ;  rubber, 
gossamer ;  rubber, general ;  safe ;  salt ;  sandstone ; 
sanitary ware ;  sand paper ;  sash, door  and blind ; 
saw ;  school-book ;  school furniture ;  sewer pipe ; 
shot and lead ;  skewer ;  smelters ;  soap ;  soda-water 
machinery ; spool,  bobbin  and  shuttle ; sponge ; 
starch ;  steel  rail;  stove  board;  straw  board ; 
structural  steel ; sugar ;  teazel ;  tinned  plate ; 
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tombstone ;  trunk; tube ;  type ;  umbrella ;  vapour- 
stove ;  wall paper ;  watch ;  wheel ;  whip ;  window 
glass ; wire ; woocl  screw ; wool  hat ; wrapping 
paper ; and yellow  pine. 
This  list  is  no  longer  accurate.  In the two 
years since it was compiled, a number of  the com- 
binations  have  dissolved  (as  the  trunk  trust). 
Others are established,  as the  "American  Leather 
company,"  the wall-paper,  the umbrella, the fire- 
extinguisher, and the playing-cards trusts.  But 
the list neither  claims  completeness, nor would it 
be possible to prove in all instances that tlle close- 
ness of  the union is such as to warrant the name of 
6b ~001."  A valuable list has  recently been given 
in Mr.  Lloyd's  book ;  this has served as the basis 
of  the list of  combinatioiis given i11  the Appendix.1 
Much  can  be  said  in  detail  concerning  tl~e 
alleged relation between the combinatioiis and the 
tariff;  e.g. an extension of  the great cordage com- 
bination all over the country was prepared in 1890, 
in anticipation  of  the passage  of  the iIIcIiiiiley 
Act.2 
A  market  nationally  closed  is  a  more  fertile 
soil  for the rise of  combinations, because it offers 
a  firmer grasp, and consequently a better chance 
Appendix XV.  a Bradstreet's Archives. 52  INDUSTRIAL  COI\IBINATIONS. 
of  success.  The prospect  of  a full enjoyment of 
the extra profits derived  from the protective sys- 
tem  is very  inviting; therefore  a  chalige  of  the 
tariff  system would  probably have a certain bear- 
ing upon  a  number  of  combinations.  As to the 
other  alleged  cause  tve  have  already  remarked 
that  without  doubt  a  number  of  cornbinations 
have  been  able to secure special advantages froin 
the railroads,l and that these have greatly facili- 
tated their gron-th.  But closer investigation shows 
that these are only two of  the Illany points to be 
considered, and, as will be seen, not even the most 
prominent ones.  A general economic tendency of 
a far more profound  nature has  called  into exist- 
ence  these  organizations.  They inay  rightly be 
called  capitalistic combinations. 
1 Vide Ro~thanz,  "Railroad Secrecy and Trusts." NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  53 
CHAPTER  V. 
NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS. 
WE have in the foregoing two chapters drawn 
the general  lines of  classification for all the vari- 
ous groups.  The rise of  coinloinations  we  found 
to  have  been  favoured  by  natural  or  artificial 
monopolies, though here mas not the  single cause 
of  their appearance, and we  found  that the form 
depended upon the inclination of  the parties, and 
their confidence in the ability of  the leaders.  But 
what makes them flourish?  How do they work? 
We shall now discuss somewhat more at length 
the  highest  forms  of  undertakings, -  the  trust 
and the corporation  of  corporations.  Here cap- 
ital and business ability work  in unison towards 
the  regulation  of  all  the  elements  which  con- 
tribute  to  the  production  of  the  articles  in 
question.  We  shall  consider  principally  the 
largest  of  them,  such  as  the  petroleum,  lead, 
cottpn  oil, linseed  oil,  sugar, cigarettes, matches, 
whiskey,  starch,  cordage,  crackers,  rubber,  and 
leather  combines. 5-1  INDUSTIZIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
The goal of  undertakings of  this sort is rightly 
expressed  by  such phrases  as  the cheapening  of 
production,  the  regulation  of  output,  and  the 
control of  prices. 
I.  The large undertakings do not originate in 
ideal, moral, or general econonlic  considerations ; 
their iininediate aims are simply larger and surer 
profits.  Hardly would  a  Rockefeller  in his first 
efforts  have  divined  what  economic  mission  his 
action  was  destined  to  fulfil;  hardly  did  old 
Commodore  Vailderbilt  invest  his  first  money, 
acquired through the Staten Island ferry service, 
in  railroads,  with  the  intentJion of  establishing 
a  model  of  centralized  railroad  administration. 
But  none  the  less  the  existei~ce  of  these  great 
personalities  has been  of  an  extraordinary,  and 
often decisive, importance for the general develop- 
ment of  the several intlustries. 
Tlmt such men went into the petroleum  trade, 
or  into  New  York  railroad  enterprises,  had,  as 
things turned  out,  consequences not  olily  much 
beyond  their  anticipation, but  also  affecting  re- 
gions far outside their immediate sphere.  In this 
country where the activity  of  the  individual  is 
least restricted,  the personality  of  the projector, 
more  perhaps  than in Europe, seeins to dominate 
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of civilization and who, with creative energy, have 
impressed  the  stamp of  their individuality upon 
whole  industries, can  be  found more  often here 
than  abr0ad.l  These  men  have to sllow  initia- 
1 The ra~idity  with which one industrial phase has succeeded 
another has brought about the impression  that a  larger percen- 
tage of  extraordinarily able men is to be  found in the United 
States than elsewhere.  This does not seem to me to be justi- 
fied.  American authors (Gunton, Cook, Bonha~n,  etc.)  show, 
however,  what has led  to this belief.  In Europe  the leading 
spirits  are often attracted into other directions, -to  the gov- 
ernment,  the army,  or the  paths of  abstract science;  in  the 
United States the exceptionally able man, to show his abilities, 
and to attain a  coveted  position,  is almost entirely restricted 
to the industrial  field.  With the public  at large the govern- 
mental  service is only a business,  and a much  less respected 
one than private business ;  and abstract science is but too often 
looked upon with a feeling of  contempt, as being a loophole for 
second-class geniuses.  In such a democratic community there 
does not exist any hereditary aristocracy, and the public service 
has not yet created an aristocracy of  honour.  Therefore ambi- 
tion finds the  only way to entrance into and  lre-eminence  in 
society "through the golden  door of  the dollar."  Not so much 
the love of  the almighty dollar per se, as the social pre-eminence 
and power secured through its agency, seems to be the leading 
motive for the most successful  business men and their lawyers 
in their enterprises.  In his inquiries the author found that, in 
the case of  two large trusts, their establishment was explained 
by the social aspiration of  their promoters.  They had  already 
become very rich, and economically there was no strong induco- 
ment for them.  Their chief motive to accept the proposition to 
join a certain combination in a leading position was a social one. 
They expected  that this would lead then1 to that higher place 
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tive, to realize the wants of  the times, and to take 
the leadership of  the various movements.  And 
by grouping the existing meails for these purposes 
in an appropriate manner, they become examples 
to others. 
Governmental and police  institutions, the pub- 
lic  ideas  of  honour  and business  morality,  are 
somewhat  more  flexible  here,  and therefore  men 
find  greater  opportunities  than  their  European 
brethren.  Different periods and stages of  society 
have  different needs.  There  are times of  rapid 
progress, in which the personality of  the promoter, 
the audacious creator, holds the predominant posi- 
tion:  and there are  times  for  the  conservative 
preservation  of  existing conditions,  times which 
rely upon organization  and regulation, and which 
distribute over the country the progress already 
attained.  Invention  and  creation  depend  upon 
one  great  spirit ; the  carrying-on  of  the  work 
afterwards may be provided  for by  a  consulting 
body of  average men. 
Even the most  conspicuo~is  men  are restricted 
by the iron  tendencies  of  general  development. 
for.  To other strong men the mere sense of  power is welcome. 
For the time being there is no other chance for them in this 
direction, and, therefore, they create  a  position  for themselves 
more powerful than that of  many a feudal prince." -  Cook. NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  57 
~h~i~  activity  is  checked.  They  cannot  arbi- 
trarily defy what are so often called  by the news- 
papers  and  a  certain class  of  econoillists  in this 
country "economic  laws."  But they can greatly 
advance the interests of  concerns which have been 
fortunate enough to secure  their services. 
11.  It  seems  that great  econonlic  revolutions 
are inevitably bound to crush a part of  the oppos- 
ing forces.  The history  of  the attempts at cen- 
tralization in this country abounds with episodes, 
in which i~umberless  individuals  have  been  eco- 
nomically  ruined  by  powerful  adversaries.  The 
methods  employed  were  not  a1w:tys  the  most 
honest.  We have already  mentioned  the secret 
relations between soine of  the trusts and the rail- 
roads, and have shown how the competitors of  the 
trusts found themselves suddenly annihilated by a 
mysterious force.  According to Bonham,l this sys- 
tem  of  secret  agreements is much older than the 
trusts, and dates from the very beginning  of  rail- 
road management.  If one merchant did not avail 
himself of  it, some one less scrupulous would, and 
thus the business  of  the former would  be  under- 
mined.  And these  were  not the only objection- 
able  methods  employed  by  the trusts.  Various 
Railway Secrecy and Trusts, especially pp.  41-50. 58  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
most  cruel  devices,  wllich  could  be  used  with 
impunity under the  rkgime  of  laissez-faire,  have 
been revealed by recent investigations.  The sighs 
of  the victims are still audible, though it appears 
that in the course of  time,  with wider expansion, 
the  older  trusts  and their  practices  steadily be- 
come less violent  and more  conservative.  Great 
business men and large undertakings are even to- 
day able to secure  discrimillations from  the rail- 
road  companies,  and  they slaughter  undesirable 
competitors in cold blood.  But these are phenom- 
ena not peculiar to the trusts.  They occur in the 
establishment  of  every  large enterprise -  as  in 
the building up of  large dry goods firms or grocery 
houses, trades where there is no organization ;  and 
the cruelties are matters not so much  connected 
with  our immediate  problem  as with the general 
public  morality.  Of  course  public  morality  is 
influenced  by  the  example  of  the  combinations 
and their  leaders  who  take  such  a  conspicuous 
position in public life. 
After the Standard Oil  Company had broken 
the ice, its imitators found their task much easier, 
and  did  not  need  to  apply  so  much  pressure. 
Bonham's  distinction between trusts which origi- 
nate  in railroad  discriminations,  and  such as do 
not so originate, useful as it may be in some ways, NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  59 
is very superficial, in so far as it presupposes that 
all trusts of  the latter kind are merely accidental 
schernas.  llany of  them  are natural  outcomes 
of  long  struggles and alliances. 
The  industry,  for  instance,  was  de- 
pressed  for many years.  Whenever a  change in 
taxation mas proposed, the production of  whiskey 
was  illcreased  enorinously 1  during  the  time the 
debates  were  pendii~g.~  Toward  the  end  of 
the sixties,  the  productive  capacity  of  the  dis- 
tilleries s~lrpassed  by three times the consumptive 
power  of  the  country.  These  distilleries  could 
only exist by means of  enormous revenue frauds. 
Alcohol  was occasionally offered in the market at 
a lower price than the tax itself.  In 1870 all but 
three distilleries north of  the Ohio River pledged 
themselves  to restrict  their  production  to two- 
fifths of  their capacity.  By and by consumption 
increased,  and in  1878 began  a  brisk  export to 
Europe,  where  bad  crops  within  the  next  few 
years made  possible an importation of  more  than 
40,000,000  gallons  of  alcohol.  But these  pros- 
perous times again brought  icto the field numer- 
F.  W.  Jcrtks,  IL  Whiskey Trust,"  Zoc.  cit. 
Taxes on alcohol per gallon : 1862, 20c. ;  1864, March, BOc., 
July,  $1.60 ; 1865, $2.00  ; 1868, 50c. ; 1872, 70c. ; 1875,  9Oc. ; 
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ous  new  competitors.  When  in  1883  the  ex- 
ports began to decrease in consequence  of  good 
European  crops  and  of  changes  in  the  tariffs 
of  most  of  the  countries,  the  vast  overproduc- 
tion  reappeared.  The  exports  decreased  from 
20,600,000  gallons in 1879 to 250,000 gallons in 
1888, whilst a capacity surpassing four times the 
domestic consumption had to be faced.  In 1881 
prices had already fallen below the cost of  produc- 
tion, as they had done several times before.  The 
formation  of  a pool was decided upon and the es- 
tablishment of  a "  Western Export Association," 
which  should export alcohol even  at a  loss,  and 
cover the loss by ineans of  monthly assessments in 
proportion to tlle production of  the different dis- 
tilleries.  None of  the distilleries could be closed 
at once, because they were at tile same time cattle- 
feeders, and could not have disposed  of  their live 
stock without heavy losses.  A11  attempt made to 
secure a bounty from Congress  proved  a failure. 
The pool was broken down in the spring of  1882 
by the refusal of  some of  its members to pay the 
assessments.  But  it was  re-established  in  the 
fall of  the same year.  From 1883 to 1887 one 
pool  follows  the  other,  until  in  1887 the  Dis- 
tillers'  and  Cattle  Feeders'  Trust mas  formed. 
It began by lowering prices in order to force out- NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  6 1 
side  competitors either  to yield  or  to  join, --a 
metllod employed  by other  trusts. 
The belief of  impartial observers is that without 
the formation of  great combinations  the  fate of 
slualler  aid economically  inferior  establishments 
would  have  been  still  more  problematic.  The 
growth and preponderailce  of  the large  competi- 
tors would  have  ruined  theill ; whereas  now  a 
considerable  percentage  of  them  could  effect  an 
entrance into the new coinbillations under fairly 
acceptable terms.l  The natural conditions of pro- 
duction, such as the price of  real estate, of  wages, 
and of  grain, and the rates of transportation, gave 
to the city of  Peoria, Ill.,  such an advantage, that 
most  of  the distilleries  in otlier 'places would in 
the course  of  time have been unable to stand its 
ccmpetition.  So also the Havemeyer and Spreck- 
els interest had already such a predominant posi- 
tion in the sugar-refining  industry, they produced 
so much  more  cheaply in consequence of  the ex- 
tent  of  their  works  and the  improved  methods 
secured  by patents,  that tl?ey  largely  coiltrolled 
the market prices.  Mr. Havemeyer  has testified 
Ed? Mr. Havemeyerls testimony before  the United  States 
Senate Investigation Committee  011  Alleged  Stock Speculation 
of United States Senators, 62d Congress, second session, Wash- 
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before  a  Se~lr~te  Committee  that  many  of  the 
smaller  refineries  had  very  often  to  choose 
between stopping their factories, or running them 
at a  loss,  when  he  and  a  few others  could  still 
make  a  very fair  profit.  In the  steel  industry 
the gigantic Carnegie works in Pittsburgh  pre- 
dominate  to such a  degree  that  rival  factories 
must  make  every  effort  to pool  wit11  Mr.  Car- 
negie.  And,  as  frequently  as  an  old  pool  is 
broken  up,  they  enter into  new  negotiations  in 
spite  of  the  experience  that  co-operation  xvitli 
Mr.  Carilegie does not always turn out entirely 
to their own advantage.  He governs with almost 
absolute power.  At the close  of  the year 1893 
he broke up a poo1,l  because  one  of  its members 
llsd protluced  more than his share.  Then, a few 
weeks  later,2  he  combined  again  with  six  steel 
manufacturers, thus bringing  65% of  the output 
under  his  control.  Outsiders were  paid  heavy 
preiniunis to close their establishments.3 
Vide the terms of  the pool in the Iron Age, November  16, 
1893. 
Vide  speech of  Congressman Johnson of  Ohio, in the Con- 
gressional  Becord of  January 10, 1894. 
3 The circumvention of  the anti-trust legislation is effected 
in  an interesting way.  One  of  the  participants  in  the  pool 
makes a contract with  a factory in Maryland  for the delivery 
of  300,000  tons of  rails; but this is mere form.  In fact, the 
stress  is  laid  on that  paragraph  by  which  the  former  binds NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF  TRUSTS.  6 3 
As a rule a combination  does not need to have 
complete control over  the market in order to be 
,ffective.l  Generally  command  over  a  majority 
of  the producers or the greater part of  the output 
has  proved  suffi~ient.~  Therefore we  find  in all 
these  cases a small number of  outsiders left more 
or less  unmolested  as long as they do not  ahow 
aggressive tendencies.  They enjoy all the benefits 
of  the combine without being forced into it. 
111.  The  ability  of  a  large  undertaking  to 
produce  more  economically  makes  it superior  to 
a  smaller  one.  Such  an  undertaking  is  ba.sed 
upon the employment of large capital, is favoured 
by  local  or  individual  circumstances,  and  is 
promoted  by  pre-eminent  men,  who  through 
enterprising skill are able  to secure  further  ad- 
vantages. 
With  the exception  of  a  few  whose  rise  mas 
gradual  and  steady,  the  birth  of  combinations 
is favoured by times of  dulness  in business.  In 
prosperous  periods  individuals  frequently  feel 
safe enough i11  their independence ; in hard times 
they  realize  how  much  better  off  they might be 
himself to pay  the latter a penalty of  a dollar per ton in case 
he should not receive  the  ordered  rails ; thus tlie  Maryland 
Company receives $.100,000  for the close of  its works. 
W.  .J.  Ashley, "The Canadian Sugar Combine." 
Vide also Jenks in Pol. Xci.  QILU~.  IX. pp. 487, 488. 64  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
in union.  Extraordinarily low prices, grave dis- 
turbances  of  the market, the crushing rivalry of 
competitors, or vigorous associations  of  working- 
men with repeated  demands and strikes, give an 
impulse to the starting of  combinations.  Never- 
theless these would have  met with much  greater 
difficulties,  and  some  of  them would  not  have 
come  into  existence  at  all,  had  they  not  been 
cheerfully greeted by the stock  exchanges.  The 
prospects of  great speculative gains have proved 
very  enticing ; though  frivolous  manipulation - 
such as overcapitalizatioi~  -and  unscientific man- 
agement -  have resulted in serious losses. 
The  material,  admiiiistrative,  commercial, and 
technical basis, on which the promoter  establishes 
his  enterprise  can  soon  be  ascertained  froin  the 
results  achieved.  Let  us  see  how  men  of 
sagacity  proceed. 
The preliminaries  generally take  months  and 
years;  they are often  interrupted  and resumed; 
and it needs more than comnloil  ability to recon- 
cile  all  the  diverging  interests.  When  this  is 
finally  done,  and the preliminaries  agreed upon, 
a document (trust-deed,  articles of  association, or 
option coi~tract,~  etc.) is aigned.Vhe  undertaking 
1 See Appendices I. and 11. 
2 To frame this the most skilful work of  corporation counsel NATURE  AND  EFFECT OF TBUSTS.  65 
is now practically established, and to comply with 
the legal requirements a charter'  is usually taken 
Meanwhile  a detailed valuation  of  the sev- 
eral  properties has been carried through.  On this 
basis  the capital of  the new coinpany  is divided 
among the parties to the agreement.  An elective 
meeting takes place and by-laws are agreed upon.= 
Thereupon  the administration passes to the presi- 
dent and board  of  directors.  One of  their  first 
steps is to ascertain the productive capabilities of 
the individual factories.  What prove  to be  the 
best  methods  of  production  are adopted.  Only 
the best equipped and the most  profitable  works 
are run to the full extent of  their capacity.  Of 
the less profitable, as many are raised to the same 
degree of  efficiency as are needed  to supply the 
market ;  the remainder are closed.  They have ab 
initio  been  admitted  only  to avoid  con~petition. 
Before  the  establishment  of  the  combinations 
hardly any industry had been  able  to utilize its 
is required.  These counsel have, of  course, to take into careful 
consideration every legal decision bearing on the situation,  in 
order  that the document  nlay  be  unassailable  in the  courts. 
Such  work  and  its importance to grant interests  explain  the 
large earnings of  the great corporation lawyers in the finallcia1 
centres. 
See Appendix XII.  2 See Appendices 11. and XIII. 66  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATLONS. 
full capability.,  For instance, even before the days 
of  the  Cotton  Oil  Trust numerous  presses  and 
refineries had for a long time been inactive.  The 
trust closed at once more than a dozen of  the small 
old-fashioned  mills.  The same  thing  happened 
with the Sugar Trust, which can supply the whole 
market  with  the  product  of  one-fourth  of  the 
plants it owns.  Tl~e  Whiskey Trust immediately 
closed  sixty-eight  of  it's eighty  distilleries,  and 
with the remaining twelve was enabled to furnish 
the  same  output as before,  and soon  to largely 
increase  it. 
The enterprises were further assisted by exten- 
sion  into  closely  connect,ed  and  neighbouring 
branches  of  trade, by gaining  and utilizing  by- 
products,  by  n~anufacturing  their  own  packing 
materials, by improving the means  of  transporta- 
tion, etc.  An attempt was  made, and often with 
success,  to increase the  sales  and to extend the 
markets.  For  this  purpose  the  Standard  Oil 
Trust  and  the  Cotton  Oil  Trust  established 
European  branches.1 
1 See Appendix 111.  The Standard Oil Company has bought 
out a number of  European  oil merchants, who  have been paid 
in  stock of  the newly  establZshed German-American,  Italian- 
American, and English-American  Petroleurn Companies.  The 
Standard Oil  Company declares  that  it controls them  by  the 
command of  51% of  the stock, whilst they affirm that they hold NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OB  TRUSTS.  6  7 
In all these directions, the existing trusts seeill 
to have  been  quite  successful,  and, therefore, to 
be ,naking an approach towards the economic ideal 
of  producing the largest arnount of  utilities with 
a steadily decreasing amount of  labour and with 
the  greatest  possible  saving  of  materials.  We 
find  continual  efforts  at further advance, by the 
application  of  the newest machinery and of  new 
labour-saving processes,  and  this  as  rapidly  as 
is  with the amortization of  the ineans 
of  production on hand.  For example, the Amer- 
ican  Sugar  12efining  Company  llas  built  a  new 
refinery,  furnished  with  the  newest  technical 
improvements,  to  serve  only  as a  safeguard  in 
the case  of  a  suddenly increased demand,  or of 
stoppages  in  other  factories.  Tlle  Cotton  Oil 
Company  has a  great experimental station of  its 
own.  The Whiskey Trust has introduced quite 
a  iiuniber  of  inventions  to improve  the quality 
of  its product.  In the  domain of  the  Standard 
Oil Trust there exist to-day more than three hun- 
dred by-products, which have  yielded  most valu- 
able materials to numerous  other industries ; and 
the danger of  explosion of  the oil has been con- 
tinually diminished by introducing more effective 
50%.  As this information  comes  from reliable informants  on 
both  sides, the author is uuable  to explain the discrepancy. 68  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
refining  processes.1  By all  new  inventions  the 
whole business is benefited at the same time, while 
the great number of  plants gives a chance to make 
local  experiments  with  new  processes  of  manu- 
factures. 
In this direction, none of  the adversaries have 
been  able  successfully  to  accuse  the  trusts  of 
negligence ; on the  contrary, since the beginning 
complaints have  been  based  upon  the very  alle- 
gatioil that through  the  introduction  of  labour- 
saving processes and of  machinery of  the newest 
construction,  and through  the  closing  of  super- 
fluous  factories,  numerous workillgillen have lost 
their  occupation, -  an  objection  which  surely  is 
not  a  new  one,  nor  peculiar  to  this  form  of 
industrial progress.  Only in conlbinations secure 
against all kinds of  competition-i.e.  legal monop- 
olies-can  there ever arise the danger of  a stand- 
still in methods of  production. 
IV.  As regards  the  regulation  of  production 
there  have  been  occasional  complaiiits  of  an 
1 It  has recently been  charged that the Standard Oil  Com- 
pany's  product has deteriorated  In Europe  as well  as in the 
United  States a decrease in  the illuminating  capacity and an 
increase of  explosions has been recorded.  The oil people claim 
that this is only due to the introduction  of  the  Ohio  oil, which 
they have not yet learned to refine as well as the Pennsylvania 
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oblectionable  restriction,  which  have  not  been 
foundat,ion.  111  the period  of  lively de- 
mand, the trusts have attempted  to bring  about 
a great rise  in prices by diminishing  the supply. 
But these  attempts at corners have  always been 
of only a temporary nature.  The more far-seeing 
and successful administrators have begun to real- 
ize  the  booinerang  character  of  such  attempts, 
alld to take the position that the greatest earnings 
are always derived from the production of  a stead- 
ily increasing quantity.  On the other hand, they 
laturally  try to prevent  a  disastrous  inflatioil  of 
the  market. 
The  most  vigorous  attacks  arose  from  the 
alleged  attitude of  the  combination towards the 
regulation  of  prices.  It  has been  objected, and 
sonletimes proved, that the trusts keep prices  im- 
moderately  high  for  the  consumers,  and  pay 
immoderately low prices to the producers  of  raw 
materials.  So, above  all, the Sugar Trust.  It  is 
alleged  that  it  arbitrarily dictates  prices  on  its 
purchases,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the  tariff,  sells 
at  prices  which  yieId  a  greater  profit  to  the 
refiner than could be obtained under free compe- 
tition.1 
This was admitted by Mr. Kavemeyer before the investigat- 
ing committee of  the United States Senate, June 15, 1894.  Tide 
diagram on p.  73. 7  0  INDUSTRIAL  CORIBINATIOKS. 
But experience has taught,  and probably  will 
ineke  it  more  and  more  apparent,  that  in  the 
long run  only those  trusts  are  successful  which 
succeed  in  steactily  cheapening  and  improv- 
ing their  product.  Whenever  they  have  raised 
prices  unwisely,  competition,  allured  by  the 
prospect  of  great  gains,  has arisen  at  once  to 
such an extent as to endanger  the very existence 
of  the undertaking.  The Starch  Trust has  at- 
tempted for a  while  to keep  prices unreaso~lably 
high,'  and  in  consequence  of  the  eilor~nously 
increased competition was at one time believed to 
be on the verge of  ruin. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that the  prices  of  raw 
material  have  in some  instances been  depressed. 
The United  States Leather Company, which  con- 
trols all the sole-leather tanneries of  the country as 
far as Texas, succeeded in reducing prices imme- 
diately after its appearance i11  the markets of  Chi- 
cago  and Kansas  City.  It maintains  a  purchas: 
ing  agent in  Chicago.  I11  the  face  of  the ring 
of  packers  it  does  not  seem  to  have  violerltly 
changed the dynamics of  supply and demand, but 
only  to  have  readjusted  them.  The American 
Tobacco  Company is said  to have,depressed  the 
Bradstreet's Archives. NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  7 1 
price  of  cigarette tobacco  in tlie  leaf 
by  several  per  cent  immediately  after it began 
business. 
But we also observe a  tendency in the opposite 
direction.  With the increase  of  the  cotton  oil 
production,  the  price  of  cottonseed,  which  the 
trust had at first soniewl~at  depressed, rose  much 
above the forrner  1evel.l  The trusts urge in their 
defence that in coilsequence of  their efforts  to in- 
crease  consumption,  the producers are given  the 
opportunity to dispose  of  much more  raw inate- 
rial, and that thus, in the end, they will enjoy an 
increase  of  total  profits,  even  where  prices  are 
reduced. 
The assertion as to the increase  of  prices is un- 
deniably justified  in  certain  instances.  But the 
possibilities  as well  as the consequences  of  such 
enhancement  have  certainly  been  exaggerated. 
Ollly a  small increase  of  prices  is possible with- 
out danger.2  On the other hand, trusts undoubt- 
edly can prevent a collapse of  prices, and they can 
temporarily raise prices slightly, and pocket larger 
Report of fourth annual meeting of  the stockholders of  the 
American Cotton Oil Company, August 31, 1893.  In 1894 the 
enormous crop again reduced the prices for cottonseed. 
Je18k.s sets forth in detail these dangers : Rise of  new com- 
petitors, diminished consumption, et~. 72  INDUSTBIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
profits in consequence  of  their improved methods 
of  production.  Within  the  range  of  common 
market prices the cost  of  production under  ordi- 
nary conditions and the normal rate of  profit may 
fluctuate at the expense  of  eaoh  other.  Produc- 
tion under the most advantageous economic  con- 
ditions  yields  an  extra  profit  to the  individual 
undertaker.  Whether under  existing  conditions 
of  distribution  the  community  at large  should 
share in this extra profit,  certainly is open to dis- 
cussion.  Jenks  declares  that the  combinations 
have occasionally attempted to secure more  than 
this legitimate extra profit, and that the establish- 
ing of  trusts resulted in a temporary increase of 
prices.  The general range  of  prices, as given in 
his article, for petroleum,  sugar, and spirits, raw 
material and product, may be  seen from the fol- 
lowing table and diagrams.' 
All well-managed  and  successful  trusts  have 
thus far attempted to progress.through  steadily 
improving  their  plant  and  affording  increased 
facilities  to  their  customers.  None  have  suc- 
ceeded in securing an absolute and lasting monop- 
oly, in spite of  the protective system.  As soon as 
a competitor sees an opportunity, he makes use of 
1 Jenks'  LL Capitalistic Monopolies,"  pp. 491-493,  497. NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS  .  7 3 
AVERAGE ANNUAL  PRICE  IN  CENTS  OF  REFINED  AND 
YEARS  . 
1870  .... 
1871  .... 
1872  .  .  . 
1873  .... 
1874  .... 
1875  .... 
1876  .... 
1877  .... 
1878  .... 
1879  .... 
1880  .... 
1881  .... 
1882  .... 
1883  .... 
1884  .... 
1885  .... 
1886  .... 
1887  .... 
1888  .... 
1889  .... 
1890  .... 
1891  .... 
1892  .... 
1893  .... 
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it, even against the almighty Stanclard Oil Trust.] 
A  combination  of  independent  oil  refiners  has 
recently attempted direct exports to Europe.  A 
new pipe line has been built, -  the  United States 
Pipe  Line, -and  the  Columbia  Oil  Company, 
which  controls  it,  has  successfully  combined  a 
number of  smaller oil refineries.  They own three 
pipe systerns for refined  oil, tank-plants and tank- 
steamers.  They ship their  oil  regularly to cus- 
tomers  in  London,  Ainsterdam  and  Mannheim. 
It  seeins very likely that this attempt will finally 
lead to an uilderstaiiding and coinbinatio~i.~ 
The rise of  the Columbia Oil Con~pany,and  the 
fact that the Standard Oil Company does not own 
a considerable part of  the oil lands, is said to have 
led to the failure of  the American-Russian  nego- 
tiations of  1894.  When the question of  a division 
of  the world was discussed in Paris, the Standard 
Oil  Company  could  not  comply  with  the  con- 
ditions  insisted  on by the Russians.  The latter 
required  evidence  that  the  Standard  Oil  Conl- 
pany  has  successfully  checked  all  competition. 
1 Vide L. G. MePherson  Li The Meaning of  Corporations and 
Trusts,''  Pop~ilnr  Sciezce ~Monthly,  July, 1894, p. 207. 
2  Tollos :  "  Nachtrag zu der A bhnndlung : Cartelle in Russ- 
land,"  in  b'chriften  des  Vereins fur  Socia2politik,  Vol.  11.  2, 
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The Americans  asked for  a  stay of  proceedings 
,,ti1  they shonld  have  dealt  with  the  Columbia 
Oil Con1pany.l 
The Cotton Oil Company2 can maintain its posi- 
tion only by the continuous i~nprovement  and en- 
largement  of  its plant  and the cheapening  of  its 
Again and again independent competi- 
tion  crops up from' among a  class  which  detests 
(6 serfdom" in large undertakings.  A new south- 
ern cotton oil  conlpany has been established.  In 
sugar refining, Claus Spreckels originally started 
a number  of  refineries in San Francisco and l'hil- 
adelphia,  to compete  with the  trust.3  Later  he 
corisolidated with the trust.  Hxt there are still a 
small  number  of  independent refineries, and two 
larger ones are nearly c~rnpleted.~ 
How  far  some  trusts have  gone  in  their  at- 
tempts  to  ward  off  competition  is  shown  by 
numerous  examples. 
The  Distilling  and  Cattle  Feeding  Company 
has  tried,  through its secretary, to bribe  one  of 
the  public  gaugers.  The latter,  while  perform- 
Vide ibid.  Vide below. 
Vide  Clazis  Spreckels'  testimony,  United  States  House 
Report, 50th Congress, No. 3112, p. 172. 
It is difficult, however, to ascertain whether in one form or 
another these are not  connected with  the  trust, and are not 
built only to preserve the semblance of  competition. 76  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
ing his  official duties, was to place a bomb under 
one of  the alcohol tanks in the Chicago distillery 
of  its most dangerous competitor.1 
In the  petroleum  business,  an  oil  dealer  in 
Buffalo  attempted  to trade with the competitors 
of  the  Standard  Oil  Company,  who  made  him 
cheaper offers.  After a  while the  Standard  Oil 
agent came  and told hiin thak unless this should 
be stopped, an office would be  opened to ui~dersell 
him until  he  should be  ruined.  To indemnify 
itself, the Standard Oil Company would raise  the 
price  of  oil  correspondirigly  in  certain  zones 
around Buffalo.  Thereupon the merchant thought 
it better  to resume relations  with the Standard 
Oil Company, in spite of  its higher prices.2 
Where it mas impossible to overcoine the com- 
1 Vide report 011  the Whiskey Trust investigation, House Re- 
port KO. 2600, pp.  16-30  and 63.  IUo  doubt is left as to the 
truth of  this fact.  There is evidence  that, in case of  the gaug- 
er's compliance, the machine was constructed so as to blow him 
up at once  with the tank, and  thus to secure his silence.  In 
spite  of  the unmistakable  proofs,  the  parties  interested  suc- 
ceeded  in having  a  suit  against  them  dropped.  It was  also 
testified  that they were well  prepared for the "accident,"  and 
had entered, with this in view, into heavy stock speculation, 
in the expectation of  a  bull  move after the annihilation of  the 
largest competitor.  Vide also the story of  the  Buffalo Explo- 
sion "  in Lloyd's ''  Wealth against Conlmonwealth,"  p. 250. 
Vide Lloyd, ib. NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  '7 7 
petition by the usual means,  special systems were 
devised  to  secure  the  continuous  patronage  of 
customers.  Thus  originated  the rebate  systems 
in  the  cigarette  and  alcohol  trade.  The trust 
grants  to  its  customers  a  rebate  of  5%-7%,  or 
other inducements, in case they are able  to prove 
that ~vithiil  a  given tiine they have bought  their 
elltire supply from- it.  To secure effective  con- 
trol, the rebates  are not paid until after a certaiu 
pried and the filing of  an affidavit that the cus- 
tomer has,  in the  interim, not bought  elsewhere. 
Since,  meanwhile,  new  purchases  are concludetl, 
the  interest of  the customer  to continue the re- 
lation  is constantly kept up.l  This  system  has 
been  upheld  by  the  courts, ~vhilst  a  pledge  to 
deal exclusively with a single party was adjudged 
illegal, al~d  consequently not ~errnitted.~ 
For the reasons  given  above, the  author does 
not care  personally to undertake that most diffi- 
cult task, the investigation of  prices.  Dodd and 
Gunton  show  decreases,  Jenks  increases,  as  a 
1 Voucher;  cf. Appendix X and X a. 
Its enemies reproached the Whiskey Trust for indemnifying 
itself  by a sudden  raise in  prices as soon as the rebate list had 
reached high figures.  The customers in that case could not help 
accepting Ihe measure.  The trust denies the truth of  this charge, 
and declares that it does not change its prices except in connec- 
tion with the situation of  the market. result  of  combillation.  A glance into the excel- 
lent and 111ost  valuable publication  of  the  United 
States Senate  on wholesale  prices,  teaches  that, 
leaving  local  and temljorary  fluctuations  out of 
the question, the trusts have at least not stopped 
everywhere the reductioil of  prices in the industrial 
pro&cts.  One might feel encouraged to believe 
that they will by  ancl  by  b~iiig  about a  state of 
stable  equilibrium  at a  generally  lower  level; 
though Jenks declares that thus far the friends of 
the  combinatiolls  have  more  often  twlked  about 
possibilities  in this  direction  than  shown  that 
anything has been  actually done. 
V.  The  following table  shows the amount of 
capital  and  funded  indebtedness  of  the  most 
important industrial trusts.  It may be noted that 
the amount of  capitalization  does  not correspond 
at all to the actual value of  the undertakings  at 
the time of  their establishment. NATUILE AND  EFFECT OF TRUSTS.  7  9 
(The bncketted figures give the amount of authorized capital.) 
berican  Cotton Oil CO. .  . . . 
American Tobacco Co.  .  . . . 
American Type Founders' Co..  . 
Diamond Match Co.  . . . . . 
Distilling and Cattle Feeding Co. . 
American Soda Fountain Co.  .  . 
American Straw-Buard Co. . . . 
American Sugar Refining Co.  .  . 
National Lea6 Go.  .  .  .  . . . 
National Linseed Oil Co. . . . . 










New Pork Biscuit Co.  .  .  . . 
United Stares Cordage Co.  .  .  . 
United States Leather Co.  .  . . 
I  I  I 
$1,250,000  first preferred, ditto second preferred. 
a  (3,000,000) 2,219,400  first preferred, (2,500,000)  1,846,000  second preferred 
stock. 
6,000,000 guaranteed 6%  stock ;  8,000,000 preferred  stock. 
- 
1,061,000 
(10,000,000)  - 
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The Standard  Oil Trust originally was  estab- 
lished with $70,000,000 trust certificates, which 
exceeded  the  actual  value  by  at  least  100%. 
Later,  it has  increased  its capital  by  distribut- 
ing a  25% stock dividend among  its  certificate 
holders.  At  the  time  of  its  dissolution,  it 
was  stated to have  a  nominal capital of  $102,- 
500,000, on which it distributed 12% per annum; 
this dividend was  equal to at least 30% of  the 
real capital.  Besides,  it is said to have  accu- 
mulated a  coesiderable amount, by which, in one 
form or another, its security-holders will be bene- 
fited.  The  Cotton  Oil  Company  and  all  the 
others  are  likewise  overcapitalized  by  200%- 
500%.  Not only the former, but also the future 
earning  capacity  has  been  taken  into  account. 
The original  valuation  is  not  based  upon  the 
actual  property,  but,  to  a  larger  extent, 11po11 
good  will,  rights,  and  prospects.  In  most  of 
the  trusts  the  common  stock  originally repre- 
sented  only  watek  The quotations show that, 
in the opinion of  the exchanges,  the anticipated 
increase  of  value has  not always been  realized. 
No  information  can  be  got  about  the  present 
condition  of  the Standard Oil Trust,  for it has 
been  formally dissolved  (vide infra). 
The table on the next page shows the dividends 88  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
paid  by  the  above  companies  in the years  after 
1890.1 
The opinion of  financial circles as to the value 
of  securities of  that sort may be seen from a table 
of  quotations  for a  longer period;  a  third table 
gives, for the same securities, the montllly quota- 
tioils during the panic-year  1893, with the addi- 
tion  of  a  few  other  leading  companies, and the 
price of  silver bullion certificates in New York. 
The foregoing hbles show remarkable features, 
which will be discussed later from a general point 
of  view.2 
A  great and striking difference  exists in the 
position of  the several companies,  in consequence 
of  their methods of  management.  Some of  them, 
as the American Tobacco Company and the Stand- 
ard  Oil Trust,  are  model  organizations,  which 
look  forward  only to  a  continual  betterment  of 
their position.  The same is true of  the reorgan- 
From Bmdstreet's. 
Tlie financial results have by no means been in all instances 
as favourable as were  expected.  This may to some extent be 
ascribed to the enormous salaries voted to the managers  by the 
boards,  i.e. their friends.  A  disproportionate amount  of  the 
earnings is absorbed  in this manner; and this, of  course, ab- 
sorbs a good deal of  the benefits derived from economies.  On 
the other hand, it is argued that men possessed of  extraordinary 
business ability would not  otherwise be  induced to offer their 
services. NATURE  AND  EFFECT  OF TRUSTS.  8  9 
ized Cotton Oil Company,  and as far as business 
management  is concerned, of  the Sugar Refining 
Company, and others.  Some, however, have been 
subject to the most scathing criticism.  Thus far 
two great disasters have  gone on record:  in 1889 
the  old  Cotton  Oil Trust  suspended payments, 
and on May 4,  1893, the National  Cordage  Com- 
pany went to pieces.  Both were  ruined through 
very  apparent  mismanagement.  The  managers 
misused  the companies'  funds for gambling pur- 
poses on the exchanges, and did not concern them- 
selves with the development of  legitimate business, 
but with Credit Mobilier transactions, and specn- 
lations for rapid gains.  It is one of  the most dis- 
astrous holes in the corporation law of  the United 
States, that  stock  companies  are  not  forbidden 
to buy  or sell their own  securities.  In Europe 
such  transactions have been  punishable for many 
years.  It has occasionally happened in the United 
States that managers, when  successful  in opera- 
tions on the exchanges, have pocketed the profits, 
but when  unsuccessful, have  thrown  the loss  on 
the stockholders. 
In the Whiskey, Linseed Oil, and Starch  trusts, 
actual crises have not yet occurred;  but in 1892 
the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company mas 
very near the verge of  ruin, and to-day it is again 92  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE LATEST  PHASE  OF  CORPORATION  LAW,  AND 
ITS  EFFECT  ON  THE  FORM  AND  NATURE  OF 
COMBINATIONS. 
I.  THE essential  provisions  of  the  anti-trust 
legislation passed  in the different states are sum- 
marized  hy  Mr.  Doddl  as  follows  (the  word 
"  persons " being used for "  persons, corporations, 
associations,  and  partnerships,"  and  the  word 
''  agreement,"  or  6G attempt,"  for "  contract,  com- 
bination, conspiracy, understanding, arrangement, 
or act ") : - 
In  sixteen states, it is a criminal  conspiracy for 
two or more persons to agree to regulate or fix the 
price of  any  article, or to fix or limit the quantity of 
any article to be manufactured, mined, produced, 
or sold.  Regulating and fixing prices necessarily 
include increasing and  reducing prices, but in most 
of  the statutes these are also specified as criminal. 
In six states, it  is a  crime  for  two  or  more 
persons to enter into any agreement whereby "  full 
1 "  Present Legal  Status of  Trusts," Harvard Law Review, 
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and free competition in production  and sale"  is 
prevented. 
In two states and one territory, it is a crime for 
two or more  persons to "attempt to monopolize" 
any article. 
In Nebraska, two or more persons  are guilty of 
conspiracy if  they agree to suspend  or  cease  the 
sale of  any manufactured products, or if they agree 
that the profits of  any manufacture or sale  shall 
be  made  a  common fund, to  be  divided  among 
them. 
In Texas and Mississippi, besides  the crimes of 
fixing, regulating, increasing, and reducing prices, 
it is also a cri~ne  for persons  to settle the price 
of  any  article  between  themselves,  or  between 
themselves  and others. 
In New  York, it is a  crime  to enter into any 
contract  ~vhereby  competition  in  the  supply  or 
price of  articles in common use for support of  life 
and health may be restrained or preveuted for the 
purpose of  advancing prices.1 
The bias of  public opinion against trusts proper 
was  bound  to  produce  some  effect;  especially 
as  some  decisions  of  the  courts2 gave  rise  to 
Anti-Trust Laws of  the United States, Illinois and Texas ; 
Appendices 1V.-VII. 
Peoplt  versus North  River  Sugar Refining Company, 121 94  INDUSTltIAL  COMBINATIOXS. 
the fear that  the  judiciary  would  not be  found 
willing to recognize  the legality  of  the  'L  trust " 
agreements.  It was  considered  wise  to yield in 
the matter of  form.  The trusts were transformed 
into companies.  Already in 1887 Cook  pointed 
out1 that although in New York and several other 
states a stock conipanp could not own the stock of 
other companies, this has always been permitted in 
some other places.  "Rlaine,  Coiinecticut, and New 
Jersey, since time immemorial, had been the snug- 
harbour  of  roaming  and  piratical  corporations. 
Afterwards  they were outdone by Kentucky and 
West  Virginia,  whose  corporation  statutes  are 
marvels  of  alluring  attractiveness  for the incor- 
poration  of  enterprises located  in  other states."2 
Seeing  wllat  financial  advantages  these  states 
enjoyed in consequellee  of  their  liberality,  what 
large revenues they drew from their incorporated 
"guests,"  many  of  the  others followed  them  in 
changing their legislation and practice.  As citi- 
zens  of  one state may establish  a  stock company 
in  any other  state,  and  as  a  stock company,  in 
consequence  of  the  interstate  comity,  is  free to 
New York, 582 ; State vevsus  Standard Oil Company, 30 U.  S. 
Rep. 279. 
"Trusts,"  p. 6. 
Cook, ''  Corporation Problem,"  pp  107-110. COI1l'OKATION  LAW.  95 
transact  busiiiess  ell  over  the  country,l-with 
the  one  exception  of  puasi-public  corporations, 
as  railroads,  gas  companies,  etc., -it  has 
been  very  easy  to  find  a  new  and  more  com- 
fortable hoine  for prosecuted  trusts. 
We now liad tlle strange  spectacle of  the enact- 
ment of  the most  severe laws against trusts and 
cornbinations on the one hand, and on the other 
of  a  trailsforination of  tlie  corporation law which 
facilitated a  renloclelling  of  the trusts, and their 
continued transaction  of  business  in the  state. 
Meailwhile a change in the taxation laws was pro- 
vided in inany states, favourable to foreign corpo- 
ration~.~  This removed tlie very difficulty which 
1lad been  one of  the chief  reasons why originally 
the forrn  of  ib trusts" had been  chosen ; the old 
laws  of  several  states ~vould  have  conipelled  a 
foreign  company  to pay  taxes  on its full stock 
or  transactions.  The  most  popular  states  for 
chartering companies  are at present  New Jersey 
and Illinois.  The former has attracted across the 
river  nearly  all  corporations  doing  business  in 
New York.  In New York, the courts and public 
opinioil are in favour of large companies ; but the 
charter is  too  expensive,  taxation too  high,  and 
Cook,  Stocks and Stockholders,"  $§ 237-240. 
Cook, "Corporation  Problem,"  pp.  102-107. 96  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
the liabilities of  stockholders and officers are too 
far-reaching.  In New  Jersey  the  incorporation 
fee is one-fiftieth of  one per cent of  the par value 
of  the capital stock; the annual tax is one-tenth 
of  one  per  cent of  the same; and a  charter can 
be  obtained for "ally  lawful business  or purpose 
whatsoever."  Only one  director  need be  a  resi- 
dent  of  the  state;  the  amount  of  capital  stock 
is unlimited ; there is no liability on the part of 
the  stockholders  for  corporate  debts;  property 
and property  rights can  be  made  the basis  of  a 
stock issue;  and annual reports of  the business 
are  not  required  to  be  made  public.'  Similar 
provisions  are  contained  in  the  Illinois  law. 
But  the  proceedings  instituted against  a  num- 
ber  of  "trusts"  by the  attorney-general  makes 
it  likely that,  if  such proceedings  continue,  the 
corporatio~ls will  no  longer  feel  safe  in  Illi- 
nois ; some  of  them  have  already  announced 
their  intelltion  to abandon their Illinois charter 
and take out one in New Jersey.  In West Vir- 
ginia, the fee  is  only $56 ;  the annual tax, $50 ; 
no director need  be  resident;  annual  and  other 
meetings  may  be  held  outside  the  state,  etc. 
1 TViZliam H.  Corbin, "The  Act concerning Corporations in 
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bb Therefore1 all the tramp and bubble  companies 
seen1  to  have  gravitated  to  her  jurisdiction." 
The manufacture of  corporations for the purpose 
of  enabling  thein  to do all  their  business  else- 
where  seems  to  be  the  policy  of  this  "young 
and  enterprising  state,"  and it has  become  the 
(&Mecca  of  irresponsible  corporatioas."  But the 
largest  corporations  have  nevertheless  preferred 
to this  charter  or  that  of  Kentucky  the  more 
expensive, but seemingly more  respectable,  char- 
ters of  the states before mentioned. 
11.  The transformation  of  the trusts into cor- 
porations has been  mainly brought about by pro- 
ceedings of  a formal character.  A former trustee 
and present director of  one of  them, has told the 
author that he is not aware of  the slightest change 
in his position,  or in its meaning.  After a  com- 
mittee  had  decided  upon  the  preliminaries,  a 
charter &as taken out ;  the trwtees became direc- 
tors;  the officials  of  the  trust  were  appointed 
officers of  the new company ;  the trust certificates 
were  exchanged  for  shares,  through  the  agency 
of  some  trust company,  on the basis of  a stipu- 
lated triangular agreement.  The parties  to this 
agreement were the trustees, a certificate holder's 
Cook, "  Stocks and Stockholders,"  p.  1604. 
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committee,  and the trust company.1  The latter 
issued,  sometimes  to  the  individpal  companies, 
and sometimes to the trust certificate holders, an 
amount  of  stock of  the new  company represent- 
ing the corresponding value  of  trust certificates 
deposited with it for that purpose. 
Attempts of  certain individuals hostile to trusts 
to have  a  receiver  appointed for liquidating the 
trust affairs (as  in the  case  of  the Standard Oil 
Trust)  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  the 
courts.  All  former  trusts have passed  through 
this metamorphosis with the exception of  the Chi- 
cago Gas Trust (vide  supra), and of  the Standard 
Oil  Trust, whose  position  was  a  different  one, 
inasmuch  as its nine  trustees  owned  persoilally 
more than 50% of  the total capital stock.  Their 
motion, at the general meeting  of  trust certificate 
holders, oil Xarch 21, 1892, to dissolve the St,zncl- 
ard Oil Trust, and to restore  to the iildividual 
trust certificate holders  a  proportionate share in 
the individual  companies,  was  practically  with- 
out significance.  The propositioil was accepted ; 
the  equitable interest " of  the trust certificate 
holders as registered in the books of  the company 
was  retransformed  into a  "legal  ownership " of 
1 Appendix XI. corresponding amounts of  stock, and recorded in 
the books  of  the individual  participating under- 
takings.  All previous actions of  the trustees were 
accepted and approved.  These officers were com- 
missioiled to wind up affairs in such way as they 
deemed  fit;  to file,  as  "attorneys  in fact,"  all 
necessary  papers;  and  to  report  periodically. 
Four  months after  the  passage  of  that motion, 
the voting  power  of  the trustees was  to expire. 
In September, 1893, at a  new  meeting, informa- 
tion was  given  that more  than 50% of  the trust 
certificates had  been  exchanged  in the proposed 
manner.  Consideriilg  the  fact  that  the  resolu- 
tions do not ask  for,  but only permit,  a  change 
of  the  certificates ; that the  trustees  own  more 
than  50%  of  the  capital  stock  as  their  private 
property ; and,  finally,  that there  is  no  reason 
why  the  other  trust  certificate  owners  shoulcl 
have  lost  their  confidence  in  the  former  trus- 
tees,-we  may  feel  justified  in  assunling  an 
identity  of  the  trust  certificates  retransferred, 
with  that private  property  of  the trustees.  Of 
the  other  certificate  holders,  it  is  not  likely 
that many have felt an inducement  to make the 
change.  Thereby it  is explained why the Standard 
Oil managers did not see the necessity of  re-estab- 
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of  their  proprietary  rights,  they  cohere  firmly 
enough; they look upon their securities as perma- 
nent investments, and do not use them for gambling 
purposes.  The  large  owners  now,  as formerly, 
control the management of  all the companies.  No 
changes have  taken place  in the general admin- 
istration,  nor  is it expected,  in the near future, 
that  anything  like  one  centralized  iilstitution 
will  be  re-established.  In the aforesaid  meeting 
of  September,  1893, one  of  the stockholders put 
the  question  whether  in  future  the  individual 
conlpanies  wonld  practically  compete  with  each 
other.  The administration  maintained  a  diplo- 
matic silence : that was to be  left to the future.' 
The stock  of  about  twenty  refining  and  trans- 
portation  companies,  of  establishments  for  the 
manufacture  of  by-products  and  packing  mate- 
rials was  finally held ready for distribution.  If 
ever serious  attempts should be  made  to  attack 
the  large  companies  by  legal  proceedings,  the 
Standard Oil institution would offer the least pur- 
chase  in  its formal  organization.  The advisers 
1 Before the expiration of  the voting  power  of  the trustees, 
and  before  the  formal dissolution  of  the trust, a number  of 
smaller corporations were dissolved or amalgamated with larger 
ones.  (Proceedings  of  meeting  held  at 26  Broadway, New 
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of  the  Standard  Oil  Company  seem  still  to be 
as superior  to those  of  other  companies,  as they 
were  twelve  years  ago.  At  that  time  they 
avoided  the  introduction  of  any of  the clauses 
into the original deed, which later on the Sugar 
and Cotton Oil Trust introduced as an improve- 
ment.  It  was  this  very  improvement  xvhich 
enabled  the  attorney-general  to  point  out  the 
illegal tendencies  of  the combiiiatioi~s.~ 
The Sugar Trust2 would have been able to take 
the same course as the Standard Oil Trust, because 
here, too, the trustees owned a controlling interest. 
Qut it was preferred  to give the trust an imme- 
diate successor  in the American  Sugar Refining 
1 The Standard Oil Trust deed did not colltain detailed state- 
ments of  any especial purposes of  the trust, except such  as are 
of  the very  nature  of  every  common  law trust.  The  Sugar 
Trust deed  added a  number  of  details,  such as: to promote 
economy of  administration ;  to reduce the cost of  refining, thus 
enabling the price of  sugar to be kept as low as is consistent 
with reasonable profit ;  to give  to each  refinery the benefits of 
all  appliances  and processes known  to the others, or used  by 
others, and useful to improve the quality and diminish the cost 
of  refined sugar; to  furnish protection  against  unlawful  com- 
binations  of  labour; to protect  against  inducements to  lower 
the standard of  refined  sugar; and to generally  promote  the 
interest of  the parties  hereto in all  lawful  and  suitable ways. 
(U. S. House Reports, No.  3112, Sugar Trust, p. 3.) 
Details  about  the  Sugar Trust,  though  not  from sources 
altogether  reliable, in "  The Sugar Trust,"  Tariff  Reform,  Au- 
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Company.  The  uncertainty  of  the  American 
tariff  policy  made  it very desirable  to the trus- 
tees  to  be  in  a  position  to rapidly  dispose  of 
their property,  whenever  a  change  in  the  tariff 
threatened a decrease in values.  In such a  case, 
the stock of  a  large company naturally would be 
inore marketable.' 
The  following  is  the  outline  of  the  present 
organization  of  the large combillations : At their 
head we find  a president, with a  board of  admin- 
istration and  a  staff  of  officers,  as required  by 
the  respective  corporation  laws.  The board  is 
1 Events proved their course to have been the right one.  The 
tariff  debates of  1894 at one time caused  the fear of  an aboli- 
tion of  all sugar duties.  This abolition would have considerably 
decreased the value of  the American Sugar Refining Company's 
property.  At the tirne  of  the last general meeting in January, 
1894, it was  found  that, in  anticipation  of  these events, the 
principal  stockholders in the board had already rid themselves 
of  a large part of  their holdings.  The measures adopted by the 
Standard Oil Trust tend of  course in a  direction exactly oppo- 
site to that intended by the  anti-trust  movement.  Public hos- 
tility had been aroused because in a trust there was no one who 
could be held responsible in case of  unlawful operations.  More 
publicity  was  desired.  The trust  seemed  to yield ; the anti- 
trust laws required dissolution, and so it dissolved.  But in fact 
this was nothing but a  complete  withdrawal  from the field  of 
publicity.  Nothing  shows more  clearly  the  mistakes  of  the 
present  anti-trust legislation.  Both groups, Standard Oil  and 
Su:ar,  Cotton Oil, etc., comply with  the letter of  the law only 
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usually  divided into two chief  departments,  one 
of  which takes charge of  the financial, the other 
of  the technical  side of  the undertaking.  They 
are  subdivided  into  committees  on  sales,, on 
I  purchases, on the technical supervision of  bspecial 
branches,  and so  on.  The individual undertak- 
ings are  run with  a  certain  degree  of  iadepen- 
dence,  which  occasionally  extends to their  very 
organization.  In general, the central  office  buys 
tlie  raw  material,  fixes  the  selling  price  of  the 
manufactured goods, and apportions larger orders. 
The brarlches  take smaller  orders  directly,  and 
decide  upon  most  of  the  details  of  their  man- 
agement.  Continuous  intercourse  is  kept  up 
with the central  ofice,  and  regular  reports  are 
filed.  For  example,  in  the  Whiskey  Trust the 
braliclles  send  daily  statements  of  production, 
sales,  and  deliveries.  Most  of  the  organiza- 
tions encourage a  spirit of  independence  and of 
rivalry  among  their  branches,  in  regard to im- 
provini  and cheapening  the  process  of  produc- 
1 The board of  the  United  States Leather Company, for ex- 
ample,  corisists of  twenty-seven  members, with  an executive 
committee of  nine.  The other eighteen preside over the admin- 
istration of  the individual tanneries.  The executive comniittee 
is divided  into conimittees  on  finance,  on  purchase  of  green 
hides,  on sales,  etc.  The technical processes  are left  to tlie 
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tion.  The reports  of  the American  Cotton  Oil 
Company 1 give a very cornplete inside view of  its 
organization.  l'he  company has fifteen directors, 
eleven of  yhom live in New  York,  two in New 
Jersey,' one  in  St.  Louis,  and  one  in Atlanta, 
Georgia.  The president  is  chosen  from  among 
the  inen~bers  of  the  board;  not  so  the  vice- 
president, the secretary, and the treasurer.  The 
administration has an attorney of  its own.  The 
executive  offices  are in New  York  City;  execu- 
tive officers besides  those  just  mentioned  are the 
chairman  of  the  Board,  and the  three  members 
of  the finance  committee  (recently  established). 
The head  office  is  in New  Jersey.  A  banking 
firm serves as transfer agent and registrar of  de- 
benture  bonds,  a  trust  company  as registrar  of 
preferred and common  stock.  There is a central 
accounting  department  with  a  comptroller,  an 
auditor,  and  a  statistician,  and  there  are  also 
departments for  sales,  transportation,  insurance, 
and  advertising.  A  chemist  is  in charge  of  a 
central  laboratory.  The Holland American  Cot- 
ton  Oil  Compaizy  has been  opened  as  an inde- 
pendent  branch  with  a  Dutch  charter  a  year 
ago, and the former foreign representative of  the 
1 Reports presented to the stockholders of  the American Cot- 
ton Oil Company, at their annual meetings, for the fiscal years 
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Cotton  Oil  Company  has  been  appointed  its 
president.  The headquarters  of  the foreign  re- 
presentative have, in consequence, been transferred 
fro111  Hamburg  to  Rotterdam.  Nine  state com- 
panies, operating crushing mills, exist in Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, North Car- 
olina,  South Carolina, Tennessee, ~tnd  Louisiana; 
they  are  managed  by  vice-presidents.  Of  nine 
refineries,  two  are  situated  in  New  Jersey,  one 
in  Chicago,  one  in  St.  Louis,  one  in  Cincin- 
nati, one  in Providence, one  in Memphis, one in 
Louisville, and one in Louisiana.  Two of  them, 
the  Wilcox  Lard  and  Refining  Company  and 
the  N.  K.  Fairbank  Company,  are  in  them- 
selves  establishments of  a world-wide reputation. 
They  maintain  branches  devoted  to  a  further 
utilization  of  cotton  oil.  They have  their  own 
staff  of  officers,  sales agents, etc.  One hundred 
and twenty manufacturing properties are located 
in sixteen  states.  They are divided into: 
Running.  Dormant  Dismantled  Total. 
Crude Oil Mills  .  .  . . .  49  5 
An  18  72 
Refineries.  .  .  . .  . .  10  5  15 
Lard and Cottolene Plants  .  4  . . . . . .  4 
Soap Factories  .  .  . . .  8  1  9 
Cotton Giuneries.  . . . .  11  4  15 
Cotton Compressors.  .  . .  2  1  3 
FertilizerMixingEstablishments 2  .  .  .  .  .  .  2 
Total  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . .  .  .  120 The compally  owns  one tank  steamer of  4300 
tons and 2300, llorse power,  355 tank cars, 23 box 
cars, and one 'barrel car.  A  table  in the report 
for 189A1, gids a  comparison  between  the  cash 
value  'of  the  property  and  the  good  will,  and 
shows. the  proportion,  borne  by  each,  to  the 
capital  stock.  From 45.2%  in 1891, the  actual 
value of  the property rose  to 48% in 1892, 50% 
in  1893,  50.8%  of  the  capitalization  in  1894. 
From  this we  may conc,lude that at the time of 
establisllment  of  the  trust  and  even  up  to  its 
reorganization,  the, actual  value  of  the  under- 
taking, minus the good will, was not much  inore 
than from  one-fourth  to  one-fifth of  the capital 
stock.2  A  calculation  in  the  report  for  1893 
shows that the actual property  the11  represented 
a security on  the preferred stock equal to 125% 
of  its  par value ; the common  stock was  repre- 
sented  by  the 25% surplus above  the par  value 
of  the  preferred  stock,  all  other  increment  of 
property,  and  surplus  earnings  over  the  6% 
preferred  stock  dividends, and also  by the good 
will,  franchises,  leases,  contracts,  patents,  proc- 
esses, brands, and kindred assets  of  the business. 
1 p.  23. 
2 This agrees  with  the testimony  of  Mr. John  Scott before 
the New York State Committee in 1888. CORPORATION  LAW.  107 
This statement is important for the understanding 
of the morphology of  a well-managed giant under- 
taking of  that sort.1 
The rubber combination has adopted a peculiar 
organization.  For a number of  years, negotiations 
were pending which, after the failure  of  several 
pools, led, in 1892, to a preliminary understanding. 
But  not  until  1898  was  strength  and  vitality 
infused into  the  combination,  when  the head  of 
the most prominent concern  in the rubber manu- 
facture, which at that time joined  the pool,  was 
elected  president  of  the  whole.  To-day  it in- 
cludes all rubber-shoe  companies of  the country, 
and  a  few  other  rubber-goods  factories.  The 
United  States  Rubber  Coinpaily  owns  only  its 
own stock, and they pretend to be  run independ- 
ently.  Practically  it exercises  a  complete  and 
uniform  control ; it buys the rubber  on  a large 
scale through its agents in  the  South American 
markets,  imports  it  in shiploads,  and furnishes 
it to the'individual factories.  To avoid even the 
seniblance  of  a  combine,  all  the  officers  of  the 
1 It is said to be  customary  for the preferred  stock in all 
kinds of  American  stock companies  to represent  the  money 
value of  land, plant, materials, products, etc., whilst  the  com- 
mon  stock  at the beginning represents good  will, rights, etc., 
to which  by and by  accumulated profits add a more  tangible 
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several companies are left in their positions.  The 
sales are entrusted to a  company in New  York, 
while  the financial affairs are managed by a third 
firm.  The  company  has  closed  several  of  the 
factories, and in order to keep the remainder in 
touch .with each  other without transgressing the 
corporation  laws, the  United  Xtates  Rubber  Ad- 
vancers'  Club  has  been  formed,  composed  of  the 
managers of  the various factories.  They began by 
payiilg a joint visit to each establishment,  and in- 
vestigating the best methods of  production.  Since 
then they have met "  socially from time to time, in 
an informal manner, and have en passant discussed 
business  affairs."  Besides the savings  resulting 
from the wholesale purchases and the doing away 
with middlemen, much stress is laid by the man- 
agers  upon  the  technical  improvemeilts  effected. 
On account  of  the  short  time  of  the  combina- 
tion's  existence,  it is  not  yet  possible  to  form 
a  definite  judgment  of  its working.  The  same 
may  be  said  about  the  United  States  Leather 
Company.  It may be  mentioned  that these two 
companies,  and  also  the  Diamond  Match  Com- 
pany, the American Typefounders'  Company, the 
American  Tobacco  Company,  the  new  United 
States Cordage Company, and a  few others, have 
never  been  trusts  in the strict  legal  sense,  but 
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111.  Mr. Cook  seems to be  right in regarding 
it as a great moral victory for public opinion, that 
the trusts have been compelled to intrench them- 
selves  under  the  cover  of  corporate  charters.' 
The secrecy of  the trusts,  their power  to refuse 
information, and their  complete lack  of  responsi- 
bility mas indeed  a  very great danger.  But the 
most important legal questions still remain unset- 
tled.  No  serious  iilvestigator  of  this  question 
attributes great weight to the anti-trust statutes 
in  their  present  shape.  More  may perhaps be 
expected finally from the decisions  of  the courts. 
Legal judgments  depend upon  the coilception of 
public  policy;  and,  as this conception  is subject 
to change, the law-creating action  of  the courts 
is likely to  change  also.  That this is possible, 
and indeed  is done  by  a  process  of  quiet  and 
natural  progress,  is  the very  thing  that consti- 
tutes the strength of  the English common  law. 
It  is  not  to  the  disadvantage  of  conservative 
develoljment  that  the  decisio~ls of  the  judges 
are  occasionally  somewhat  behind  the  advanced 
demands of  the age.  It has been well remarked 
that  a  judge  who  has  to render  a  decisioil  on 
modern  proble~ns  received  his  education  in eco- 
nomics twenty-five to fifty years ago, when condi- 
1 W. TV.  Cook, "  Corporation Problem,"  p. 245. 110  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
tioils and views  were  very different.  Therefore 
he is very likely to  take a mistaken attitude towards 
a  recent  movement.  In a  comparatively  short 
time,  however,  there  will  sit  on  the  ber~ches  a 
race of  judges who  have received  a modern eco- 
nomic training.  They will be able to decide such 
a  case from a practical standpoint and with due 
consideration for time and place. 
The  most  important  recent  decisions  of  the 
United  States  courts  already  show  a  changed 
tenor.1  They declare the anti-trust legislation in 
its  present  shape  to  be  entirely  unserviceable. 
In his  report for  the  year  1893,2 the  attorney- 
general of  the United States expresses his views 
regarding the Sherman anti-trust law.  He con- 
siders this law illegal.  Though a member  of  the 
Democratic party, he apparently does not  expect 
very much from any sort of  anti-trust legislation of 
the present  He thinks that an exact defi- 
nition of  the punishable acts is almost impossible, 
and  that what  is  said  about monopolies  can  be 
applied  just  as  well  against  individual business 
1 Dodd,  Present Legal Status of  Trusts,"  p. 167-169. 
p. 20. 
As the former  attorney of  the Whiskey Trust, he has, of 
course, had the opportunity to study the trust question  from a 
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transactions.  He qnotes for his support the con- 
clusions of  a judge in the United States Court for 
the Southern District of  Ohio, recently elected an 
associate justice of  the Supreme Court : '' (1) that 
Congress cannot  limit  the right of  state corpora- 
tions or of  citizens in the acquisition,  accumula- 
tion,  or control  of  property;  (2)  that Congress 
cannot prescribe the prices at  which such property 
shall be sold  by the owner, whether a corporatioil 
or  individual;  (3)  that  Congress  cannot  make 
criminal the intents  and purposes  of  persons  in 
the acquisition and control of  property which the 
states of  their residence or creation  sanction ;  (4) 
that monopoly as prohibited  by the statute means 
an  exclusive  right in  one  party  coupled  with  a 
legal  restriction  or  restraint  upon  some  other 
party which  prevents the latter from  exercising 
or  enjoyiilg  the  same  right; (5)  and that  con- 
tracts in restraint of  trade and commerce as pro- 
hibited are contracts in general  restraint thereof, 
and such as would  be void  at common law, inde- 
pendently of  any statute." 
This decision must be accepted and acted upon 
as a  precedent,  until  it is  reversed  by  a  tribu- 
nal of  last  resort.  The attorney-general finally 
directs attention to the fact that an attempt has 
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the provisions  of  this  law,  and even  to  declare 
illegal  upon  this  ground  a  paragraph1  on  the 
statutes of  the Brotherhood of  Locomotive Engi- 
neers.  I11  other words, these measures of  restric- 
tion were invoked even to solve the great problem 
of  capital and labour!  It is generally  believed 
that the final decisions of  the Supreme Court will 
move on the lines of  the attorney-general's  report. CHAPTER VII. 
PUBLIC  OPINlON  AND  THE  COMBINATIONS. 
I.  THE  Theorists. 
There are many who  disapprove  of  trusts and 
upon  general  anti-centralistic  and 
individualistic reasons,  and as a  matter of  prin- 
ciple.  They regard  the  trusts  as  hideous  and 
rapacious monopolies,  which annihilate  the indi- 
vidual, and by heaping up wealth stolen  from the 
people, and by their entire organization, play into 
the hands  of  socia1ism.l  "They are things to be 
feared.  They  antagonize  a  leading  and  most 
valuable  principle  of  industrial  life,  in  their 
attempt to  curb competition and bring  it under 
strict control.  And when we witness  the heart- 
less  manner  in which  some  trusts  have  closed 
manufactories,  and  turned  men  willing  to  be 
industrious into the street, in order that they ]nay 
increase  profits  already  bea as on ably large, we  can- 
not help  asking ourselves  whether  the  trust, as 
we  see it, is not a  public  enemy, whether  it is 
1 Such are the views of  writers like Professor Hadley.  See his 
Speech before XIX. Century Club, New York, December, 1894. 114  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
not  teaching  the  labourer  dailgerous  lessons, 
whether it is not helping to breed anarchy."l 
These views are upheld by a number of  the older 
"Manchester  men "; their  arguments  are  most 
clearly summed up i11  the statement of  Gen. Roger 
A. Pryor before the New York Senate C~mmittee.~ 
"1.  Competition  between  buyers  of  the  raw 
material enhances the price to the producer. 
"  2.  Competition between sellers  of  the manu- 
factured article reduces  its price to the consumer. 
"  3.  Reduction of  price multiplies  the number 
of  consumers. 
"  4.  Increase of  consumption stimulates produc- 
tion to supply the increased demand. 
"5. Increase of  production implies an increase 
in the employment of  labour. 
." 6.  Competition  between  the  employers  of 
labour enhances the wages of  labour. 
"  7.  Enhancement of  the wages  of  labour in- 
volves the material and moral  amelioration of  the 
condition of  the labouring class. 
"  8.  Competition to sell stimulates to improve- 
ments in the quality of  the article offered. 
"  9.  Competition  to sell  urging  reduction  in 
the cost of  the article, ingenuity is quickened to 
1 Judge Cooley in Relfort's  Magazine, June, 1888. 
2  Lc Trust Combinations,"  p.  54. the invention of  expense-saving and labour-saving 
machinery,  and  so a  stimulus  is applied  to the 
progress  of  the useful  arts and sciences. 
((In  short, competition ministers to the welfare 
of  all classes  of  the  community,  and  augments 
the  resources  an& power  of  the state.  But the 
evil of  excessive competition is counter~cted  and 
arrested by the principle  of  self-interest  and the 
operation of  the  law of  supply and demand.  On 
the  other  hand, by  monopoly  all these  salutary 
results are arrested and prevented. 
" 1.  There being but a single buyer of  the same 
material, he  dictates to the producer  what  price 
he pleases. 
"2.  There being but a single seller of  the fin- 
ished article,  he  extorts  from  the  consumer  an 
exorbitant price. 
"  3.  The increased price to the consumer dimin- 
ishes  the  number  of  consumers  and  restricts 
consumption. 
"  4.  Diminished  consumption  necessitates  di- 
minished production. 
"  5.  Diminished production diminishes the em- 
ployment  of  labour. 
"6.  There being  but a  single employer  of  la- 
bour,  he hires it at his own reduced price. 
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sale  in any event, the  seller  has  no  motive for 
improving  the  quality  of  the  article,  and so  it 
necessarily deteriorates. 
"8.  Monopolizing  the  market,  and  so  com- 
manding his own price, and assured of  his profit, 
the manufacturer has no motive to reduce the cost 
of  production  by  the invelltion  of  labour-saving 
and expense-saving  machinery. 
"  9.  Monopolizing  the  production  and  the 
market,  and  so  com1na:iding  what  profits  he 
pleases,  the manufacturer  has  no  motive  to  in- 
crease  production, but, on  the contrary, is urged 
by  interest  to  save the expense of,  to him,  un- 
necessary production, and so takes factories in the 
combine  for the purpose only of  dismantling and 
stopping them. 
"In one word, monopoly despoils and oppresses 
all classes  of  the conlmunity and debilitates and 
impoverishes the state. 
"But the political  effects  of  the monopoly are 
even more menacing than are its economic results, 
-as  is illustrated  by the impressive warning  of 
the late Judge David Davis.  Great corporations 
and consolidated  monopolies  are fast seizing the 
avenues of  power that lead  to the control of  the 
government.  It is an open secret that they rule 
states through procured legislatures and corrupted courts, that they are strong in Congress, and that 
they are unscrupulous i11  the use of  means to con- 
quer  prejudice  and  to acquire  influence.  This 
condition of  things is  truly alarming, for unless 
it  be changed quickly and thoroughly, free institu- 
tions are doomed to be  subverted by an oligarchy 
resting upon a basis of  money and  corporate power." 
On the other hand, we  find  in favour of  corn- 
binations most of  the younger  economists  of  the 
country who have studied the question thorougllly. 
Under  the  influence  of  historical  thought,  they 
feel convinced that tlie movement is an unavoida- 
ble  step in all  organic development, and that it 
finds its justification in tlie tendencies  of  modern 
capitalism and its technical auxiliary, -the  large 
undertaking.  To such opinions they have  been 
led by  the observation  of  facts.  They are fully 
aware  that in  the  modern  mechanism  of  trusts 
there are many defects and faults, and these they 
strongly condemn.  But they think that all these 
drawbacks  are  not  inherent,  but  rather  tempo- 
rary.  According  as  they are influenced by  their 
professional position or their conception of  indus- 
trial society, they ask either for laissex faire, or for 
legal  recognition  and  regulation.  The  former 
standpoint  is  taken  by  Mr.  Dodd.'  He breaks 
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into a panegyric on  the progress  which has  been 
derived from the application  of  large  capital and 
from  the  centralization  of  undertakings.  He 
shows  how  l~umauity,  by  means  of  organization 
and  combination,  is  led  from  "thatched  huts, 
without chimneys  or glass,"  froin  a  state where 
"naked women  chanted wild measures, while the 
men with brandished clubs danced a war dance," 
to  the  highest  blessings  of  civi1ization.l  He 
emphatically  declares  that all state  interference 
is  unlawful,  unnecessary,  and  hampering;  he 
tries to defeat  the  anti-trust  wing  of  the laissez- 
faire  party on their own  ground, by urging that 
the play of  natural forces  and the  endeavours  of 
individuals  in furtherance  of  their own and the 
common  interest  ought  to  be  left  unchecked. 
President  Andrews,  Professor  Jenks,  and  Mr. 
George  Gunton, likewise, all approve of  the ten- 
dencies towards  organization, which  they believe 
to be  necessary, but they think that control,  and 
protection against  the frequent abuses  of  combi- 
nations,  are  badly  needed.2  Mr.  Guriton  warns 
them not to employ unjust methods, which cannot 
1 LL Aggregated Capital," p. 54. 
2 Andrews, "  Trusts accordiiig  to Official Investigation " ;  Gun- 
ton, "  Economic and Social Aspect of  Trusts "  ; Ident.,  LL The 
Economic Errors of  Trusts " ;  Jenls, "  Capitalistic Monopolies." PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  COXBINATIONS.  119 
but  result -  so  he  declares -in  their annihila- 
tion.  Their  only  justification  he  finds  in  their 
constant  effort  towards  the  cheapening  and im- 
proving of  products.  Professor Jenks admits the 
great importance of  cheaper prices ; he finds, how- 
ever, this to be only one of  many justifications for 
the rise  of  combinations and urges that the mere 
fact of  an increase  in  prices  is not  a  sufficient 
reason for denouncing trusts as an evil per se. 
The radical  socialists, especially the European 
im~nigralits with  social-democratic  tendencies, 
favour  trusts, in  so far  as  they appear to be  a 
progress along the lines of  their Marxian  creed, 
and a step in the direction  of  their future system 
of  production, in accordance with Marx's theories. 
The large capitals  concentrated  in a  few hands, 
the masses  impoverished, -that  will hasten the 
nationalization of  all private property.1  Against 
the present controllers of  the trust these men  of 
course protest most decidedly. 
The author has attempted to learn the opinions 
of  the anarchists  in regard to  trust^,^  but he has 
Vide Powderly, "  Trusts," p. 24. 
2  Besides  the  Russian-Polish  immigrants  there  are  some 
native Americans who from theoretical and ideal considerations 
have been led into the ranks  of  anarchism.  For instance, Mr. 
Ben. R. Tucker, in his  Instead of  a Book, a Fragmentary Ex- 
~lanatio~i  of  Philosophic Anarchism."  I cannot help thinking 120  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
not  succeeded  in  understanding  them.  They 
declare  the  capitalistic  orgallizatioll  of  procluc- 
tion to be  extremely harmful, as well as all capital 
and all organization.  But what  they  desire  to 
put in its place they are unable to say. 
11.  The Politicians. 
The great political parties differ in their views 
about the usefulness of  large combinations, accord- 
ing to their general doctrines.  The Democrats, 
who are anti-centralistic, regard  them as a great 
danger to the institutions of  the country.  They 
refer  to innumerable  cases  of  bribery,  of  undue 
influence  upon  the  courts  and  the  legislatures, 
which  are  directly ascribable to the trusts.  In 
this point  some  of  their  adversaries  agree  with 
them;  but Mr.  W.  W.  Cook,  who  is  himself  a 
Democrat,  believes  this  to  be  a  danger  which 
will  diminish steadily with the progress  and de- 
that these men, who are not so frenzied as the Italian and French 
anarchists, have  been  led  into anarchism simply by seeing the 
enormous corruption of  the administration around them.  They 
are mostly to be found in New York and Illinois.  It does not 
seem inexplicable that men who have never seen a  good Enro- 
pean government, and are too near-sighted to conceive  of  one, 
but have for a  long time witnessed  the failures  of  attempted 
domestic reforms, arrive at the conclusiori : rather no govern- 
ment than such a one ! 
This, of  course, applies only to a small minority ;  the major- 
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velopment  of  legislation.  "They  are not  seek- 
illg  glory,  or  honour,  or  even  power  for  the 
sake of  power;  they are seeking property.  . . . 
They are in politics  for business only.  . . .  If 
government  could afford to have  notbing  to do 
with  their  property,  they  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with  government.  . . .  Government  is 
seeking  to  rule  the  corporations,  and  the  cor- 
porations  are  seeking  to  control  the  govern- 
ment.  . . .  This source  of  political  corruption, 
however,  will  decrease,  as  time  goes  on.  The 
points  of  controversy  between  the  corporations 
and  government  will  grow  less  and  less,  and, 
as  these  disputes  diminish  in  number  and  in- 
tensity,  so  also  will  diminish  the  motives and 
reasons  of  the corporations  for  interfering with 
government. "  1 
The Republicans are more  in favour  of  combi- 
nation  froin the very nature of  their principles. 
They  strive  for  organization  and  centralization 
where  the  individual  has  proved  insufficient. 
Wherever  combinations  employ  illegal methods, 
as the trusts frequently have done, they are will- 
ing  to  restrict  them.  Otherwise  they  regard 
them as a natural outgrowth of  modern economic 
1 Cook, "Corporation  Problem,"  p. 247. 1'22  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
1ife.l  But public prejudice  made  it appear wise 
to them not to confess  too openly their feelings, 
and the platforms  of  1894 contain, as well on the 
Republican  as  on  the  Democratic  side,  strong 
denunciation  of  trusts. 
The. Populists detest every sort of  capitalistic 
organization.  They deemed it fit, however, in the 
Texas anti-trust law, whilst  forbidding combina- 
tions in mailufactured goods, to exempt the agri- 
cultural products in the hands of  the farmers from 
this restriction.  So far as they appreciate the un- 
avoidable character of  the movement, they ask for 
state control or ownership of  the monopolies.2 
To thoughtful men  of  whatever party, the rise 
of  a  plutocracy,  in  consequence  of  the  greater 
ease with which wealth can  now be accumulated 
appears to be  a source of  weighty objection  from 
the standpoint of  economic policg.3  This is one 
of  the largest questions forced to the front by the 
1 Opening address of  the Republican Congressional campaign 
in Boston by  George 0. ~Yhattuck,  October 2,  1894. 
2 H.  D. Lloyd,  '&  Wealth  against Commonwealth,"  Chapter 
XXXV. 
a Economists like Professor Sumner do not  consider this to 
be  dangerous  at all.  He  expresses his  astonishment, in the 
Forum, 1894, at the fact that a  man can hold a professorship 
of  eco~lomics  in a leading German university who points out in 
his  lectures that the increasing inequality in the distribution of 
wealth may prove a great danger in social politics. modern  economic  system,  and  it covers  a  much 
wider  field  than  our problem.  Some  like  Mr. 
Cool;,'  who are well aware of  the danger, regard 
the  corporate  investment  of  wealth  as  likely  to 
avert it.  'L  Corporations are created by the state ; 
as soon as they abuse their privileges,  the people 
can  restrict  or  annihilate them.  The plutocrat 
gives  bonds  to  keep  the  peace  when  he  acts 
through the corporation." 
Mr. Dodd, also, remarks that the middle classes, 
and even the workingmen, are enabled to partici- 
pate in the largest combinations by acquisition of 
their stock, and he tries to show by statistics that 
this very often occurs.  The figures published by 
the Sugar, Cotton  Oil, and some other companies 
seem to justify this view to a certain extent.2 
During the past  few years the-subject of  trusts 
and monopolies  has  begun  to  play an important 
r61e  in political  campaigns.  It was  one  of  the 
factors which,  together with  the  silver  question 
and the tariff, brought the Democrats in 1892 back 
1 Cook,  lL Corporation Problem,''  p. 279. 
To ascertain  whether  the increase  of  stockholders  is not 
largely  due to  a  more  general  distribution  of  the individual 
securities  among  a  relatively  very  small group  of  capitalists 
who gradually diversify their investments, would require a very 
minute comparison  of  the lists of  stockholders in the various 
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into power.'  There is no doubt that in the near 
future, the trust question will prove a still more 
important  issue. 
In  the last two or three  campaigns the matter 
has  come  to the front, not so  much  directly,  as 
in its connection with free trade slid protection. 
The free traders have skilfully,  and with a good 
understanding of  their effectiveness, directed vio- 
lent attacks against protection and trusts togetl~er.~ 
Their arguments are, that the tariff  favours the 
trusts,  that the  latter  impoverish  the people  by 
raising domestic prices, whilst selling more cheaply 
to foreign countries, that they depress wages, and 
even dismiss workingmen, and force tlienl  to be- 
come  tramps.  Instead of  increasing  production, 
as was intended by the tariff, of  opening new  es- 
tablishments, and employing more hands, the trusts 
are alleged to have limited and restricted industrial 
progress.  Some  Republicans,  such  as  Senator 
Sherman, have therefore declared their willingness 
to abolish  the protective  tariff  in industries con- 
trolled by trusts.  During the recent tariff debates 
1 Vide D. A. Wells, ''  Trusts and Monopolies." 
See  the pamphlets  of  the New  York Reform  Club : "  The 
Trusts  and  the  Tariffs" ; "  Labour,  Wages,  and  Tariff " ; 
"  'Tramps, TrusLs, arid Tariff " ;  Tariff  Trusts plead guilty " 
bL  Labour, Wages, and Trusts" ;  Trusts vs.  Wages." of  Congress, the House of  Representatives voted 
for free coal,  sugar,  and iron, chiefly  because  of 
the  combines  therein,  but  the  conlbinations  se- 
cured the services of the Senate, and defeated this 
attempt.' 
The free traders think that, once the duties are 
abolisliecl and the extra profits thence accruing are 
removed (profits ~vI-~ich  in the Sugar Trust recently 
anzounted  to $20,000,000  a  year2),  trusts will no 
longer pay, and so will collapse. 
111.  The Jurists. 
Their  opinions have already been touched upon 
in former chapters.  Seine of  them have remained 
strictly on the basis  of  the old English lam, and, 
1 The proceedings in the Senate, especially those  in connec- 
tion with the sugar schedule, make it worth while  to remember 
Cook's words : c' They have controlled nominating conventions, 
carried elections, dictated  appointments, tampered  with alder- 
Inen and municipal  authorities, bribed judges, legislators, and 
other public officers, and made their influence  felt in Congress 
and in every branch of  the  national  government,. . . . l'olitics 
and bribery are to tliem a matter of  business." -  LL Corporation 
Probleln,"  p.  246.  But Professor Jeizks  is right wlien  lie  calls 
events of  that sort political  phenomena,  which  originate  not 
from the  character  of  the trusts, but  from the character of 
prevailing  political  morality. 
Vide <'  The Sugar Trust"  in Tar@ Reform,  August, 1804. 
Twelve  to  thirteen  millions,  according  to  Mr.  Havenleyer'~. 
testimony before the Stock Gambling Investigation  Committee, 
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according to their views, that maxim is still valid 
which  two hundred and fifty years  ago declared 
the trusts "very dailgerous and obnoxious to  divers 
arts  and  artisans."  Formerly  this  was  Cook's 
standpoint, and to-day it is that of  Spelling.  But 
the body of  lawyers friendly to combines has  of 
late grown both in number and weight.  Promi- 
nent  among its leaders are to be  mentioned  the 
late Professor Dwight, Austin Abbott, and Ch. F. 
Beach, Jr.1 
Undeniably  the  decisions  of  the courts  have 
been  influenced  by  considerations  of  a  merely 
political nature, -which  inay be attributed to the 
practice  in inany  states  of  electing  judges  and 
pu'blic  attorneys by popular  vote  and only for a 
limited period. 
IV. Among  business  men  the  trust  has met 
with many enemies who  felt tEiemselves  put at a 
disadvantage by its existence.  They noticed with 
sorrow how they were being deprived of  their busi- 
ness, and exposed pitilessly to the arbitrariness of 
the magnates.  Seeing  their bread vanish,  they 
cried  out that the ~vhole  country  was  going  to 
starve.  Numberless  are  their  complaints,  ccn- 
tained in the reports of  the various investigations, 
1 Th. W. Dwight,  Li Legality  of  Trusts "  ; Austin Abbott, 
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in law-suits,  and in newspaper articles, and many 
of  them seem well justified by the methods which 
the  trusts  have  employed,  and  by  their  secret 
qreements with railroads and individuals.1  Yet 
it must be remembered, as Jenks says,2 that under 
a system  of  the freest competition, many  of  the 
busiilesses would have been  destroyed which have 
come to grief  froin the action of  the trusts. 
The public has complained about some sudden 
rises of  price.  The Sugar Trust was once accused 
of  having  kept  back  from  the market  the due 
supply, in order to advance prices  artificially;  but 
it  urged  as its defence poor  crops and the non- 
arrival of  raw materials.  The WThiskey combine 
has doubtlessly displayed  a great deal of  arbitra- 
riness.  Complaints  have  been  made  about  the 
deterioration of  the trust-made products;  for in- 
stance, recently against the Standard Oil combine. 
The latter answers  that this is  only  temporary, 
and due to the introduction  of  the new  Ohio oil, 
which is much more  impure, and cannot at once 
be  refined  to the highest  degree.  Generally the 
trusts claim  to have raised  steadily the standard 
of quality, whilst  it is well  known that formerly 
H.  D. Lloyd,  Wealth against Commonwealth,"  Chapters 
II., IV., VIII., IS., XI., etc. 
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an exaggerated competition served as an induce- 
ineilt for adulteration.  Flour was mixed with the 
sugar;  leaves  of  a  poorer  quality, and even  of 
other  plants,  with  good  tobacco;  fusel  oil  and 
water with  alcohol ; cotton oil  with mixed  lard 
products;  and lime  with starch, etc. 
The Whiskey Trust for a  good while has put 
out more  than 75%  of  the total alcohol produced 
by the country.  Eighty-five per  cent of  this is 
compounded by the admixture  of  fusel oil, chem- 
icals, liquors,  fruit juices,  water,  and sugar into 
all  sorts of  spirits -  whiskey, cordials, and every 
kind  of  wine -by  specially  licensed  rectifiers. 
These  compounded  goods  are  sold  everywhere 
under  the  pretence  of  being  original  products; 
but the  Distilling  ancl  Cattle  Feecling  Company 
denies any connection with these practices, which 
had been  common  before  its  establishment  and 
were  legally  authorized  by  "compounders'  and 
rectifiers'  licenses." 
All other attacks the trusts try to meet  with 
explanations, or, if  this is not possible, with com- 
plete  silence.  On the other hand, they boast  of 
their tecllllical  achievements, the introduction of 
better  and  cheaper  methods  of  production,  the 
1 Whiskey  Trust Investigation  of  1892, specially  pp. iii- 
iv, 1-7, 67-74,  82-6,  87-00. lower  prices,  improved  quality,  and safer condi- 
tion of  the undertaking.  They declare that they 
are  able  to ward  off  crises,  and  to  guarantee 
the  steadiness  of  trade.  They show how  they 
have  furthered the export trade of  the country. 
They demand credit for having at certain periods 
exported  at a  rate  cheaper  than  they  asked at 
home;  though  this  has  not  everywhere  been  a 
characteristic  of  such  organizations,  since  while 
Standard  Oil and Cotton  Oil  have  done  a good 
deal in this line, on the contrary, the establishment 
of  the  trust  has  just  stopped  such  practices  in 
the whiskey  trade.  But  if  there  should  occur 
a  decrease  in consumption  in  the  country, they 
would be enabled by this method to coiitinue pro- 
duction, and thus to avoid a depreciation  of  their 
plants and a dismissal of  their workingmen. 
One of  the arguinerits which, economically, is of 
great interest,  the saving of  national  wealth  by 
means of  regulated and steadily improved produc- 
tion and the advantage which thereby accrues to 
the community, tlie  author has, to his  surprise, 
found nowhere  definitely  expressed.1  Economy 
Vide Losch,  "Nationale  Produktion  und  Nationale  l'ro- 
duktion~gliederung,~'  He tries to figure out how  much  saving 
could be  effected by the application of  centralized processes of 
production on a large scale. 130  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
in the use of  raw material has not yet become  a 
fundamental  maxim  in  this country, where  one 
meets throughout with an enormous waste of  the 
natural wealth.  Jenks makes sonle suggestion in 
this direction  and acknowledges  its fundamental 
bearings.  He shows the enormous cost of  adver- 
tising e.g. in the tobacco industry, of  gifts in the 
grocery business, of  travelling salesnlen, etc.' 
V.  The Workingmen. 
The trusts claim  to have  inuch  improved  the 
condition of  their workingmeii by reducing hours 
of  work,  increasing  wages,  and securing steady 
employment.  Their opponents allege that the first 
step of  the trust has always been to dismiss many 
labourers,  and then,  in  consequence  of  the  in- 
creased  number  of  the reserve army of  working- 
men and their conlpetition for work, to extend the 
hours  of  labour, or to reduce the wages together 
with the  hours  of  labour.  Of  this  the Demo- 
cratic tariff  reformers have endeavoured to gather 
as many instances as p~ssible.~  We have, indeed, 
seen that at the beginning numerous workingmen 
were  discharged;  but the information  given  by 
the workingmen  themselves  seems to prove  that 
generally a reduction of  the hours of  work, seldom 
1 ''  Capitalistic MonopoIies,"  pp. 488-90. 
2 Holt,  Trusts VS. Wages." a reducti~~~  of  wages, and occasionally an increase, 
have  taken place,  especially where  the working- 
men were well  organized  themselves.  This they 
are  in  the  railroad,  petroleum,  iron,  and sugar' 
industries.  In other  industries subject to trusts 
the organizatio~l  of  workmen has as yet gone but 
a little may.'  It is pretty clear that the labourers 
in centralized undertalrings  have  not been worse 
off than in decentralized ones. 
Mr.  Gonlpers,  ex-president  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labour, believes  that tl~e  combina- 
tions of  producers  are necessary,  and that their 
consequences  are,  at  least,  not  harmful.  He 
realizes  the blessings  of  a  more  stable  condition 
of  things.  The  grand-inasterworkman  of  the 
Knights  of  Labour  is  not in favour  of  trusts ; 
he is in favour of  the natio~~alization  of  the great 
enterprises like coal-mining, oil-refining, railroads, 
gas works, etc.  The heaping  up of  vast  capitals 
seems  to him  to be  to the  disadvantage  of  the 
workingmen.  Dodd,  on  the  other hand,  tllinks 
that much  more  can be  done in  the  interests of 
the workingmen  when  capital  is  united  in  the 
hands of  experienced  men.  How little, he  says, 
In the cotton oil industry the majority of  the workingnlen 
are negroes ;  in the cigarette, match, and biscuit factories worneu 
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mould  the prosperity  of  the workingmen  be  in- 
creased  by  those  fortunes which  to-day,  in the 
hands of  a Vanderbilt, a Stanford, a Rockefeller, 
or a  Carnegie,  have  liberally established  univer- 
sities,  museums,  institutions of  art and charity, 
and.  which  have  again  and  again  opened  new 
fields to productive  labour. 
The  men  in  control  of  the  trusts have  over 
and over  declared  that they were  fully conscious 
of  their duties toward their workingmen.  Being 
alnlost  tlie  only employers within their branches, 
they  were  in  a  position  different  from  that  of 
an  individual  employer  surrounded  by  competi- 
tors.  Furthermore, -  and that is really the key- 
stone, -  nothing would  be  more  suicidal in their 
fight  against  public  opinion,  than  to  be  con- 
victed  of  an unjust  pressure  on  their  working- 
men.  There  is hardly  ally  doubt that in view 
of  the ilnportance  to the political  parties  of  the 
votes  of  the  workingmen,  the legislatures would 
proceed very draconically  against  the oppressors 
of  labour.  The workingmen do not  as yet form 
a political  party of  their  own ; they are  Demo- 
crats, Republicans, or Populists ; they are divided 
on the tariff  a~d  most of  the other questions ; and 
they  have  not  yet  taken  a  uniform  position  in 
regard  to the  trust  question.  In the  crisis  of 1893  the  workingmen  in  industries  organized 
ullder  trusts and the like seem  to have  suffered 
less  than i11  unorganized ones, as is shown in the 
differelice between  the anthracite and bituminous 
coal regions. 
VI.  The Trusts and the Exchanges. 
On the exchanges, principally on those of  New 
York,  all  the  financial  interests  of  the  large 
urldertakings  are  concentrated.  Naturally  the 
great  conlbinations  exercise  a  considerable  influ- 
ence there.  Though in part  not officially recog- 
nized,  they were  all admitted by  the backstairs 
af  a quotation among the unlisted securities.  In 
the  beginning  the  stock  exchanges  probably 
wanted to avoid the odium  and the respoiisibilitg 
that might be attached to the official admission of 
securities  which were but too  often  of  a  rather 
dubious  character.  But they were  neither will- 
mg nor  able to forego the vast  profits  accruiiig 
from transactions with these corporations.  Trust 
papers, soon  after their introduction,  gained the 
leadership  in the speculative stock market ; eco- 
nomically  expressed,  they  became  the  medium 
by which  delilalid and supply are usually made to 
balance  one  another in the inoney market. 
In regard to the trust question, the members of 
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the one it seems desirable to deal with large units 
and concerns, where  there is an opportunity for a 
uniform supervision of  the entire business.  They 
have  more  confidence  in them;  and furtllerrnore 
the  power  derived from  a  connection with such 
an undertaking  is one  of  the mainstays of  their 
position.  These  are  the    nag nates  of  the  ex- 
changes.  The medium-sized or smaller brokerage 
and banking concerns,  which formerly  did busi- 
ness for the smaller undertakings,  of  course find 
theinselves nearly excluded from the transactions 
with the giants.  Only as second-hand represen- 
tatives,  or  surreptitiously,  when  the leaders do 
not  want  to  act  personally,  are  they employed. 
Therefore they are opposed to the new concerns. 
Moreover,  the expectation that the  trusts would 
provide the smaller  capitalists with a very remu- 
nerative and safe kind of  investment, has, so far, 
not been realized at a1l.l 
It is a thorn in the side of  some great financiers 
that the trusts are enabled, by  their  centralized 
power, to obtain more favourable terms of  credit, 
and  that  thus  their  opportunity  for  individual 
gain is lessened.  They do not like transactions 
involving great risks, and they see that the risk 
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is greatly increased  in dealings  with the trusts. 
They think the whole  stock-exchange, that busi- 
ness life itself, is threatened.  They admonish the 
public  to take warning  by the disasters  in  the 
administration of  the cotton oil and cordage com- 
bines, where it is clearly shown what inay happen 
in other cases.  How terrible have been the panics 
resulting from the collapse of  the Cordage Trust, 
from  the  failure  of  the large  railway  systems! 
It was  just  the uncertainty of  the original trust 
and its secret methods which  aroused  the oppo- 
sition of  almost all parties.  The spirit of  uncer- 
tainty originating from it, was, in consequence  of 
the well-known nervousness of  the exchanges, dis- 
seminated throughout the whole business world. 
The organizers of  some trusts, as we have seen, 
had  no  other  purpose  than  the  creatioi~  of  a 
marketable paper, of  an enlarged  opportunity for 
speculation,  of  which  they  abundantly  availed 
themselves.  Manipulating  now  on  the  bull  and 
now on the bear side, their influence was decidedly 
demoralizing.  They invited  the  disaster which 
befell the undertakings.  Therefore the adminis- 
trators of  many of  the bankrupt railway systems 
and  cornbinations  have  by  many  been  declared 
largely responsible  for the recent  crisis. 
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through  the hard times  much  better  than  they 
were expected to do, principally those which were 
placed upon a sound financial basis,  i.e.  not bur- 
dened with a great funded indebtedness of  bonds 
or mortgages, and not in need of  extensive credit. 
Wherever  vast  current  expenses had to be  met, 
and for that purpose recourse to extensive credits 
was  necessary, -as  in the Distilling  and Cattle 
Feeding Company to carry their large stock and 
pay the accumulated rebates,lP  there have  been 
moments  of  great  anxiety.  Oilly  those  giant 
undertakings whose financial power  was indepen- 
dent  of  outside  help  have  proved  reliable  in 
hard times.  The endeavour of  the cornbinations 
is as a rule to give and employ as little credit as 
possible.  Wherever they must avail  themselves 
of  it, as in the importation of  ram materials, they 
enter into vast transactions with first-class finan- 
ciers at New York  or  London.  It is the avowed 
purpose  of  the  trusts  to  restrict  and  regulate 
1 Again the Distilling  and Cattle Feeding Company has to 
pass through  a great  internal crisis.  It is impossible for the 
outsider to get a clear idea  about these endless proceedings in 
the courts, rumours about bankruptcy, plans of  reorganization, 
action  taken  by  groups  of  stockholders, etc.  Certainly  the 
business  methods  around  this  concern  cannot do  very  much 
to strengthen the arguments of  the advocates of  centralization 
or to refute the eneuiles of  gambling on the exchanges. PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  COMBINATIONS.  137 
the  credit  granted  to  their  customers,  and  to 
deal as much  as possible  on a  cash  basis. 
One  of  the  most  striking  features  of  the 
American  stock markets in connection  with this 
problem are the reorganization committees.  It is 
generally known what  is their purpose.  Besides 
those who are largely interested in the bankrupt 
undertaking  either  for  themselves  or  as  repre- 
sentative~,  there  are many who  only try, in  one 
way or the other, to make money out of  the job. 
The numberless reorganization committees within 
the last years,  and the way in which  they have 
settled affairs,  have  not  always been  samples  of 
sound  business  policy.  Under  the  present  con- 
ditions  all  depends  upon  the  quality  and  the 
standing of  the men of  whom they are composed, 
what interests are represented in them, and what 
intentions work  beneath  the  surface.  The ex- 
changes and the public  seem  rather tired  of  this 
system.  It  has  someti~lles  proved  satisfactory, 
very  often,  not.  It  is  alleged  that  companies 
have  occasionally  been wrecked  in order to give 
a  chance  to the spoliation of  'breorganizers." 
The  cotton oil  and cordage  reorganization com- 
mittees needed  months to clean  out the Augean 
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stables of  the old administrations.  Payment of 
new  assessn~ents  on  the  stock,  reduction  of  the 
fixed liabilities  as well  as of  the original capital, 
and the issue of  new preferred securities, were the 
principal  elements of  the final settlement.  The 
administration was  changed,  and better financial 
advisers taken into the board  of  directors.  Ap- 
parently the majority of  the existing coriibiiiations 
had to pass through disasters and reconstructions, 
though  of  a  less  radical  character,  before  they 
settled on firm  ground.1 
1 It may finally be said that it is not very advisable to refer 
to the  newspapers as representatives  of  public opinion as to 
trusts.  As far as they are not in  the pay  of  the one or the 
other, the papers, for the sake of  cheap popularity, are allnost 
unanimous  in  condemning them,  without  any attempt to do 
justice to the real situation  They know that nothing  is more 
interesting than attacks upon  "the robbers of  the people,"  and 
for that purpose they  collect all kinds of  statements with  no 
sort of  critical selection.  The author has hardly seen one good 
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CHAPTER  VIII. 
CONCLUSIONS, 
TEE course of  the foregoing investigation has 
shown  that  our subject  has  an  importance  far 
beyond its temporary and local aspect.  Through- 
out it is  linked to  all the moinentous  problems 
of our time, -indeed  to the problem of  the whole 
future orgaaization of  our economic life.  Large 
undertaking versus small workshop, centralization, 
and regulation versus individualism, the distribu- 
tion of  wealth among the masses, and, finally, the 
relation  of  all this to the form of  government,-- 
such are the questions that are involved. 
An attempt at present  to prophesy whither the 
movement will lead can  only be  guess-work;  for 
not  only do  opinions  differ,  but also  the  facts. 
In  every  direction  we  witness  the  collapse  of 
fresh  attempts.  Numberless  combinations  come 
illto  existence  and break  down,  come  once  more 
and go again,  and  innumerable  are  the  reasons 
upon  which  all these  inovements  depend.  Now 
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branches ;  then, after they have disappeared, some- 
times  their creations  disappear  also ; whilst,  in 
other cases, these survive in consequence  of  their 
centripetal  gravity,  grouped  around capital and 
property  and  sustaiiled  by  improved  technical 
efficiency. 
What  changes  will the  near  future  bring  in 
the  econolllic  life  of  the  country,  and  in  the 
organization  of  enterprises ?  We hear about the 
nervly  discovered  iron  regions  of  the  Mesaba 
range.  A great concern has  been  established for 
their exploitation.  The  iron  ore  penetrates  to 
the surface, in apparently inexhaustible quantities 
and the greatest possible purity.  No  mining is 
necessary ;  it sinlply needs  to be  digged.  Will 
this  lead  to a  concentration of  all iron produc- 
tiori ?-What  discoveries and inventions mill the 
technical development of  the next years  bring to 
light?  We have  just witnessed  at Niagara Palls 
a first attempt to utilize  the natural water  power 
for productive  purposes on the largest scale, so as 
to provide  the smallest  and most  distant under- 
taking with :t  cheap and effective  motive  power. 
Does this  indicate a step in the direction cf  de- 
centralized production ? 
While,  in  the  manufacturing  industries,  the 
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sured,  in the cotton  cultivation  of  the southern 
states  the  small  producer,  the  farmer,  outstrips 
the  plantation  owner.  The  large  undertaking 
rtlld  the  hired  labour  of  the  plantation  yield 
less  than the  small  farm,  where  the  proprietor, 
in  a  limited  area,  uses  nothing  but  his  own 
pllysical  and  intellectual  working  power.  The 
large  planter  becomes  impoverished,  the farmer 
secures a safe position.  The average  size of  the 
cotton  plantation  decreases.  The  same  is  true 
wherever  American  agriculture proceeds  to "in- 
tensive " methods.  And even  in  the cotton  oil 
industry we  see a relapse  into decentralized pro- 
duction, at least as far as the productioi~  of  raw 
oil and its by-products  is concerned.  Outside of 
the American  and the Southern Cottoil Oil Com- 
panies a number of  small, independent mills have 
been  recently  established  which  claim  to  yield 
better results than the large compailies with their 
staff of  highly paid officials. 
No definite  judgment  about  the trust question 
is possible as yet.  It is too recent, and its phases 
undergo  rapid  and  constant  changes.  But one 
thing is certain, the mere form of  organization is 
irrelevant,-possibly  effect,  surely  not  cause. 
Armour  or  Chicago  Gas  Companies  or  Sugar 
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Companies  under  uniform  management,  or  the 
American  Cotton  Oil  Com,)any -  the  form  of 
ownership or control is of  a secondary importance 
economically.  The issue proper  is,  and will be 
for the  near  future:  shall  it be  small  or  large 
undertakings,  or  to what  extent  shall  there  be 
compromises  between  them? 
In the  United  States,  public  opinion  has  to 
decide  finally  about  the  meaning  and  nature of 
things.  It  will  not  be  able,  ia  the  long run, 
to lean  upon  mere  theories  and nlaxiins; it will 
be  forced  by the actual development  to undergo 
changes,  to reform  and to remodel  itself  in cor- 
respondence with the great laws of  historical prog- 
ress.  The old  ideas  about  the illfallibility  anti 
exclusive  desirability  of  iildividual  and  unre- 
stricted activity have begun to fade.  The masses 
still adhere to them, and are supported therein by 
the newspapers and  politician^ who prefer popular- 
ity to thoroughness and thought, and by the cheap 
economics  of  old-fashioned every-dny economists, 
who  are not able to perceive that, since the time 
of  their youth, there has been any change or prog- 
ress  in practical  life, as well as in the scientific 
interpretation  of  it.  Rut  whosoever  tries  to 
understand the times,  at once perceives  the dif- 
ferent  cllaracter  of  ~llodern problems,  and  the 
necessity  of  new   standard^  of  judgment. CONCLUSIONS.  143 
A  good  while  mill  probably  elapse  before  the 
majority of  the public  has  learned to account for 
what  has  happened,  and to draw  its conclusions 
correspondingly.  This  process  possibly  will 
take  longer,  and  witness  more  painful  expe- 
riences,  than  in countries  where  an institution 
exists,* whose  purpose  it is  to  gather  informa- 
tion  impartially and to impart  it to the public. 
The  earlier  attempts  to  deal  with  the problem 
have  been  fruitless,  because  they  were  dictated 
by mere theory and by partisan  views  as to what 
ought  to  be,  and were  not  based  upon  a  suf- 
ficient  and  intelligent  weighing  of  facts.  No 
definite  settlement can  follow before  the results 
of  such  an  examil~ation  have  entered  into the 
public  mind, and every  attempt  will be  thrown 
away which  tries to block  the road of  economic 
evolution.  Marx is mistaken in saying that the 
developmei~t  of  society  has  been  caused  exclu- 
sively  by  economic  forces.  But  doubtless  an 
attempt  to  interfere  with  economic  forces  for 
the sake of  general principles  is not very prom- 
ising to-day.  It must either remain  unsuccess- 
ful, or turn out disastrous  to the nation  which 
passes  through  it.  In the  United  States, past 
experiences  make  it more  likely that the former 
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tive legislation.  In Europe,  it has  come  to be 
seen that legal interference can  only to a limited 
extent create an economic situation.  It can  pre- 
pare,  accompany,  or  follow  it,  and  can  adapt 
existing institutions to the exigencies  of  a novel 
situation.  European  legislators,  and  Congress 
in this  country,  to be  sure, command  very good 
lawyers;  but  trade will always  be  able  to pay 
better  ones,  who  will  show how  to legzlly cir- 
cumvent  laws  which  prove impracticable.  And 
success,  if  the undertaking attains it, will show 
afterwards  that they were  right. 
The situation differs too widely from the Euro- 
pean for there to be much chance for socialism in 
the  form  it  takes  in  America.  But the  social 
idea of  organization has, during the last few years, 
spread in many directions.  The progress  of  na- 
tional  development,  the  increase  of  the popula- 
tion of  the country, the closer and closer contact 
between  men  and  their  interests, -all  this  ill- 
creases the need for a new regulation of  the rela- 
tions  of  individuals.  The evident result  of  the 
concentration  of  modern  undertakings  has been 
the unavoidable advance into new  lines of  legis- 
lation,  such  as  the  attempts  of  the  interstate 
commerce 2nd anti-trust legislation.  Wherever a 
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public regulation is bound to follow.  To-day the 
centralizing  movement  in industry has  not  yet 
its height.  The tide is apparently still 
rising.  Therefore an increased need of  legislation 
during the next few years is more than probable. 
The existing trusts, as described, are no ideal 
beings.  Like  all  human  creations,  they  show 
virtues and vices.  They conie because they must ; 
their influence is diversified, their  effect  not yet 
sufficiently comprehensible.  Wherever  they ap- 
pear, they  call  forth a wild  excitement  and the 
natural  resistance  against  everything  unusual. 
Now they prove useful in the hands of  an able con- 
trol,  now  dangerous  and  hultful  to  their  own 
leaders,  as  well  as  to guiltless  outsiders.  The 
misconception  of  their  nature,  which  took them 
for something altogether exceptional, whilst they 
were  really  only  one  form  of  a  group of  phe- 
nomena,  did not make  feasible  a  just  apprecia- 
tion of  them.  A better understanding will replace 
horror  and malediction  with an attempt to check 
their abuses, to extend their utility. 
The first reasonable  propositions  have  already 
been  made.  In a  form which  corresponds to the 
character of  the people  and constitution,  the mil- 
road problem has been  entrusted to a  controlling 
commission ; a similar measure is asked for to-day, 
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in  view  of  the  great  capitalistic  organization 
of  production.  The  means  by  which  it is  at- 
tempted  to  settle  the great  social  problems  are 
in many respects identical all over the world.  For 
problems are involved which concern the civiliza- 
tion of  the world.  It is not a  mecharlical  regu- 
lation  of  busi~iess life,  which  would  lame  the 
individual  and make  him  subservient to a  vast 
machine, that is sought for ; but a  display of  the 
rights of  the nation, by means of  a control in the 
hands  of  the community,  and  in the 'full  light, 
of  publicity.  No  author  has  conceived  better 
the meaning  of  the corporation  problem  for the 
commonwealth  than  Henry C. Adams.  He asks 
for publicity,  publication  of  the  results,  and  the 
ways in which they were reached, a control through 
public bodies, and a responsibility of  the individ- 
ual  member  of  the  administration  of  the  cor- 
poration  for  the  observance  of  the  necessary 
restrictions.  The leaders of  the large companies 
have  power  and honour, but are not kept face to 
face with sufficient public supervision. 
The idea  of  an  imposition  of  higher taxation 
has  already made  way even  beyond  the ranks of 
the extreme radicals.  What seems to the author 
indispensable for  the  beginning  of  an  effective 
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commercial  code,  or  at least  a  ~lniform  corpo- 
ration  law for the whole United States.  A  uni- 
form  practice  is  indispensable  considering  that 
the activity of  the great enterprises  has  extended 
far over  the boundaries  of  individual  states.  It 
can only be a question of  time, until, by an  amend- 
ment of the constitution, the corporation law shall 
have  been  brought  within  the reach  of  congres- 
sio~~al  1egislation.l 
Meanwhile,  the repeal of  the present anti-trust 
legislation seems desirable.  Passed as they were 
merely  for  political  purposes,  even  those  politi- 
cians who sought by their passage to soothe popu- 
lar  feeling,  do  not expect  them  to be  complied 
with.  And  the  multiplicity  of  laws  of  such 
a character  is a  great danger to the community. 
It  explains to a large extent the astonishing im- 
morality in politics  and in the political thought 
of large classes.  The necessity of  circumventi~~g 
so many laws because they prescribe things simply 
impossible must in the long run  undermine  the 
sense of  legality  and respect  for law. 
The American Bar Association  has already  established a 
Committee on Uniform State Laws, to which twenty-two states 
and territories have delegated menlbers.  Here the attempt will 
probably  be made  to prepare the laws nniformly  and to pass 
them  in the individual  states, as had been done with the Com- 
lnercial  Code  of  Germany  before  the  establishment  of  the 
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Whatever experiences the next few  years may 
bring, the entire character of  the movement which 
this investigation  has  tried  to follow  makes it 
evident that the American people will by and by 
realize  the  meaning  of  the facts, proceed  in the 
same direction, and adapt its actions to given con- 
ditions.  Wise economic  policy does  not take a 
second  step before  the  first.  As  long  as  one 
does  not feel  sure of  a  complete  victory of  the 
large undertakings, one must avoid  making more 
concessions  than are really called for by the situ- 
ation.  A progress is manifest, but also increased 
dangers;  an increase  of  the large undertakings, 
and the  augmentation  of  the  masses  dependent 
on  large  capital;  the  growth  of  the  colossus, 
and an  increase  of  that tendency  towards  self- 
destruction  which  is innate  in  all  things.  It 
is  satisfactory  to  witness  the  genuine  impulse 
in the Ame~ican  people to push on towards further 
self-development,  and to secure  progress  by  an 
evolutionary transition illto new forms of  society, 
upon  the basis  of  present  conditions, which can- 
not at once be  radically changed.  Ready as it is 
to wait, the people may he able meantime to equip 
itself with the administrative machinery of  a  re- 
formed  civil service ; for this will probably have 
to play a very important part in the time to come. CONCLUSIONS.  149 
Without it, great  reforms  can  hardly  be  made 
It is my belief  that the future beloags  neither 
to the prophets of  individualism, nor to the ideals 
of  the social-democrats.  Its next phases  belong 
to  social  reorganization.  And  the  probability 
is that this will show  a  corporate character, and 
will be  sustained and coritrolled by public super- 
vision. APPENDIX  I. 
THE  STANDARD  OIL  TRUST  AGREEMENT. 
THIS agreement, made and entered upon this second 
day of  January, A.D.  1883, by and between all the per- 
sons who shall now or may hereafter execute the same 
as parties thereto, Witnesseth : 
I.  It is intended that the parties to this agreement 
&all embrace three classes, to wit : 
1st.  All the Stockholders  and members  of  the fol- 
lowing Corporations and Limited Partnerships, to wit : 
Acme  Oil  Company  (New  York),  Acme  OL 
Company (Pennsylvania), Atlantic Refining Com- 
pany,  of  Phila. ;  Bush & Co.  Limited,  Camden 
Consolidated  Oil  Company,  Elizabethport  Acid 
Works,  Imperial  Refining  Company,  Limited, 
Chas.  Pratt & Co., Paine, Ablett & Co., Limited, 
Standard Oil  Company  (Ohio), Standard Oil  Co. 
(Pittsburg),  Smith's  Ferry Oil Trans.  Co.,  Solar 
Oil  Company  Limited,  Sone  &  Fleming  Manu- 
facturing Co. Limited. 
Also  all  the  Stockholders  and  members  of  such 
other Corporations and Limited Partnerships  as may 
hereafter join in this agreement at the request  of  the 
Trustees herein provided for. 
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powers shall be embraced in the several charters such 
as shall seem  expedient to the parties  procuring  the 
charter,  or if  necessary  to comply wit,h the law,  the 
powers aforesaid may be restricted and reduced. 
(3)  At any time hereafter, when it may seem advis- 
able to the Trustees herein  pro~~ided  for, similar Cor- 
porations may be formed in other States and Territories. 
(4)  Each of  said  Corporations  shall  be  known  as 
the Standard Oil  Company  of -  (and  here  shall 
follow the name of  the State or Territory by virtue of 
the laws of  which said Corporation is organized). 
(5)  The Capital Stock of  each  of  said Corporations 
shall be fixed at such an amount as may seem necessary 
and advisable  to the parties  organizing  the same, in 
view of  the purpose to be accomplished. 
(6)  The shares of  stock  of  each  of  said Corpora- 
tions  shall  be  issued  only  for  money,  property  or 
assets equal at a fair valuation to the par value of  the 
stock delivered therefor. 
(7)  All of  the property,  real  and personal,  assets 
and business of  each and all of  the Corporations  and 
Limited Partnerships mentioned or embraced in class 
first  shall  be  transferred  to and vested  in the  said 
several Standard Oil Companies.  All of  the property, 
assets and business in or of  each particular State shall 
be transferred to and vested in the Standard Oil Com- 
pany  of  that particular  State, and in order to accom- 
plish  such  purpose,  the  Directors  and  Managers  of 
each and all of  the several Corporations  and Limited 
Yartnerships mentioned in  class first, are hereby anthor- 
ized  and directed  by  the Stockholders and members thereof  @ll of  them being  parties to this agreement) 
to  sell,  assign, transfer,  convey  and make  over,  for 
the consideration hereinafter mentioned, to the Stand- 
ard Oil Company or Companies of  the proper State or 
States, as soon as said Corporations are organized and 
ready  to receive  the same, all the property, real and 
personal,  assets  aid business  of  said  Corporations 
and Limited Yartnerships.  Correct schedules of  such 
property  assets,  and business  shall  accompany  each 
transfer. 
(8)  The individuals embraced in class second of  this 
agreement do each for himself  agree, for the consider- 
ation  hereinafter  mentioned,  to sell,  assign, transfer, 
convey  and set over.  all the property,  real  and  per- 
sonal, assets and business mentioned and embraced in 
schedules accompanying such sale and transfer, to the 
Standard Oil  Company  or  Companies,  of  the proper 
State or  States, as soon  as the said  corporations  are 
organized and ready to receive the same. 
(9)  The  parties  embraced  in  class  third  of  this 
agreement do covenant and agree to assign  and trans- 
fer all of  the stock held by them in the Corporations 
or Limited Partnerships herein named, to the Trustees 
herein  provided  for,  for the consideration  and upon 
the terms hereinafter set forth.  It is understood  axid 
agreed that the said Trustees and their successors may 
hereafter take the assignment of  stocks in the same 
or similar Companies upon  the terms herein provided, 
and that whenever  and as often as  all the stocks of 
any Corporation  and Limited  Partnership are vested 
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to have all the money, property, real  and personal, of 
such Corporation or Partnership assigned and conveyed 
to the Standard Oil Company of  the proper  State on 
the terms and in the mode  herein  set forth, in which 
event the Trustees shall receive stocks of  the Standard 
Oil  Company equal to the value  of  the money, prop 
erty and business assigned, to be held in place of  the 
stocks of  the Company or  Companies  assigning  such 
property. 
(10)  The consideration for the transfer and convey- 
ance of  the money,  property  and business  aforesaid 
to each or any of  the Standard Oil Companies shall be 
stock of  the respective Standard Oil Company to which 
said transfer or conveyance is made, equal at par value 
to the  appraised value  of  the  money,  property  and 
business so transferred.  Said stock shall be delivered 
to the Trustees hereinafter provided for, and their suc- 
cessors, and no stock  of  any of  said Companies  shall 
ever be issued except for money, property or  business 
equal at least to the par value of  the stock  so issued, 
nor  shall any stock be  issued  by any of  said camp* 
nies for any purpose,  except to the Trustees herein 
provided for, to be  held  subject to the trusts herein- 
after specified.  It is understood,  however, that this 
provision is not intended to restrict the purchase, sale 
and exchange of  property of  said  Standard Oil Com- 
panies  as fully as they may  be  authorized to do by 
their respective charters, provided  only that no  stock 
be issued therefor except to said Trustees. 
(11)  The con~idera~ion  for ally stock  delivered  to 
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stocks  delivered  to  said  Trustees  by  persons  men- 
tioned  or included in class  third  of  this agreement, 
&all  be  the delivery by said Trustees, to the persons 
entitled  thereto, of  Trust Certificates hereinafter  pro- 
vided for, equal at par value  to the par value  of  the 
stocks of  the said Standard Oil Companies so received 
by  said  Trustees,  and  equal  to  the  appraised  value 
of  the stocks of  other Companies or Partnerships de- 
livered  to said  Trustees.  [The  said  appraised value 
shall be  determined  in a  manner agreed upon  by the 
parties  in interest and said  Trustees.]  It  is under- 
stood  and  agreed,  however,  that  the  said  Trustees 
may, with any trust funds in their hands, in addition 
to the mode above provided, purchase  the bonds  and 
stocks of  other Companies engaged in business similar 
or  collateral  to  the  business  of  said  Standard  Oil 
Companies  on  such terms and in such mode  as they 
may deem advisable, and shall hold  the same for the 
benefit  of  the owners  of  said  Trust Certificates, and 
may sell, assign, transfer  and pledge such  bonds  and 
stocks whenever  they may  deem  it advantageous  to 
said  Trust so to do. 
111.  The  trusts upon  which  said  stocks  shall  be 
held,  and  the  number,  powers  and  duties  of  said 
Trustees,  shall be  as follows: 
(1) The number of  Trustees shall be nine. 
(2) J. D. Rockefeller, 0. H. Payne and Wm. Rock- 
efeller  are  hereby appointed  Trustees, to hold  their 
office until the first Wednesday of  April, A.D.  1885. 
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den are hereby appointed Trustees, to hold their office 
until the first Wednesday of  April, A.n. 1884. 
(4)  Chas. Pratt, Benj. Brewster  and Jno. D.  Arch- 
bold  are  hereby  appointed  Trustees,  to  hold  their 
office until the first Wednesday of  April, A.D.  1883. 
(5) Elections for  Trustees to succeed  those  herein 
appocnted shall be  held annually, at which election a 
sufficient  number  of  Trustees shall be  elected to fill 
all vacancies occurring either from expiration of  the 
term of  office of  Trustee or from any other cause.  All 
Trustees shall be  elected  to hold their office for three 
years,  except  those  elected  to fill  a vacancy  arising 
from  any cause, except expiration  of  term, who shall 
be  elected for the balance of  the term of  the Trustee 
whose  place  they are elected to fill.  Every Trustee 
shall hold his office until his successor is elected. 
(6)  Trustees shall be  elected by ballot  by the own- 
ers of  Trust Certificates or their proxies.  At all meet- 
ings  the  owners  of  Trust  Certificates  who  may  be 
registered as such on the books of  the Trustees may 
vote  in person  or  by  proxy, and shall have one vote 
for each and every share of  Trust Certificates standing 
in their names, but no such owner shall be  entitled to 
vote upon any share which has not stood in his name 
thirty days prior to the day appointed for the election. 
The transfer books  may  be  closed for thirty days im- 
mediately preceding  the annual election.  A majority 
of  the shares represented at such election shall elect. 
(7)  The annual meeting of  the owners of  said Trust 
Certificates for the election of  Trustees, and for other 
business, shall be held at the office of  the Trustees, in APPENDIX  I.  161 
the City  of  New  York,  on  the first  Wednesday  of 
April  of  each  year,  unless  the place  of  meeting  be 
changed  by  the Trustees,  and said  meeting  may  be 
adjourned from day to day until its business  is com- 
pleted.  Special meetings  of  the owners of  said Trnst 
Certificates  may  be  called  by  the  majority  of  the 
Trustees at such times and places as they may appoint. 
It shall  also be  the duty of  the Trustees to call  a 
special meeting of  holders  of  Trust Certificates when- 
ever  requested  to do so  by  a  petition signed  by  the 
holders  of  ten per cent. in value of  such certificates. 
The business  of  such special meetings  shall  be  con- 
fined to the object specified in the notice given there- 
for.  Notice  of  the time and place  of  all meetings of 
the  owners  of  Trust Certificates  shall  be  given,  by 
personal notice as far as possible, and  by public notice 
in one  of  the principal newspapers  in each  State ir, 
which  a  Standard  Oil Company  exists,  at least  ten 
days before such meeting.  At any meeting, a majority 
in the value  of  the holders  of  Trust Certificates rep- 
resented  consenting thereto,  by-laws  may  be  made, 
amended or repealed relative to the mode  of  election 
of  Trustees and other business of  the holders of  Trust 
Certificates, provided, however, that said by-laws shall 
be  in conformity with this agreement.  By-laws  may 
also be made, amended and repealed  at any meeting, 
by  and with the consent of  a inajority in value of  the 
holders  of  Trust Certificates,  which  alter this agree- 
ment  relative  to  the number,  poffers and  duties of 
the Trustees end to other matters tending to the more 
efficient accomplishment of  the objects for which the 
Y 162  INDUSTKIAL COMBINATIONS. 
Trust is created,  provided  only  that. the essential in- 
tents and purposes of  this agreement be not thereby 
changed. 
(8)  Whenever  a  vacancy  occurs  in the Board  of 
Trustees more  than  sixty  days  prior  to the annual 
meeting  for the election  of  Trustees,  it  shall be  the 
duty of  the remaining Trustees  to call a meeting of 
the  owners  of  the  Standard  Oil  Trust  Certificates 
for the purpose  of  electing  a  Trustee or  Trustees to 
fill  the vacancy  or vacancies.  If  any vacancy occurs 
in  the  Board  of  Trustees,  from  any  cause,  within 
sixty days of  the date of  the annual meeting for the 
election  of  Trustees,  the  vacancy  may  be  filled  by 
a  majority  of  the  remaining  Trustees,  or,  at  their 
option, may remain vacant until the annual election. 
(9). If, for  any reason,  at any time,  a  Trustee  or 
Trustees  shall be  appointed by  any Court  to fill any 
vacancy or vacancies  in said  Hoard  of  Trustees,  the 
Trustee or Trustees so appointed shall hold his or the 
respective  office  or  offices  only  until  a  successor  or 
succ,essors shall be  elected  in the manner above pro- 
vided for. 
(10)  Whenever any change shall occur in the Board 
of  Trustees, the legal title to the stock and other prop- 
erty held in trust shall pass  to and vest  in the suc- 
cessors  of  said  Trustees without  any  formal transfer 
thereof.  But if  at any time such formal transfer shall 
be deemed necessary or advisable, it shall be the duty 
of  the Board  of  Trustees to obtain the same, and it 
shall be the duty of  any retiring Trustee or the admin- 
istrator or  executor of  any deceased  Trustee to make 
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(11)  The Trustees  shall prepare  Certificates which 
&all  show  the interest  of  each  beneficiary  in said 
trust, and deliver them to the persons properly entitled 
thereto.  They shall be divided into shares of  the pax 
value of  one hundred dollars each, and shall be known 
as Standard Oil Trust Certificat,es, and shall be issued 
subject to all the terms and conditions of  this agree- 
ment.  The Trustees  shall have pourer to agree upon 
and  direct  the  form  and  contents  of  said  Certifi- 
cates,  and the mode  in which  they shall be  signed, 
attested  and transferred.  The Certificates shall con- 
tain  an  express  stipulation  that the holders  thereof 
shall be  boumd  by  the terms  of  this  agreement,  and 
by the by-laws herein provided for. 
(12)  No Certificates shall be issued except for stocks 
and bonds  held  in trust, as herein  provided  for, and 
the par  value  of  Certificates issued  by said  Trustees 
shall be  equal to the p-dr  value  of  the stocks of  said 
Standard Oil Companies,  and the appraised value  of 
other  bonds  and  stocks held  in trust.  The various 
bonds, stocks and moneys held under said Trust shall 
be  held  for  all  parties  in interest  jointly,  and  the 
Trust Certificates so issued  shall be  the evidence of 
the interest held by the several parties  in this Trust. 
No duplicate Certificates shall be  issued by the Trus- 
tees, except upon  surrender of  the original Certificate 
or  Certificates  for  cancellation,  or  upon  satisfactory 
proof of  the loss  thereof, and in the latter case  they 
shall require a sufficient bond of  indemnity. 
(13)  The  stocks  of  the various  Standard Oil Com- 
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assigned  or transferred  by  said  Trustees,  or  by  the 
beneficiaries, or by both combined, so long as the Trust 
endures.  The stocks and bonds of  other Corporations, 
held by said Trustees, may be  by them  exchanged or 
sold and the proceeds  thereof distributed p~o  rata to 
the holders of  Trust Certificates, or said proceeds may 
be  held and reinvested by said Trustees for the pur- 
poses  and uses  of  the Trust, provided, however, that 
said  Trustees  may  from  time  to time  assign  such 
shares  of  stock  of  said  Standard  Cil  Companies  as 
may  be  necessary  to qualify  any person  or  persons 
chosen or to be chosen as Directors and Officers of  any 
of  said Standard Oil Companies. 
(14)  It  shall be the duty of  said Trustees to receive 
and safely to keep all interest and dividends declared 
and paid upon any of the said bonds, stocks and moneys 
held  by  them in trust,  and to distribute all moneys 
received from such sources or from sales of  trust prop 
erty or  otherwise  by declaring and paying dividends 
upon the Standard Trust Certificates as funds accumu- 
late, which in their judgment  are not needed for the 
uses and expenses of  said Trust.  The Trustees shall, 
however,  keep  separate  accounts  and  receipts  from 
interest and dividends, and of  receipts from sales  or 
transfers of  trust property, and in making any distri- 
bution of  trust funds, in which  moneys derived from 
sales or transfers  shall be  included, shall render  the 
holders  of  Trust  Certificates  a  statement  showing 
what amount of  the fund distributed has been derived 
from such sales or transfers.  The said Trustees may 
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majority  in  value  of  holders  of  Trust  Certificates, 
%,henever stocks or  bonds  have accumulated  in their 
hands  from money  purchases  thereof,  or  the  stocks 
bonds  held by  them  have  increased  in value,  or 
stock  dividends shall have  been  declared  by  any of 
the  Companies  whose  stocks are held  by  said  Trus- 
tees,  or  whenever  from any such cause  it is deemed 
advisable  so  to do,  to increase  the amount  of  Trust 
Certificates to the extent of  such increase or accumula 
tion of  values and to divide the same among the per- 
sons then owning Trust Certificates pro ~ata. 
(16) It shall be  the duty of  said Trustees to exer- 
cise  general  supervision  over the affairs  of  said  sev- 
eral  Standard  Oil  Companies,  and as  far  as practi- 
cable  over the other  Companies or Partnerships, any 
portion of  whose stock is held in said Trust.  It shall 
be  their  duty as Stockholders of  said  Companies  to 
elect  as  Directors  and  Officers thereof  faithful  and 
competent men.  They may elect themselves  to such 
positions when they see fit so to do, and shall endeavour 
to  have  the affairs  of  said Companies  managed  and 
directed in the manner  they may  deem  most  condu- 
cive to the best  interests of  the holders of  said Trust 
Certificates. 
(16)  All  the powers  of  the Trustees may be exer- 
cised by a majority of  their number. 
They may appoint  from  their own number an Ex- 
ecutive  and other  Committees.  A  majority  of  each 
Committee  shall  exercise  all  the  powers  which  the 
Trustees may  confer upon  such Committee. 
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Agents and Attorneys as they may deem necessary in 
the management of  said trust. 
(18)  Each Trustee shall be  entitled to a  salary for 
his services not  exceeding  twenty-five  thousand  dol- 
lars per  annum,  except  the President  of  the  Board, 
who may be voted a salary not exceeding thirty thou- 
sand  dollars per annum, which  salaries shall be  fixed 
by said Board of  Trustees.  All salaries and expenses 
connected with or  growing  out of  the Trust shall be 
paid  by the Trustees from the trust fund. 
(19)  The Board of  Trustees shall have its principal 
office in the City of  New York, unless  changed  by a 
vote of  the Trustees, at which office, or in some place 
of safe deposit in said City, the bonds and stocks shall 
be kept.  The Trustees shall have power to adopt rules 
and regulations pertaining to the meetings of  the Board, 
the election of  Officers  and  the management  of  the 
Trust. 
(20)  The Trustees shall render at each annual meet- 
ing a statement of  the affairs of  the Trust.  If a termi- 
nation  of  the  Trust be  agreed  upon,  as hereinafter 
provided, or within a reasonable time prior  to its ter- 
mination by lapse of  time, the Trustees shall furnish 
to the holders  of  the Trust  Certificates  a  true and 
perfect inventory and appraisement  of  all stocks and 
other property held  in trust, and a  statement of  the 
financial affairs of  the various Companies whose stocks 
are held in trust. 
(21)  The Trust shall continue  during the lives of 
the  survitors and  survivor  of  the  Trustees in this 
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provided, however,  that if  at any time  after the ex- 
piration of  ten years two-thirds of  all the holders in 
value, or if after the expiration of  one year ninety per 
cent. of  all the holders in value  of  Trust Certificates 
shall,  at a  meeting  of  holders  of  Trust  Certificates 
called for that purpose, vote to terillinate this Trust at 
some time  to be  by  them then  and  there  fixed.  the 
said Trust shall terminate at the date so fixed.  If the 
holders of  Trust Certificates shall vote  to terminate 
the Trust as aforesaid, they may, at the same meeting, 
or at a  subsequent meeting  called  for  that  purpose, 
decide by a vote of  two-thirds in value  of  their num- 
ber the mode in which the affairs of  the Trust shall be 
wound  up,  and whether  the trust  property  shall be 
distributed or whether part, and if  so, what part shall 
be divided and what part sold, and whether such sales 
shall be  public  or  private.  The Trustees, who  shall 
continue  to hold  their offices  for that purpose,  shall 
make the distribution  in the mode  directed, or, if  no 
mode be agreed upon, by two-thirds in value  as afore- 
said, the Trustees shall make distribution of  the trust 
property according to law.  But said distribution, how- 
ever made, and whether it be of  property, or values, or 
of  both,  shall be  just  and equitable,  and such  as to 
insure to each  owner  of  a  Trust  Certificate  his  due 
proportion of  the trust property or the value thereof. 
(22)  If the Trust shall be terminated by the expira- 
tion of  the time for which it is created, the distribution 
of  the trust property  shall be  directed  and made  in 
the mode above provided. 
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Certificates,  books  of  accounts,  and other books  and 
papers connected with the business of  said Trust, shall 
be safely kept at the principal office of  said Trustees. 
[SIGNATURES.] 
SUPPLEMENTAL  AGREEMENT. 
Whereas in and  by  an agreement  dated  January 
2nd, 1882, and known  as the Standard Trust Agree- 
ment, the parties thereto did  mutually covenant  and 
agree, ir~ter  alitr, as follows, to wit: That Corporations 
to be  known as  Standard  Oil  Companies  of  various 
States should be formed, and that all of  the property, 
real and personal, assets and business of  each and all of 
the Corporations and Limited Partnerships mentioned 
or  embraced in class  first  of  said  Agreement  should 
be transferred and vested in the said several Standard 
Oil  Companies;  that all of  the property,  assets and 
business in or of  each particular State shonld be trans- 
ferred to and vested  in the  Standard  Oil  Company 
of  that particular State, and the Ilirectors and Man- 
agers of  each and all of  the several Corporations  and 
associations mentioned  in class first were  aathorized 
and directed to sell, assign, transfer, and convey and 
make over to the Standard Oil Company or Companies 
of  the proper State or States, as soon as said  corpora- 
tions were organized and ready to receive the same, all 
the property, real and personal, assets and business of 
said  Corporations or Associations;  and whereas it is 
not deemed expedient that all of  the Companies and 
Associations mentioned should transfer their property APPENDIX  I.  169 
to the said  Standard  Oil  Companies  at the  present 
time, and in case of  some Companies and Associations 
it may never be deemed expedient that the said trans- 
fer should be made, and said  Conlpanies  and Associa- 
tions  go  out of  existence;  and whereas it is deemed 
advisable that a discretionary power  should  be vested 
in the Trustees as to when  such transfer  or transfers 
should take place, if at all.  Nolo, it is hereby mutually 
agreed between  the parties  to the said  Trust Agree- 
ment, and as supplemeiltary thereto, that the Trustees 
named  in the  said  Agreement  and  their  successors 
shall have  the power  and  authority to  decide what 
Companies  shall  convey  their  property  as  in  said 
Agreement contemplated, and when the said sales and 
transfers  shall take  place,  if  at all,  and until  said 
Trustees shall so decide, each of  said Companies shall 
remain in existence and retain its property and bnsi- 
ness,  and the Trustees shall hold the stocks thereof 
in trust, as in said Agreement provided.  In the exer- 
cise  of  said  discretion  the  Trustees  shall  act  by  a 
majority  of  the,ir 'number  as provided  in said  Trust 
Agreement.  All  portions  of  said  Trnst  Agreement 
relating to this subject shall be considered so changed 
as to be in harmony with this supplemental Agreement. 
In witness whereof, the said parties have subscribed 
this Agreement, this 4th day of  January, 1882. 
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APPENDIX  11. 
BY-LAWS  OF THE TRUSTEES OF T- 
STANDARI)  OIL  TRUST. 
ARTICLE  I. 
ELECTION  OF  TRUSTEES. 
Trustees shall be elected by ballot by the owners of 
Trust Certificates or their proxies. 
Electiorls  of  Trustees to succeed  those  already ap 
pointed  shall  be  held  annually, at which  election a 
sufficient  number  of  Trustees  shall be  elected to fill 
all vacancies occurring  either  from expiration  of  the 
term of  office of  any Trustee or from any other cause. 
All Trustees shall be elected to hold their office  for 
three  years,  except  those  elected  to fill  a  vacancy 
arising from any cause except expiration of  term, who 
shall be  elected  for  the balance  of  the term of  the 
Trustee whose  place  they are elected  to fill.  Every 
Trustee  shall  hold  his  office  until  his  successor  is 
elected. 
The annual meeting of  the holders of  Trust Certifi- 
cates and the election of  Trustees shall be held  at the 
office  of  the  Trustees  in  the City of  New  York  on 
the  first  Wed~lesday  in  April  of  each  year,  unless 
otherwise ordered by the Trustees, and the said meet- APPENDIX  11.  171 
ing may be adjourned from day to day until its busi- 
ness is completed. 
Special meetings of  the holders of  Trust Certificates 
may be called by a majority of  all the Trustees at such 
tijne and place as they may appoint. 
Special meetings shall also be  called  by a  majority 
of  the Trustees whenever  requested  so  to do,  by  a 
request signed by the holders of  ten per cent, in value 
of  Trust Certificates. 
The  business  of  such  special  meetings  shall  be 
confined  to  the objects  specified  in the notice  given 
theref or. 
Notice  of  the time  and  place  of  all  meetings  of 
owners of  Trust Certificates shall be given by personal 
notice  as far as possible, and shall also be advertised 
in one of  the principal newspapers, published  in each 
State in which a Standard Oil Company exists, at least 
ten days previous to the time of  meeting. 
At  all meetings  the  owners  of  Trust Certificates, 
who  may  be  registered  as such on  the books  of  the 
Trustees, may vote  in person  or  by  proxy, and shall 
have one vote for each and every share of  Trust Cer- 
tificates standing in their names, but  no  such owner 
shall  be  entitled to vote upon  any share  which  has 
not  stood  in his  name  thirty days prior  to the day 
appointed for the election. 
The Transfer Rooks may be  closed  for thirty days 
immediately preceding the annual election. 
A majority of  -che shares  represented  at such  elec- 
tion shall elect. 
At all elections of  Trustees the Board  of  Trustees 172  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
shall be the judges of  the qualification of  voters; shall 
prescribe  rules  and  regulations  for  voting;  appoint 
Tellers  to  direct  aad count  the votes  and cause  the 
result  of  the election  to be  entered  in full on their 
minutes. 
The. Trustees  ]nay  commit  their  powers  in  this 
matter. to a  Committee  of  their own  members. 
The  election  shall be  held  on the  day designated 
for  that  pnrpose,  unless  prevented  by  accident,  in 
which case the Trustees shall designate another  day 
for  the electioa. 
ARTICLE  11. 
BOARD  OF  TRUSTEES. 
The Board  of  Trustees at their first meeting  after 
their annual election  shall elect  by ballot  from their 
own  number  a  President,  Vice-President,  Treasurer 
and Secretary, and such officers shall hold their offices 
during  the  pleasure  of  the Board.  Whenever  a  va- 
cancy  occurs  in  the  Board  of  Trustees  more  than 
sixty days prior to the annual meeting for the election 
of  Trustees,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  reinaining 
Trustees to call a meeting of  the holders of  the Trust 
Certificates  for  the purpose  of  electing  a Trustee or 
Trustees to fill the vacancy or vacancies. 
If  any vacancy  occurs  in the  Board  of  Trustees 
from  any cause within  sixty days of  the date of  the 
annual meeting for the election  of  Trustees,  the va- 
cancy  may  be  filled by  a  majority  of  the remaining 
Trustees, or at their option  may remain vacant until 
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The Board may also appoint an Assistant Treasurer, 
Assistant Secretary, Auditor and such  additional  offi- 
cers, agents, executive and other conlmittees as it may 
deem advisable and remove the same at its pleasure. 
In the absence of  the President and Vice-President, 
the  Board  may  appoint  a  Chairman  pro  tempore; 
during a prolonged  absence  or inability of  the Presi- 
dent  or  any  other  officer,  the  Board  may  appoint 
substitutes p~o  te~npore,  and on the death or resigna- 
tion of  the President or other officers, it shall fill  the 
vacancy. 
A  majority  of  the Trustees  shall be  required  to 
constitute  a  quorum  for the transaction  of  business, 
but  less  than a  quorum  may  adjourn  from  time to 
time  and from place  to place. 
Regular meetings of  the Board .of  Trustees shall be 
held  on the first Wednesday of  January, April, July 
and October  of  each year, unless the same  shall be a 
legal holiday, in which event the meeting shall be held 
on the day following. 
ARTICLE  111. 
THE PRESIDENT. 
The President shall preside at all meetings  of  the 
owners  of  Trust  Certificates  or  Trustees  if  present; 
appoint  or  remove  all officers and agents other  than 
those  elected by  the owners  of  Trust Certificates or 
the Board of  Trustees; call meetings of  the Board of 
Trustees, when requested by a majority  of  the Trus- 
tees in wrj  ting ; sign all certificates of  shares, and have 
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of  the Trust.  He shall have power t,o call meetings of 
the  Board  from  time  to time  when  he  shall  think 
proper;  to sign  certificates  of  shares  in  blank  and 
leave them with the Treasurer in sufficient numbers to 
provide for the prompt transfer of  shares. 
In the event  of  the death, absence  or  inability  of 
the President to perform the duties imposed upon him 
by these by-lams and the orders of  the Board of  Trus- 
tees, the Vice-President  may exercise  his powers and 
perform his duties, subject to the control of  the Board 
of  Trustees or Executive Committee. 
ARTICLE  IV. 
THE  SECRETARY. 
It shall be  the duty of  the Secretary to notify the 
members thereof of  all meetings of  the Hoard of  Trus- 
tees, when required by the President or by a majority 
of  the Trustees in writing;  to attend such meetings 
when  practicable;  keep  true  records  of  the proceed- 
ings; attest such  records  after meeting, by his signa-  . 
ture;  safely  keep  all  documents  and  papers  which 
shall  come  into  his  possession  and truly  keep  the 
books  and accounts of  the Trnst  appertaining  to his 
office, so as at all times to show the real condition of 
the Trust affairs, and shall present  statements thereof 
when required by the Board.  He shall keep books in 
which transfers of  shares may be  made by any owner 
of  Trust Certificates or  his Attorney  duly constituted 
in writing; also a share Ledger and Certificate Book; 
prepare  new  certificates upon  the transfer  of  shares 
and surrender of  the old certificates, and keep a regis- 
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On the day of  the annual election the Secretary shall 
furnish for the use  of  the inspectors  an alphabetical 
list of  the names of  all the owners of  Trust Certificates 
who shall have been registered as such for thirty days 
prior to said election.  The Assistant Secretary shall 
perform such of  the duties of  the Secretary as may be 
required of  him by the Board of  Trustees. 
ARTICLE  V. 
TREASURER. 
It shall be  the duty of  the Treasurer to keep  and 
account  for  all  moneys,  funds,  and  property  of  the 
Trust which  shall come into his hands,  and he shall 
render such accounts and present  such statements to 
the Trustees and Executive Committee  as niay be re- 
quired of  him. 
Disbursemeilts  shall only  be  made  by  him  under 
resol~tions  of  the Board of  Trustees, or by the Execu- 
tive  Committee,  or  upon  vouchers  approved by  the 
proper officers. 
He shall sign certificates  of  shares when presented 
to  him  after  they  shall  have  been  signed  by  the 
President. 
The ilssistant Treasurer shall perform  such of  the 
duties of  Treasurer as may be  required  of  him by the 
Board of  Trustees. 
ARTICLE  VI. 
EXECUTIVE  COMDIITTEE. 
The Executive Committee shall possess and exercise 
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duties of  the Board  of  Trustees,  but  only  when  the 
Board shall not be in session.  They shall keep a rec- 
ord of  all their proceedings, which shall be certified by 
the Secretary under  his  hand, which  record  shall be 
read at the next eilsuiilg illeetii~g  of  the Board of  Trus- 
tees.  The Secretary shall call ir~eetings  of  this Coin- 
mittee on the requisition of  the President of  the Board 
or of  any of  its members. 
ARTICLE  VII. 
The fiscal year of  this Trust shall be  the calendar 
year. 
ARTICLE  VIII. 
These by-laws may be  altered, amended  or repealed 
at any meeting of  the owners of  Trust Certificates by 
a vote  of  majority  in value  of  all the owners repre- 
sented, provided, however, that all by-laws relative to 
fornlal meetings and formal duties of  the Trustees and 
OEcers may be altered by the Board of  Trustees. APPENDIX  111. 
APPENDIX  111. 
STATUT  DER  DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN 
PETROLEUM-GESELLSCHAFT. 
I.  ALLGEMEINE  BESTIMMUNGEN. 
5 1. 
Die  Deutsch-Amerikanische  Petroleum-Gesellschaft 
bezweckt den Betrieb von Petroleumhandel. 
Zum Gesch~ftsbetrieb  der Gesellschaft  gehiiren ins- 
besondere : 
1.  der Erwerb, die Bebauung oder sonstige Einrich- 
tung von Grundstucken fur die Zwecke der Gesellschaft 
im In- und Auslande, 
2.  der Erwerb von Schiffen, Eisenbahnwaggons, und 
sonstiger  Betriebsmittel  fiir  die  Zwecke  der  Gesell- 
schaft, 
3.  die  Be- und  Verfrachtung  der  der  Gesellschaft 
gehiirigen  Schiffe, die  Charterung  und Verchafterung 
von fremden Schiffen, 
4.  der Kauf und Verkauf von rohem Petroleum und 
samtlichen  daraus  zu  gewinnenden  Produkten,  ins- 
besondere  von  raffiniertem  Petroleum,  sowie  der 
Handel mit Waren Bhnlicher Art, 
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5.  der  Betrieb  von  Kommissionsgeschaften  jeder 
Art, 
6.  der Betrieb von Geschaften, sowie die Beteiligung 
an Unternehmungen, welche nach  dem  Ermessen von 
Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat  mit  dern  Unternehmen  in 
Verbindung stehen oder den Zwecken desselben forder- 
lich sind. 
Die  Aktiengesellschaft hat  ihren  Sitz  in Bremen. 
Die Errichtung von Zweigniederlassungen ist zulassig. 
Die Dauer des Unternehmens ist unbestimmt. 
Laut Vertrag  vom  22.  Februar  1890  erwirbt  die 
Aktiengesellschaft von den Herren Wilhelm A. Riede- 
mann in Geestemiinde, Franz Ernst Schutte und  Carl 
Schutte in Bremen die in den, dem Vertrage angefiigten 
Specifikationen aufgefuhrten Aktiven zu dem Gesamt- 
preise  von 5,000,000 Mark,  der  durch Barzahlung in 
Hijhe  von  3,000,000  Mark  und  durch ubergabe  von 
Aktien  der  Gesellschaft  im  Nominalbetrage  von 
2,000,000  Mark, welche  fur  voll  eingezahlt  gelten, 
beglichen wird. 
Alle  namens  der  Gesellschaft  zu  erlassenden  Be- 
kannkmachungen  erfolgen  durch einmalige Vercffent- 
lichung im Deutschen Reichsanzeigea APPENDIX  III.  179 
11. GRUNDKAPITAL, AKTIEN. 
5  5. 
Das Grundkapital der Gesellschaft betragt 9,000,000 
Mark;  eingeteilt  in  9000  auf  den Namen  lautende 
Aktien  1000 Mark. 
Die  Aktien werden  mit  genauer  Kezeichnung  des 
Inhabers nach  Namen,  Wohnort  und  Stand  in  das 
Aktienbuch der  Gesellschaft  eingetragen.  Im  Ver- 
h~ltnis  zu der Gesellschaft sind nur diejenigen Inhaber 
von  Aktien  zur  Ausiibung  ihrer  Rechte  legitimiert, 
welche im Aktienbuche verzeichnet sind.  1st eine auf 
den Namen  lautende  Aktie  auf  einen  anderen  iiber- 
tragen, so ist dies unter Vorlegung  der Aktie und  des 
Nachweises des ~berganges  bei der Gesellschaft anzu- 
nlelden und im Aktienbuche einzutragen. 
Vor  dem 31.  Marz  1905 ist eine  Obertragung von 
Aktien der Ges6llschaft gegenuber nur rechtsmirksain, 
wenn  die ~bertragung  von  dern Vorstande und  dem 
Aufsichtsrate genehmigt ist. 
5  6. 
Soweit die Aktien nicht laut 8 3 dieses Statutes den 
Herren Wilhelm A. Riedemann, Franz Err&  Schiitte 
und  Carl  Schutte als Gegenleistung fiir iibertragene 
Werte iibergeben sind, sind die Aktien von den  Griin- 
dern unter Einzahlung von 25 % drs Neiinwertes iiber- 
nommen.  Die Einzahlung des rLestbetra,ges erfolgt an 
den vom Vorstande festzusetzenden Terminen. §  7. 
Die Aktien werden unter  fortlaufenden  Rummern 
ausgefertigt  und  mit  der  faksimilierten  oder  eigen- 
handigen Unterschrift eines Mitgliedes des Vorstandes 
und eines Mitgliedes des Aufsichtsrates versehen. 
§  8. 
Die  Auszahlung  der Dividende erfolgt gegen  Aus- 
hsndigung  des  Dividcndenscheines.  Vorstand  und 
Aufsichstrat sind jedoch  berechtigt,  falls der Verlust 
eines  Dividendenscheines  ihnen  glaubhaft  gernacht 
wird, die Auszahlurig an denjenigen vorzunehinen,  auf 
dessen Name11 die Aktie in das Aktienbuch der Gesell- 
schaft eingetragen ist ; mit dieser Auszahlung erloschen 
alle Rechte aus dem Divide~ldenschein. 
Der Vorstand ist berechtigt, neue  Serien von Divi- 
dendenseheinen an denjenigen auszugeben, auf  dessen 
Nan~en  die Aktie eingetragen ist, men?  der  zur  Erhe- 
bung bestinlmte Talon nicht bis zum Falligkeitstermine 
des  zweiten  der  Dividendenscheine  der  neuen  Serie 
eingereicht worden  ist ; mit  dieser  Ausgabe  verliert 
der nicht eingereichte Talon seine Giiltigkeit. 
Kin offentliches Angebot und eine Kraftloserklarung 
von Dividendenscheinen  und  !Ca!ana,  abgesondert von 
den Aktien, zu denen sie gehoren, Sndet nicht statt. 
111.  ORGANE  DER  GESELLSCHAFT. 
§  9. 
Organe der Gesellschaft sind : 
a.  der Vorstand, 
b.  der Aufsichtsrat, 
c.  die Generalversammlung. APPENDIX  111. 
5  10. 
Den ersten Vorstand bilden die Herren Wilhelm A. 
Riedernann,  Pranz Ernst Schutte und  Carl  Schiitte. 
Die Generalversainmlung ist berechtigt, eine Erhohung 
oder Verringerung  der  Zahl  der  Vorstandsmitglieder 
zu beschliessen. 
Die Neuwahl von Vorstandsmitgliedern erfolgt auf 
Vorschlag des Vorstandes durch die  Generalversamm- 
lung;  sind  keine  Vorstandsmitglieder  in1  Amte,  so 
erfolgt die Neuwahl auf  Vorschlag des Aafsichtsrates. 
Eine  Vertretung  von  Vorstandsmitgliedern  durch 
Mitglieder des Aufsiclltsrates findet nicht statt. 
Die  Restellung  eines  Vorstandsmitgliedes  ist  nur 
durch  Beschluss  der  Generalversammlung  wider- 
ruflich. 
§  11. 
Willenserklarungen  des Vorstandes  bediirfen,  um 
fur die Gesellschaft verbindlich zu sein, der Mit-tvirk- 
ung zweier ~orstandsrnit~likder,  wenn es sich handelt 
um  Ankauf,  Verpfandung  oder  Verausserung  von 
Grundsti~cken  und  Schiffen,  urn  Vertrage,  welche 
die Gesellschaft auf  18nger als ein  Jahr verpflichten, 
urn  Aufnahme  von  Anliehen,  urn  Errichtung  oder 
Auflosung von Z-tveigniederlassungen, nm  Beteiligung 
an dritten Unternehinungen oder den Erwerb  solcher, 
urn  Restellungen von I'rokuristen  und  Generalbevoll- 
machtigten;  in allen anderen Fallen  sind TTTilleaser- 
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lich,  wenn  dieselbell von  einem  Vorstandsmitgliede 
abgegeben werden. 
Der  Vorstand  bedarf  der  Genehmiemg  des  Auf- 
sichtsrates : 
1.  zum Erwerb, zur Verpfandung und Ver2usserung 
von Grundstiickell und Schiffen, 
2.  zu  Neubauten  und banlichen  und  maschinellen 
Anderungen,  sofern  die  Kosten  einen  Betrag  von 
100,000 Mark iibersteigen, 
3.  zur Aufnahme von Anliehen, 
4.  zur Errichtung oder Aufliisung von  Zweignieder- 
lassungen, 
6.  zur Bestellung eines Yrokuristen, 
6.  zur Beteiligung an dritten Unternehmen. 
Der  Vorstand .sol1  das  Recht  haben,  mit  Geneh- 
migung  des Aufsichtsrats  Genussscheine  auszugeben, 
welche  zn  einem  Anteil  an dem  Gewinn  und  dem 
Vermogen  der  Gesellschaft  in  Gemassheit  naherer 
Bestiminungen  berechtigen  sollen,  welche  von  dem 
Vorstand und dem Aufsichstrat festzustellen sind. 
Der Aufsichtsrat besteht nach naherer  Bestimmung 
der Generalversammlung aus drei bis sieben Mitglied- 
ern, welche von der Generalversammlung  in geheimer 
Abstimmung mit absoluter Majoritat  gewahlt werden. 
Bei  Stimmengleichheit  entscheidet  das  Los.  Eine 184  INDUSTRIAL  COMBINATIONS. 
Der Vorsitzer ist berechtigt, Beschlussfassungen des 
Anfsichtsrat  auf  schriftlichem Wege  herbeizufiihren, 
falls nicht von  seiten eines Mitgliedes  des Aufsichts- 
rates TViderspruch dagegen erhoben wird. 
Zur Giiltigkeit eines auf diese Weise herbeigefiihrten 
Beschlusses  ist  Zustimmung der  Mehrheit  der  Mib 
glieder des Aufsichtsrates erforderlich. 
$  17. 
Der Aufsichtsrat ist beschlussf%hig,  falls wenigstens 
drei seiner Mitglieder anwesend sind.  Den Vorsitz in 
den Versammlungen  des Aufsichtsrats  fiihrt der Vor- 
sitzer oder  dessen  Stellvertreter, oder, fall3 beide  am 
Erscheinen  verhindert  sind, ein von  eine~n  derselben 
beauftragtes Xitglied des Aufsichtsrats. 
Die Beschliisse werden mit absoluter Stimmenmehr- 
heit  gefasst,  bei  Stimmengleichheit  entscheidet  die 
Stimme des Vorsitzenden  der betreffenden  Versamm- 
lung. 
Die gefassten Beschliisse sind in ein Protokollbuch 
einzutragen und von dem Vorsitzenden der betreffenden 
Versammlung zu unterzeichnen. 
$  18. 
Ausfertigungen  und  Bekanntmachungen  des  Auf- 
sichtsrats werden namens desselben von dem Vorsitzer 
oder dessen Stellvertreter erlassen. 
$  19. 
Der Aufsichtsrat ist berechtigt, die Wahrnehmungen 
ihm obliegender Geschafte, insbesondere  die Einsicht APPENDIX  111.  1% 
der Biicher und Schriften der Gesellschaft  einem oder 
mehreren seiner Mitglieder  dauernd  oder  voruberge- 
bend zu iibertragen, soweit eine derartige ubertragung 
gesetzlich zuliissig ist. 
8  20. 
Die  Mitglieder  des Aufsichtsrats  erhalten fur ihre 
Thatigkeit keine Vergiltung, jedoch  Ersatz barer Aus- 
lagen. 
Die Generalversammlung  werden von dem Vorstande 
berufen und finden in Bremen statt. 
Eine  Versainmlung  ist  ordnungsm&ssig  herufer,, 
wenn die Einladung zu derselben wenigstens eiilen &lo- 
nat vor dem fur die Generalversamn~lung  bestiminten 
Tage im  Deutschen Reichsanzeiger veroffentlicht  ist, 
und wenn die Mitglieder  des Aufsichtsrates  zu  dieser 
Versanlinlung geladen  sind.  Zum  nachweis,  dass ein 
Mitglied  des Aufsichtsrates  ordnnngsmassig  geladen 
ist, geniigt die von der Postanstalt  erteilte  Bescheini- 
gnng, dass wenigstens einen Monat vor Abhaltung der 
Generalversammlung ein eingeschriebener Hrief an das 
betreffende Mitglied  des Aufsichtsrats abgesandt ist. 
§  22. 
Jede  in  das Aktienbuch der Gesellschaft eingetragene 
Aktie gewahrt eine Stimme ; die Vertret,ung abwesen- 
der  Aktioniire  ist  nur  durch  schriftliche  Vollmacht 
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Ohne besondere Vollmacht konnen vertreten werden: 
Handlungshauser oder Kommanditgesellschaftendurch 
einen  Geschaftsinhaber  oder  Yrokuristen,  Ehefrauen 
durch  ihre  Ehem%nner, Witwen  durch  einen  ihrer 
grossjahrigen Sohne, Minderjahrige  oder sonst  Bevor- 
mundete durch einen ihrer  Vormiinder  oder Pfleger, 
Korporationern,  Institute  und  Aktiengesellschaften 
durch'einen ihrer gesetzlichen Vertreter. 
§  23. 
Die ordentlichen Generalversammlungen finden all- 
jahrlich in der ersten Halfte des Geschaftsjahres statt. 
Ausserordentliche  Generalversammlungen  werden 
berufen, wenn  der Aufsichtsrat oder  der Vorstand eS 
fur erforderlich erachtet. 
$  24. 
Ein Mitglied des Vorstandes oder  des Aufsichtsrats 
fiihrt  den  Vorsitz.  ober die Versammlung  ist  ein 
gerichtliches oder notarielles Protokoll aufzunehmen. 
25. 
Gegenstande der ordentlichen  Generalversammlung 
sind : 
1.  Entgegennahme der Rechnung und  des Berichts 
des letzten Geschaftsjahres. 
2.  Beschlussfassung uber die Gewinnverteilung. 
3.  Wahlen fur den Aufsichtsrat. 
4.  Beschlussfassung  iiber  etwa  sonst gestellte An- 
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Die Generalversammlnng ist berechtigt, zur Priifung 
der  Bilanz- und  der  Gewinn-  und  Verlustrechnung 
Revisoren zu ernennen.  Die Wahl erfolgt in geheimer 
Abstimmung mit absoluter Stimmenmehrheit. 
Beschliisse  der  Generalversammlung  werden  mit 
absolnter  Stimmenmehrheit  gefasst ; iiber  die  nach- 
stehenden Gegenstande kann ein Heschluss nur gefasst 
werden,  wenn  drr Antrag vom Aufsichtsrate  gestellt 
ist, und fur die Annahme desselben dreiviertel  des in 
der  Generalversamlnlung  vertretenen  Grundkapitals 
sich erklart : 
1.  Abanderung und Erganzung des Statuts ; 
2.  Vergrosserung  des  Grundkapitals  bezw.  eine 
Herabsetzung oder teilweise Zuruckzahlung desselben; 
3.  Vereinigung  der Gesellschaft  mit einer  anderen 
oder Auflosung derselben. 
Ausserdem ist eine Mehrheit von dreiviertel Stiinmen 
des in einer  Generalversammlung vertretenen Aktien- 
Kapitals in allen Fallen erforderlich,  wo  das Gesetz 
sie verlangt. 
Jabresrechnung, Bilanz und die Vorschlage zur  Ge 
winnverteilnng  gelten  als genehmigt, wenn  die  Gen- 
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IV.  GESCH~SJAHR,  BILANZ,  REINGEWINN- 
VERTEILUNG. 
Q  28. 
Das  Gesch&ftsjalir ist das Kalenderjahr, das erste 
Geschsftsjahr lauft bis zum 31. Uezeinber 1890. 
Auf  den 31.  Uezer~lber  eines jeden Jahres muss vom 
Vorstande  die  Itechn~ulg  abgesclilossen  und  sodann 
binnen drei Monaten eine  Kilanz  riebst  Inventar, eine 
Gewinn-  und  Verlustrechnung,  sowie  ein  den  Ver- 
mogensstand  und  die  Verhaltnisse  der  Gesellschaft 
darlegender Hericht  dern Aufsichtsrate  zur  Genehmi- 
gun,- eingereicht  ~{erden. 
Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat sind berechtigt, die Vor- 
nahme  ausserordentlicher  i2bschreibungen,  son-ie die 
Hildung von  Specialreserven  gemeinschaftlich  zu  be- 
schliessen. 
Q  29. 
Die  Vorlagen  sind von  dem  Vorstande  nebst  den 
Bemerkungen des Aufsichtsrats in dem Geschaftsloliale 
der Gesellschaft  auszulegen, und werden  sodann  der 
Generalversammlung vorgelegt. 
Der  bilanzm8ssige  Reingewinn  wird  wie  folgt 
verteilt : 
1.  5  %  an  den  gesetzlichen  Reservefonds,  bis 
clerselbe die gesetzliche Hohe erreicht hat, APPENDIX  III.  189 
2.  der  Rest  soll,  insofern  der  Vorstand  und  der 
Aufsichtsrat  nicht  dessen Verwendung zu  besonderen 
Reserven heschliessen, als Dividende unter den Alitic~ 
naren und Inhabern von Genussscheinen zur Verteilung 
gelangen. 
§  31. 
Der Vorstand  ist ernlachtigt, mit Zustimmung des 
Aufsichtsrats  alle  ~nclerun~en  und  Zusatze  der  Sta 
tuten  illit verbindlicher  Kraft fur alle  Aktionare  zu 
beschliessen, welche zum Zwecke  der  Eintragung .der 
Gesellschaft in das Firmenregister voln Registerrichter 
verlangt werden sollten. 